Friends Of Great Salt Lake v. Utah Dep't Of Natural Res., 20080147

• Decision Date: 30 March 2010
• Docket Number: No. 20080147,20080155.,20080147
• Citation: 230 P.3d 1014,2010 UT 20
• Parties: FRIENDS OF GREAT SALT LAKE; Utah Waterfowl Association; National Audubon Society; Audubon Society of Utah, including Bridgerland Audubon Society; Great Salt Lake Audubon Society; Red Cliffs Audubon Society; Wasatch Audubon Society; Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club; League of Women Voters of Salt Lake; League of Women Voters of Utah; Utah Airboat Association and Utah Rivers Counsel, Petitioners,v.UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, an agency of the State of Utah; Executive Director of the Utah Department of Natural Resources, in his official capacity, Utah Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands, an agency of the State of Utah, and Director of the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands, in his official capacity, Respondents,Great Salt Lake Minerals, Intervenor.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

230 P.3d 1014

2010 UT 20

FRIENDS OF GREAT SALT LAKE; Utah Waterfowl Association; National Audubon Society; Audubon Society of Utah, including Bridgerland Audubon Society; Great Salt Lake Audubon Society; Red Cliffs Audubon Society; Wasatch Audubon Society; Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club; League of Women Voters of Salt Lake; League of Women Voters of Utah; Utah Airboat Association and Utah Rivers Counsel, Petitioners,v. UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, an agency of the State of Utah; Executive Director of the Utah Department of Natural Resources, in his official capacity, Utah Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands, an agency of the State of Utah, and Director of the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands, in his official capacity, Respondents,Great Salt Lake Minerals, Intervenor.

Nos. 20080147, 20080155.

Supreme Court of Utah.

March 30, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Joro Walker, Salt Lake City, for petitioners.

Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Brent A. Burnett, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for respondents.

Steven J. Christiansen, Daniel A. Jensen, David C. Reymann, Cheylynn Hayman, Salt Lake City, for intervenor.

PARRISH, Justice:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 Petitioners, Friends of Great Salt Lake (“Friends”), ask us to review the Final Agency Action, Decision and Orders (the “Order”) issued jointly by the executive director (“Executive Director”) of the Utah Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”) and the director of the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands (the “Division”), which rejected Friends' Petition for Declaratory Order, Petition for Consistency Review, and Request for Agency Action (collectively the “Petitions”). Friends seek review of the Division's decision to lease 23,088 acres of the area of the Great Salt Lake known as Clyman Bay to the Great Salt Lake Minerals Corporation (“Mineral Company”) and to allow the Mineral Company to expand its use of already-leased areas in Clyman Bay and Bear River Bay. Because the Order did not issue from a formal proceeding, we lack jurisdiction to consider Friends' claims. Therefore, we dismiss.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Mineral Company currently operates a large mineral extraction enterprise around the Great Salt Lake. In February 2007, pursuant to the Great Salt Lake Mineral Leasing Plan (the “MLP”),¹ Mineral Company nominated for lease an additional 23,088 acres of land located in the bed of the Great Salt Lake near Clyman Bay. Mineral Company also notified the Division of its intent to build a series of dykes and evaporation ponds on previously undeveloped areas of leases it holds in Clyman Bay and Bear River Bay.

¶ 3 Mineral Company's nomination of the Great Salt Lake sovereign land triggered the Division's obligation to conduct site-specific planning under Utah Administrative Code rule 652-90-300.² Accordingly, the Division notified the Utah Resources Development Coordinating Committee (the “RDCC”),³ which informed various members of the public of the nomination of the additional lands and solicited input about whether additional stipulations or restrictions should be placed on the leasing of those lands. See Utah Admin. Code r. 652-90-400(1)(d) (2008). During the RDCC process, Friends submitted comments opposing the lease proposal on the grounds that the Division did not adequately investigate nor properly analyze the environmental impact of the leases on the public trust values. The Division responded to Friends' comments and ultimately chose to nominate the lands for lease. Mineral Company then submitted an application for lease, which was accepted in a Record of Decision (“ROD”) issued by the Division on July 2, 2007. The ROD encompasses both the results of the site-specific planning process and the decision to lease the Clyman Bay lands to Mineral Company.

