Friessen Const. Co., Inc. v. Erickson, 11647

• Decision Date: 15 January 1976
• Docket Number: No. 11647,11647
• Parties: FRIESSEN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. De Loris ERICKSON, Minnehaha County Treasurer, and Lyle Wendell, Secretary of Revenue, Defendants and Appellants.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Page 278

238 N.W.2d 278

90 S.D. 60

FRIESSEN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. De Loris ERICKSON, Minnehaha County Treasurer, and Lyle Wendell, Secretary of Revenue, Defendants and Appellants.

No. 11647.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Jan. 15, 1976.

Gale E. Fisher of May, Johnson & Burke, Sioux Falls, for plaintiffs and respondents.

William J. Janklow, Atty. Gen., John Dewell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for defendants and appellants.

DOYLE, Justice.

Respondent taxpayers sued the Minnehaha County Treasurer and the South Dakota Secretary of Revenue for a refund of taxes paid under protest. The taxpayers, who installed concrete pipe for the City of Sioux Falls, were subjected to a use tax on the pipe pursuant to SDCL 10--46--5 even though they had never held title to it. The taxpayers contend that SDCL 10--46--5, when read with SDCL 10--46--1(2), does not impose a tax on them, or, in the alternative, that SDCL 10--46--5 is void as inconsistent with Art. XI, § 5 of the South Dakota Constitution. The trial court found for the taxpayers on the constitutional grounds cited. We reverse.

I. Facts.

The taxpayers include five construction firms ¹ which successfully bid on city contracts for the installation of 21,000 feet of reinforced concrete pipe and appurtenances for an addition to the central main sanitary sewer in Sioux Falls. Under the terms of the contract, the city purchased the pipe and caused it to be delivered to the installation site. The taxpayers, pursuant to detailed specifications, provided a proper foundation for the pipe, placed it, and backfilled and restored the surface. The pipe apparently became an integral part of the municipally operated sewer system.

About two years after the contracts were signed the Department of Revenue conducted audits on the taxpayers and gave each a notice of hearing to determine tax due. Subsequent to hearing, each taxpayer was assessed a use tax on the pipe it had installed. The amounts claimed by the state vary from a high of $6,220.71 to a low of $1,089.89.

II. Conflict of SDCL 10--46--5 with SDCL 10--46--1(2).

The first issue we must consider is whether SDCL 10--46--5 and SDCL 10--46--1(2) impose a use tax on a construction firm for pipe which is owned by a municipal corporation but which the construction firm installs in furtherance of its contract with the city.

SDCL 10--46--5 reads in part:

'Where a contractor * * * uses tangible personal property in the performance of his contract * * * whether the title to such property be in the contractor * * * or any other person, or whether the titleholder of such property would be subject to pay the sales or use tax, such contractor * * * shall pay a tax at the rate prescribed by § 10--45--2 * * *.'

It seems abundantly clear that the plain meaning of the statute is that the use tax is to be imposed on a contractor, who, in the performance of his contract, uses tangible personal property, the title to which is in a nontaxable entity, such as a municipality. The taxpayers apparently admit that there is no other logical way to read the statute when the remainder of the tax code is not considered.

However, the taxpayers argue strenuously that other sections of the tax code must be considered to give full meaning to the statute. In particular, the taxpayers suggest that the 'plain meaning' construction of SDCL 10--46--5 is at odds with the definition of 'use' contained in SDCL 10--46--1(2). This definition states:

"Use' means and includes the exercise of right or power over tangible personal property incidental to the ownership of that property * * *.'

The taxpayers assert that 'use,' under SDCL 10--46--5, must therefore be 'incidental to ownership' even though SDCL 10--46--5 specifically states that the tax is to be imposed 'whether the title to such property be in the contractor * * * or any other person.' The history of the two statutes demonstrates the taxpayers' contention to be inaccurate. The definition of 'use' contained in SDCL 10--46--1(2) was adopted in 1939 when the overall Use Tax Act was enacted. The definition included the 'incidental to the ownership' language. See Ch. 276, Sec. 2(2), S.L.1939. In 1964 the United States Supreme Court decided United States v.Boyd, 378 U.S. 39, 84 S.Ct. 1518, 12 L.Ed.2d 713. In Boyd the Supreme Court held valid a Tennessee statute which imposed a use tax upon a contractor who employed property belonging to the federal government in carrying out his contract, but who never himself held title to that property. In 1966 the South Dakota legislature enacted Ch. 256, S.L.1966, i.e., SDCL 10--46--5, which followed the language of the Tennessee statute very closely; in particular, it should be noted that both the Tennessee statute and the South Dakota statute contain language imposing the tax on the contractor 'whether the title to such property be in the contractor * * * or any other person' and 'whether the titleholder * * * would be subject to * * * (the) use tax.' See 12 T.C.A. 67--3004; SDCL 10--46--5.

