Friends of Oceano Dunes v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n

Decision Date20 April 2023
Docket Number2d Civil B320491
PartiesFRIENDS OF OCEANO DUNES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, Defendant; DEPARTMENT OF PARKS AND RECREATION, Defendant and Real Party in Interest; COUNTY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO, Real Party in Interest; NORTHERN CHUMASH TRIBAL COUNCIL et al., Movants and Appellants. ECOLOGIC PARTNERS et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION et al., Defendants; COUNTY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO, Real Party in Interest. FRIENDS OF OCEANO DUNES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, Defendant; DEPARTMENT OF PARKS AND RECREATION et al., Real Parties in Interest.
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Environmental Law Clinic University of California, Irvine School of Law and Michael Robinson-Dorn for Movants and Appellants.

Law Offices of Thomas D. Roth and Thomas D. Roth for Plaintiff and Respondent Friends of Oceano Dunes.

Gatzke Dillon & Ballance, David P. Hubbard and Kendall F. Teal for Plaintiffs and Respondents EcoLogic Partners and Specialty Equipment Market Association.

BALTODANO, J.

Three community stakeholders moved to intervene in several lawsuits challenging the authority of the California Coastal Commission (Commission) to ban all off-highway vehicle (OHV) use at Oceano Dunes State Vehicular Recreation Area (Oceano Dunes). The trial court denied the motion on the ground that the stakeholders' interests are adequately represented in the litigation.

We conclude that where a nonparty has interests in the outcome of a civil action that are identical to those of a party to the action, the nonparty must make a compelling showing of inadequate representation to be permitted to intervene as of right.

The Northern Chumash Tribal Council, Oceano Beach Community Association, and Center for Biological Diversity (collectively, Appellants) appeal from the order denying their motion to intervene in four petitions for writ of mandate that Friends of Oceano Dunes, EcoLogic Partners, and Specialty Equipment Market Association (collectively Respondents) filed against the Commission and the Department of Parks and Recreation (Department) (collectively, the State defendants). Appellants contend the trial court erred when it: (1) denied them leave to intervene as of right, (2) denied their request for permissive intervention, and (3) sustained Respondents' evidentiary objections. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY[1]

The Department established what is now known as Oceano Dunes in 1974. OHVs have operated at the park since its founding. Since 1982, the vehicles have operated subject to a coastal development permit (CDP) issued by the Commission. The CDP has been amended several times over the years to limit access to and protect culturally and environmentally significant areas of Oceano Dunes.

In March 2021, the Commission amended the CDP to phase out the use of OHVs at Oceano Dunes over three years, restrict beach driving and camping to the north end of the park, and close one park entrance. Respondents challenged these amendments in a series of petitions for writ of mandate, alleging the Commission had no authority to adopt them. Alternatively, they alleged that the State defendants violated the California Coastal Act of 1976 (Pub. Resources Code, § 30000 et seq.; Coastal Act) and California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.; CEQA) when doing so.

Respondents subsequently entered into a stipulation with the Department and the County of San Luis Obispo (a real party in interest) to stay implementation of specified CDP amendments pending the outcome of their lawsuits. The Commission did not oppose the stipulation, and the trial court entered an order approving it in December 2021.

Two months later, Appellants moved to intervene in Respondents' lawsuits against the State defendants. The State defendants did not oppose Appellants' motion, but Respondents did. Respondents also objected to evidence Appellants attached to their reply brief.

The trial court denied Appellants' motion to intervene as of right, concluding that they have the "same ultimate objective [s]" as the State defendants, objectives the State defendants will adequately protect: First, Appellants do not intend to raise any new legal arguments in the litigation or present any additional evidence. Nor do they claim that the State defendants will "take an undesirable legal position" or otherwise fail to "vigorously defend the [CDP] amendment." Second, the amendment "completely addresses and protects all of [Appellants'] claimed interests . . . over any and all competing interests," and there is no indication the State defendants might be "considering a scaled-back amendment at odds" with those interests. Third, Appellants have no "special expertise" concerning the Commission's authority to amend the CDP or the procedures employed when doing so, the sole issues raised in Respondents' writ petitions.

