Friends of Tower Hill Park v. Foxfire Props., LLC
| Decision Date | 02 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | A19-1111 |
| Parties | Friends of Tower Hill Park, Appellant, v. Foxfire Properties, LLC, et al., Respondents, Vermilion Enterprises, LLC, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).
Affirmed
Hennepin County District Court
Erik F. Hansen, Elizabeth M. Cadem, Martin C. Melang, Burns & Hansen, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
Joseph J. Christensen, Kenneth J. Smith, Christensen & Laue, P.A., Edina, Minnesota (for respondents Foxfire Properties, LLC, et al.)
Howard R. Roston, Emily A. Unger, Fredrikson & Byron, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondents Vermilion Enterprises, LLC, et al.)
Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Slieter, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant challenges the dismissal of its action under the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (MERA), Minn. Stat. §§ 116B.01-.13 (2018), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief regarding respondent-developers' planned construction project. Appellant argues that the district court erred by applying collateral estoppel based on prior municipal proceedings regarding the project. We affirm.
Respondents Vermilion Development and Vermilion Enterprises, LLC (collectively, Vermilion) plan to construct a 14-story mixed-use building (the project) on University Avenue in Minneapolis, approximately one-half block away from the Prospect Park Water Tower, which is commonly known as the Witch's Hat Tower. Appellant Friends of Tower Hill Park opposes the project, claiming it will impair views of and from the tower.
The Witch's Hat Tower was built in 1914 on the highest natural point in the Twin Cities. It was designed to serve the dual purposes of observation deck and water tower, though it has since ceased operation as a water tower. In 1997, the Witch's Hat Tower was placed on the National Register of Historic Places because of its association with the Twin Cities' early water system and its unique architecture.
In May 2018, Vermilion submitted a land-use application to the City of Minneapolis. Vermilion requested rezoning, a conditional-use permit, variances, and approval of the project's site plan and plat. The city's planning and economic developmentdepartment (CPED) considered public comments and prepared findings on each aspect of the application. In doing so, the CPED addressed the impact of the project on views of and from the Witch's Hat Tower:
The most significant landmark building affected by the proposed development is the Witch's Hat Tower in Tower Hill Park, located ½ block from the proposed site. The tower is a locally-designated historic landmark and is listed on the National Register of Historic Places. The applicant has provided documentation demonstrating the ways in which the proposed development would obscure views to the tower from the public realm. According to illustrations provided by the applicant the most impacted view of the tower that would be altered or obscured is along University Ave SE to the SE of the site. Modeling indicates that this view would be equally obscured by a 4-story building, a height which would be allowed by right [under existing zoning]. Significant views of public spaces and notable buildings would not be obstructed from the tower or from Tower Hill Park, most notably, the view of Downtown Minneapolis.
The CPED recommended approving the project. The city's planning commission adopted the CPED's findings and approved the project.
Trina Porte appealed the planning commission's decision, as did Eric Amel and Gayla Lindt, appellant's founding member and vice chair. Both appeals argued that the city needed to further analyze the project's impact on views from and of the Witch's Hat Tower and possibly reject the project because of that impact. After a public hearing, the city council substantially denied the appeals, adopting the CPED's findings and approving the project. The city council imposed several conditions to address concerns raised in the appeals, including two related to the Witch's Hat Tower: (1) Vermilion "shall work with the property owners of directly adjacent property to implement screening and othermeasures to reduce the visual impact of the [project]," and (2) Vermilion "shall confer with a historical consultant to identify and mitigate to the extent practical any potential impact on nearby historic properties, including the Witch's Hat water tower." None of the challengers appealed the land-use decision.
Approximately two weeks later, appellant filed a petition requesting that the city prepare an environmental assessment worksheet (EAW) for the project. The petition asserted that the project "will cause serious adverse environmental effects to the natural resources (including historic and esthetic resources) of Tower Hill Park and the Prospect Park Water Tower, as defined in [MERA]." The city denied the EAW petition. Appellant did not appeal that decision.
In December, appellant initiated this MERA action, seeking a declaration that "the Witch's Hat Tower and its viewshed are natural resources and cannot be impaired pursuant to MERA" and an injunction prohibiting Vermilion from proceeding with the project.1 Vermilion asserted collateral estoppel, pointing to the extensive public record of the city's proceedings, and moved to dismiss under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e). The district court granted the motion and dismissed the action. This appeal follows.
A district court may dismiss a complaint when the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e). On appeal, we considerde novo whether the complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief, taking the facts alleged in the complaint as true and drawing inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 606 (Minn. 2014). We also independently analyze statutory language, Caldas v. Affordable Granite & Stone, Inc., 820 N.W.2d 826, 836 (Minn. 2012), and whether collateral estoppel precludes litigation of a claim, Hauschildt v. Beckingham, 686 N.W.2d 829, 837 (Minn. 2004).
Collateral estoppel is a common-law doctrine that bars "relitigation of previously determined issues." State by Friends of the Riverfront v. Minneapolis, 751 N.W.2d 586, 589 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Sept. 23, 2008). The doctrine is based on the principle that "a right, question or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined . . . cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies." Hauschildt, 686 N.W.2d at 837 (quotation omitted). We do not apply the doctrine "rigidly" but consider the substance, procedural safeguards, and parties involved in the prior and current proceedings. Friends of the Riverfront, 751 N.W.2d at 589. "[O]ur focus is on whether the application would work an injustice." Id.
Appellant challenges the district court's determination that its MERA claim is barred by collateral estoppel, arguing that (1) MERA precludes application of the doctrine and (2) the city's land-use and EAW proceedings do not justify application of the doctrine.
Appellant principally argues that MERA itself precludes application of collateral estoppel based on a prior municipal proceeding because "[t]he broad language of Minn.Stat. § 116B.12 makes clear that, whatever remedies a plaintiff may pursue elsewhere, MERA claims are ultimately the province of the Minnesota Courts." This argument is unavailing for two reasons.
First, it is contrary to principles of statutory interpretation. "The goal of all statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature." Caldas, 820 N.W.2d at 836. Absent ambiguity, we discern legislative intent from the plain language. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lennartson, 872 N.W.2d 524, 529 (Minn. 2015). And unless that plain language expressly declares or necessarily implies an intent to abrogate the common law, we presume the statute is consistent with the common law. Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 314 (Minn. 2000); see also Urban v. Am. Legion Dep't of Minn., 723 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2006) ().
Nothing in the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 116B.12 indicates the legislature intended to abrogate collateral estoppel. The legislature enacted MERA in 1971 to establish a new private right of action, empowering citizens to obtain declaratory or injunctive relief to protect the state's "natural resources" from "pollution, impairment, or destruction." State by Schaller v. County of Blue Earth, 563 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn. 1997); see Minn. Stat. § 116B.03, subd. 1. In doing so, the legislature recognized that it was not writing on a blank slate: Minn. Stat. § 116B.12.
We are not persuaded that this provision precludes application of collateral estoppel based on administrative proceedings. It merely indicates that MERA is nonexclusive—MERA does not displace existing rights, and existing rights cannot substitute for the MERA right to protect natural resources from pollution, impairment, or destruction. If an administrative body fully and fairly considered a MERA claim, nothing in Minn. Stat. § 116B.12's terms bars application of collateral estoppel to preclude its relitigation.
Second, appellant's argument is contrary to existing caselaw. Our supreme court has expressly held that collateral...
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