This history leads us to the conclusion that the South Dakota legislature intended in 1966 to accomplish what the Tennessee legislature had already accomplished; it intended to impose the use tax upon those who contracted with local, state, federal or other nontaxable entities and who 'used' the property of those entities in their construction contracts.

This conclusion is bolstered by SDCL 5--18--5.1 enacted in 1973. That section makes specific reference to situations in which a public corporation supplies tangible personal property for which the contractor is taxable under SDCL 10--46--5. SDCL 5--18--5.1 states:

'When a public corporation is to supply tangible personal property to be used in performance of the contract which is taxable to the contractor under § 10--46--5, the specifications or notice to bidders shall state the purchase price or fair market value thereof, whichever is the greater, which shall be the basis for determining the contractor's liability for tax.'

We regard SDCL 5--18--5.1 as an affirmation by the legislature of its intention to tax contractors who use property of a municipal corporation in the furtherance of their contracts.

We have noted above, however, that there does appear to be a conflict between the taxing statute, SDCL 10--46--5, and the definitional statute, SDCL 10--46--1(2).

Furthermore, we recognize the general principle that, "The courts do not favor repeals by implication, and it is the duty of this court to give effect to both enactments if their provisions can be reconciled'.' Argo Oil Corporation v. Lathrop, 76 S.D. 70, 76, 72 N.W.2d 431, 435, quoting Brookings County v. Sayre, 53 S.D. 350, 354, 220 N.W. 918, 920. Our analysis has indicated that there is an irreconcilability between the statutes in question as to whether a contractor may be subject to a use tax on property owned by the city. The later enacted statute, SDCL 10--46--5, allowing such taxation, must prevail in this regard. However, SDCL 10--46--1(2), the definitional statute, is still pertinent with regard to other sections of the tax law. We therefore hold, consistent with the principles announced in Lathrop, that insofar as SDCL 10--46--1(2) is in conflict with the taxing statute, SDCL 10--46--5, the later statute should prevail. However, SDCL 10--46--1(2) retains its validity in any situation not set out in SDCL 10--46--5.

Our construction of these statutes thus allows imposition of a use tax on the taxpayers here who 'used' the property of the municipality in completing their contracts.

We note that this interpretation is squarely in line with decisions of the Tennessee Supreme Court. In a case very similar to our own, that court construed 12 T.C.A. 67--3002(h) (an 'incidental to ownership' section comparable to SDCL 10--46--1(2)) with 12 T.C.A. 67--3004 (a use tax on government contractors section comparable to SDCL 10--46--5). The Tennessee Court found that a use tax could be imposed on a contractor who installed a gas pipeline for the city even though the pipe was owned by the city. The court decisively rejected the contention that the contractor necessarily had to exercise power over the pipeline 'incidental to ownership.' Hall Contracting Corporation v. Tidwell, Tenn.1974, 507 S.W.2d 697. Furthermore, the Tennessee Court has held that a contractor who installs carpet owned by a tax exempt institution is liable for the use tax on the carpet. General Carpet Contractors, Inc. v. Tidwell, Tenn.1974, 511 S.W.2d 241. The Tennessee Court thus has also construed the sections at issue so as to allow a tax in a situation such as is presented to this court.

III. Constitutionality of SDCL 10--46--5.

The final question with which we must deal is whether Art. XI, § 5 of the South Dakota Constitution invalidates SDCL 10--46--5. Article XI, § 5 ² reads in part:

'The property of the United States and of the state, county and municipal corporations, both real and personal, shall be exempt from taxation * * *.'

The trial court, acting under the authority of that section, struck down SDCL 10--46--5 as it applied to the taxpayers here. It acted on the theory that the 'all encompassing' provision of the constitution forbids any levy of taxes which falls directly or indirectly on the city unless the city somehow consents. ³

Our examination of the cases of this court leads us to the conviction that the use tax, as directly or indirectly applied to municipalities, does not fall under the proscription of Art. XI, § 5, because a use tax is not in law a tax on property itself but rather it is a tax on its use. We therefore reverse the trial court and hold SDCL 10--46--5 to be constitutional.

The leading decision on point is State v. City of Sioux Falls, 1932, 60 S.D. 330, 244 N.W. 365. In that case the court considered whether the state could levy a motor fuel tax on the city for gasoline used in its business. The court held that...