Frierson v. U.S. Casualty Co.

• Decision Date: 09 March 1915
• Docket Number: 9022.
• Citation: 84 S.E. 535,100 S.C. 162
• Parties: FRIERSON v. UNITED STATES CASUALTY CO.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

84 S.E. 535

100 S.C. 162

FRIERSON v. UNITED STATES CASUALTY CO.

No. 9022.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

March 9, 1915

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Florence County; C.J Ramage, Special Judge.

Action by W. D. Frierson against the United States Casualty Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Willcox & Willcox, of Florence, for appellant.

Gasque & Page, of Florence, for respondent.

WATTS J.

This was an action by plaintiff against the defendant for recovery of $104.28 alleged to be due plaintiff under a policy of insurance issued on August 8, 1911, by the New Amsterdam Casualty Company, and subsequently assumed by the defendant. The cause was tried before Hon. C.J. Ramage, special judge and a jury, at the April term of court, 1914, for Florence county, and resulted in a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $84.28. After entry of judgment defendant appealed, and by two exceptions imputes error on the part of the trial judge in refusing to direct a verdict for the defendant, as moved for in trial of case, for the reason that the contract of insurance between the parties shows that, in order for the plaintiff to recover, he must have given written notice of his claim within ten days after the commencement of his illness, unless such notice should be shown not to have been "reasonably possible," when, according to all the evidence, including the plaintiff himself, such notice was not given. These exceptions narrow the appeal down to one point: Was it reasonably possible for such notice to have been given within the ten days provided for in the contract of insurance under which plaintiff seeks to recover in this action? The only evidence in the case is that introduced on part of plaintiff. The defendant offered none.

The judge could not direct a verdict if , from the evidence, more than one inference could be drawn. If the evidence was susceptible of more than one conclusion, then it became a question of fact for the jury to pass upon and determine. It was not the duty of the plaintiff to prove a strict compliance with the terms of the contract. If there was a breach subsequent which would go to defeat the liability of the insurer in case they are not complied with that is a matter of defense. For this principle see Pickett v. Insurance Co., 60 S.C. 485, 38 S.E. 163 629; Thompson Bros. v. Piedmont Insurance Co., 77 S.C. 294, 57 S.E. 848; Spann v. Ph nix...