Fritz v. Detroit Citizens' St. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 16 April 1895
• Citation: 105 Mich. 50,62 N.W. 1007
• Parties: FRITZ v. DETROIT CITIZENS' ST. RY. CO.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

62 N.W. 1007

105 Mich. 50

FRITZ v. DETROIT CITIZENS' ST. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Michigan

April 16, 1895

Error to circuit court, Wayne county; Willard M. Lillibridge Judge.

Action by Louis Fritz against the Detroit Citizens' Street-Railway Company. From a judgment for defendant plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

McGrath C.J., dissenting.

Keena & Lightner, for appellant.

Russel & Campbell (A. C. Angell, of counsel), for appellee.

MONTGOMERY J.

This is a case of collision. There was testimony tending to show that plaintiff was driving north on Woodward avenue in a milk wagon. It was covered at the sides and behind. There was an opening of two feet wide opposite the driver's seat. In front there was an opening across the wagon about two feet in depth, between the dashboard and the hood. This and the opening at the sides were the only apertures through which plaintiff could look out, as his back curtain was down. On the left side of the wagon he had 11 or 12 empty milk cans each three or four feet high. He could not, on account of these cans, well look out of the left side of the wagon. Plaintiff was familiar with the locality. After turning onto Woodward avenue, he drove past Larned street, and to near the corner of Woodward and Congress. There were three horse cars ahead of him on the Woodward avenue line, going north, and on the opposite side of the street a Michigan avenue motor car going south. Plaintiff testified that when about 50 feet in the rear of the last horse car, and just before he got to the crossing on Congress street, he turned across the track, and when on the track the rear wheel of his wagon was struck by defendant's motor car. He testifies: "I was watching my way ahead to get across, and was driving my horse at the usual gait. I did not see the car at all before the accident. I never noticed the car. I did not hear any gong rung. They always used to ring a bell at every crossing since they had electric cars. Some gongs rung very hard, but this one never rung, I don't think; either a little one or a big one. I heard nothing, and I think I would have heard the gong if it had been rung." And on cross-examination he testified: "Before I started to turn across the track, I did not look out of the side window to see if anything was coming from the south, because I did not notice any danger. I had to watch ahead. That is what I was looking for. I wanted to get across the track, and, If I had noticed anything, I would not have gone right ahead. *** I listened to see if I could hear anything, and passed right across after the Michigan avenue car was coming up the street. I didn't stop my horse after I turned from Jefferson. I cannot tell just how fast I had been coming up Woodward, but I was just trotting along at the usual gait, same as milk wagons usually go." Joseph M. Kehoe, a member of the police force, testified that he noticed the milk wagon cross Woodward avenue; that the Michigan avenue car slacked up, and the Woodward avenue car, bound north, "came right along at a fair rate, and hit the milk wagon in the back, the back hub, and turned the wagon over." He also testifies that he thinks the motor car could have stopped before it got to the milk wagon. The defendant produced Phineas J. Tucker, who saw the accident from the street, who testifies that his attention was called by the ringing of the gong, and that the wagon was about 15 feet ahead of the car when the wagon got fairly on the track. Orla B. Taylor testifies on behalf of the defendant that he was riding on the front seat of the car; that, when he first noticed the milk wagon, it was going north, right along the track, possibly eight or ten feet in front of the car, and on the east side of the east track; the west wheel of the wagon was within an inch or two of the track, running very close to the rail, and possibly over upon the track; that, the wagon being in this position as they came up, the motorman sounded his gong; but that, as they came up to the south crossing of Congress street, the wagon turned suddenly to the west, being diagonally across the track; that, at the time it turned, the hind end of the wagon was not more than six or eight feet-ten feet at the outside-from the front of the car; that the wagon had been going slowly, and the car was keeping right along behind the wagon; that the motorman began to turn the brake immediately after the wagon swung. He was corroborated in this by the conductor and the motorman. Upon this testimony the circuit judge directed a verdict for defendant, and the plaintiff brings error.

In determining whether the instruction of the circuit judge should be sustained, it will be well to recall briefly the general rules relating to the rights and duties of the respective parties. The driver of a vehicle in a public street traversed by a street railway is bound to take notice of the conditions. He knows that the street cars run in grooved tracks, and that it is therefore impossible for the driver or motorman to turn out to avoid collision with an object on the track; that the only means of avoiding collision is by stopping the car; and that this cannot be done instantly. It is therefore negligence for the driver of a carriage to suddenly turn directly in front of an approaching car, whether the car be coming from the direction in which he is driving or from the rear. We think it is also true that, in the absence of something to excuse the performance of that duty, it is incumbent upon the driver of such a vehicle, before attempting to turn across the track, to take proper means of ascertaining whether the way is clear, and this is especially true of an attempt to turn across the track in the middle of a block or at any place other than a regular crossing. See Watson v. Railway Co. (Minn.) 55 N.W. 742. This the plaintiff failed to do in this case. Unless he had the right to assume that there was no car in the rear with which he was likely to come in contact, or unless he had the right to rely upon his failure to hear the sound of the gong, it was clearly negligent for him to turn across the track suddenly, and without assuring himself by proper investigation that no car was coming. Booth, St. Ry. � 315. In fact, until the car approached the crossing, it is very doubtful whether it was...