Watson v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co.

• Citation: 55 N.W. 742,53 Minn. 551
• Parties: WATSON v MINNEAPOLIS ST. RY. CO.
• Decision Date: 27 June 1893
• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)

53 Minn. 551

55 N.W. 742

WATSONvMINNEAPOLIS ST. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 27, 1893.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. One who had been a conductor of an electric street car for two months held competent to testify within what distance such a car, going at a specified rate of speed, can be stopped.

2. Evidence held to make a case for the jury on the questions of both defendant's and plaintiff's negligence.

3. When a jury report they cannot agree, it is in the discretion of the court to send them out for further deliberation.

4. In such case it is proper for the court to urge them to use all reasonable efforts to come to an agreement, and to state, as a reason for it, that the case is an expensive one to try.

5. At a street crossing as high a degree of care is required of those in charge of an electric street car as of those driving other vehicles.

6. Where the fact to be found is to be determined upon the consideration of numerous facts and circumstances proved, whether and to what extent the trial court, where it has fully, correctly, and clearly stated to the jury the general rules that are to control them in their deliberations on the facts, shall call their attention to particular facts and circumstances, is in its discretion.

7. A street-railway car has no priority of way at a street crossing, with respect to other vehicles, and when the driver of such another vehicle, approaching the street-railway track to cross it, sees a car approaching at such a distance that he can apparently make the crossing safely, he has a right to attempt it, and it is not negligence per se in him to attempt it without looking a second time at the car.

8. Upon much-traveled streets in a city it is negligence to run an electric street-railway car over a crossing at a high and dangerous rate of speed; and it is also negligence to run it over a crossing, the person in charge of it not being on the lookout, nor having the car under control, nor using the proper means to stop it, so as to avoid a collision.

9. Damages held not excessive.

Appeal from district court, Hennepin county; