Friesenhahn v. Ryan
| Decision Date | 16 January 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-1314,95-1314 |
| Parties | 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 261 Frederick FRIESENHAHN, Nancy Friesenhahn, and Todd Friesenhahn, Petitioners, v. Stephan G. RYAN and Sandra Ryan, individually and as natural parents of Sabrina A. Ryan, a minor deceased, and Stephen G. Ryan, as temporary administrator of the estate of Sabrina A. Ryan, deceased, Respondents. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Ross S. Crossland, Austin, for Petitioners.
Donald J. Mach, San Antonio, for Respondents.
We determine whether the trial court should have allowed the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their pleadings before the trial court rendered a take-nothing summary judgment against them. Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the trial court erred in rendering summary judgment. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Todd Friesenhahn, son of Nancy and Frederick Friesenhahn, held an open invitation party at his parents' property. Guests, many of whom were under the age of twenty-one, were encouraged to "bring your own bottle." Seventeen-year-old Sabrina Ryan attended the party and later died in a one-car accident after allegedly leaving the party in an intoxicated condition.
Sabrina's parents, Sandra and Stephen Ryan, in their individual capacities, and Stephen Ryan, as administrator of his daughter's estate, sued Todd, Nancy, and Frederick Friesenhahn for wrongful death, negligence, and gross negligence. The Ryans claimed that (1) Todd Friesenhahn and others acting in concert with him directly or indirectly made alcohol available to those attending the party; (2) the Friesenhahns were negligent in allowing the party to continue on their property when they knew that minors were possessing, exchanging, and consuming alcohol, and in directly or indirectly inviting Sabrina to the party; and (3) the Friesenhahns wrongfully allowed Sabrina to become intoxicated and drive in this condition.
The Friesenhahns filed special exceptions contending that no cause of action exists in Texas for social host liability. 1 On March 23, 1992, the trial court orally rendered an order that was signed on November 13, 1992, which (1) denied the special exceptions to the Ryans' individual claims, (2) granted the special exceptions to the cause of action brought on Sabrina's behalf and struck those pleadings, and (3) allowed the Ryans to file a motion for leave to amend their pleadings to state a cause of action on Sabrina's behalf, but restricted the time for doing so to a period not sooner than twenty-five days before trial, and not later than eight days before trial.
The docket sheet reveals that there had been a trial setting of November 16, 1992. However, another notation in the docket sheet seems to indicate that the November 16, 1992 trial setting had been dropped. In any event, under the trial court's order, the Ryans could not file an amended petition on Sabrina's behalf before October 22, 1992.
Before the Ryans had an opportunity to amend Sabrina's claims, the Friesenhahns moved for summary judgment claiming that the Ryans' pleadings failed to state a cause of action by not positing a cognizable legal duty owed by the Friesenhahns. The motion was set for hearing on October 14, 1997. In response, the Ryans contended that the motion for summary judgment was premature because the time period in which they could amend their pleadings to state an appropriate cause of action had not begun, and that the motion should be overruled or at least abated. The trial court denied the Ryans' request for abatement and granted summary judgment on all the Ryans' claims against the Friesenhahns.
The court of appeals held that the trial court erred in not giving the Ryans an opportunity to amend their pleadings and that the Ryans had stated a cause of action for negligence and negligence per se. 911 S.W.2d 113, 116-18. We agree that, under the circumstances of this case, the Ryans should have had an opportunity to amend before summary judgment was rendered against them. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. However, we express no opinion on the court of appeals' conclusion that the Ryans' pleadings stated a cause of action for negligence and negligence per se.
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