The trial court also denied Appellants' motion for permissive intervention, finding that Appellants' reasons for intervention are "outweighed by the rights of the original parties to conduct their lawsuit on their own terms."

Finally, the trial court sustained Respondents' objection to admitting into evidence a copy of the December 2021 stipulation and order staying portions of the CDP amendment. Appellants offered the stipulation for the first time with their reply brief, affording Respondents no opportunity to respond. The proffered evidence also lacked foundation because it was neither part of a request for judicial notice nor attached to a declaration from counsel.

DISCUSSION

Intervention as of right

Appellants first contend they have the right to intervene in Respondents' lawsuits because the State defendants cannot and will not adequately protect their interests. State and federal cases are unsettled as to whether the denial of a motion for intervention as of right is reviewed de novo or for abuse of discretion. (Crestwood Behavioral Health Inc. v. Lacy (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 560, 573-574.) We do not weigh in on the standard-of-review debate here because there was no error under either standard.

A nonparty has the right to intervene in a civil action if they: (1) file a timely application, (2) have "an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action," (3) are "so situated that the disposition of the action may impair or impede [their] ability to protect that interest," and (4) show that their interest is not "adequately represented by one or more of the existing parties." (Code Civ. Proc.,[2] § 387, subd. (d)(1)(B).) Only the fourth of these elements is at issue here. We "take guidance from federal law" when evaluating whether it has been met (Edwards v. Heartland Payment Systems, Inc. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 725, 732), and"' "are guided primarily by practical and equitable considerations" '" (Callahan v. Brookdale Senior Living Communities, Inc. (9th Cir. 2022) 42 F.4th 1013, 1020 (Callahan)). We" 'liberally construe []'" it (City of Malibu v. California Coastal Com. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 897, 902), resolving "[a]ny doubt as to whether the existing parties will adequately represent the [nonparty's interest] . . . in favor of intervention" (California Dump Truck Owners Assn v. Nichols (E.D.Cal. 2011) 275 F.R.D. 303, 307 (California Dump Truck)).

Three factors determine whether a party will adequately represent a nonparty's interest: "(1) whether the interest of a present party is such that it will undoubtedly make all of [the nonparty's] arguments[,] (2) whether the present party is capable and willing to make such arguments[,] and (3) whether [the nonparty] would offer any necessary elements to the proceeding that other parties would neglect." (Callahan, supra, 42 F.4th at p. 1020.) Generally, the burden of satisfying this test is "minimal"; it can be satisfied if the nonparty "shows that representation of [their] interest 'may be' inadequate." (Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of America (1972) 404 U.S. 528, 538, fn. 10.) If the nonparty's "interest is 'identical to that of one of the present parties,'" however," 'a compelling showing [is] required to demonstrate inadequate representation.'" (Callahan, at pp. 1020-1021.)

Here, Appellants' interest in this litigation is identical to that of the State defendants: They, like the State defendants, assert that the Commission had the authority to amend the CDP and that the amendment process complied with both the Coastal Act and CEQA. And if the CDP amendment takes effect, the Commission's decision to ban OHVs at Oceano Dunes will completely protect Appellants' concerns about negative impacts on the environment, local citizens, and the Northern Chumash. (Cf. Callahan, supra, 42 F.4th at p. 1021 [interests identical where party and nonparty seek the same litigation outcome].) Appellants are thus required to make a compelling showing that the State defendants' representation will be inadequate.

Appellants maintain that they need not make such a showing because they have different interests than the State defendants: The State defendants are" 'public agenc[ies] that must balance relevant environmental and health interests with competing resource constraints and the interests of various constituencies,'" while they "are 'not required to balance any economic impact against [their] own considerations pertaining to health and environmental protections.'" (Citing California Dump Truck, supra, 275 F.R.D. at p. 308.) But here the State defendants are not balancing anything: The issues in this litigation do not center on...

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