¶ 4 Friends responded by filing the Petitions to challenge the ROD. The Petitions all allege basically the same misconduct: that the Division failed to comply with the public-trust doctrine when it issued the new Clyman Bay lease and when it considered the expansion of Mineral Company's mineral-extraction enterprise in Clyman Bay and Bear River Bay. As a remedy, each of the Petitions requested that the Division be required to use a more stringent formulation of the public-trust analysis, undertake a more detailed site-specific analysis, and correct its deficiencies in its public-trust and management-planning efforts.

¶ 5 The Division and Executive Director gathered additional information and then dismissed the Petitions on legal grounds without holding a hearing. They found that Friends were not a party to the adjudication that awarded the mineral leases to Mineral Company and thus could not bring a Petition for Consistency Review, that the Petition for Declaratory Order was not allowed because it was based on disputed facts and would substantially prejudice Mineral Company's rights, and that requests for agency action could not challenge the rights between two other parties.

¶ 6 Friends filed an appeal from the agency action with the district court and with this court, and filed an additional Petition for Extraordinary Relief with this court in the event that we hold that the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (the “UAPA”) provides no avenue for Friends to appeal the ROD. In April 2008, we granted intervenor status to Mineral Company, and all of the Respondents moved to dismiss Friends' appeal to this court on jurisdictional grounds, arguing that because Friends did not appeal a final order from a formal agency adjudication this court did not have jurisdiction to consider their petition. We agree and therefore dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction.

ANALYSIS

¶ 7 We first decide whether we have jurisdiction to hear Friends' appeal from the denial of the Petitions or whether jurisdiction properly lies in the district court. We then determine whether Friends' petition to this court for extraordinary relief gives us jurisdiction to consider the merits of their claims.

I. THE SUPREME COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO HEAR FRIENDS' APPEAL FROM AN INFORMAL AGENCY PROCEEDING

¶ 8 We must decide whether we have jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the Executive Director's decision to affirm the Division's denial of Friends' Petitions. We have jurisdiction over “final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with ... the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources reviewing actions of the Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands.” Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(e)(vi) (2008) (emphasis added). Thus, to find that we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal, we must find that the Order issued jointly by the Executive Director and the Division (1) was a final order or decree (2) resulting from a formal adjudication that (3) originated with the Executive Director reviewing a decision of the Division. There is no dispute that the Order was a final order. As a result, the arguments of the parties focus on (1) whether the proceeding originated with the Executive Director, and (2) whether the proceeding from which the Order issued was formal or informal.

A. The Order Issued Jointly by the Executive Director and the Division Originated With the Executive Director for Purposes of Jurisdiction

¶ 9 Friends argue that the Petitions originated with the Executive Director because the Order issued jointly from the Division and the Executive Director. In the alternative, Friends argue that at least their Petition for Consistency Review, which was specifically directed to the Executive Director, qualifies as originating with the Executive Director. Mineral Company contends that the origination argument is moot because the underlying proceeding was informal and therefore unreviewable by this court in any event. Mineral Company also argues that the Order originated with the Director of the Division who determined that the petition was complete and forwarded it to the Executive Director. Friends assert this argument to be invalid because such an interpretation of the statute would mean that the supreme court would never have jurisdiction over orders issued by the Executive Director because no order could ever “originate” with him. We agree with Friends.

¶ 10 We hold that any order issued by the Executive Director originates with him and is therefore subject to our jurisdiction so long as the proceeding from which the order issued was formal. See So. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bd. of State Lands & Forestry, 830 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1992). The Order at issue in this case clearly states that the Executive Director and the Division issued a joint opinion with regard to the Petitions and does not specify whether some of the Petitions were addressed by the Division as opposed to the Executive Director. We therefore conclude that the Order qualifies as one originating with the Executive Director.

B. The Formality of the Review Proceeding Is Determined by the Formality of the Underlying Proceeding

¶ 11 We now turn to the question of whether the underlying proceeding was formal or informal. We conclude that formality designations for agency proceedings apply only to original proceedings and not to the agency review of those proceedings. UAPA clearly designates all adjudications as formal unless otherwise specifically designated by agency rule. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-202(2). By Division rule all adjudicative proceedings are initially designated as informal. Utah Admin. Code R. 652-8-200 (2008). ⁴ But UAPA does not clearly state whether the appeal from an adjudicative proceeding constitutes a separate adjudicative proceeding to be designated as formal or informal, whether the appeal retains the character of the underlying proceeding, or whether it is neither formal nor informal, but merely a review proceeding whose formal or informal nature has no bearing on which court has jurisdiction. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-301. Rule 652-8-200 designates all requests for agency...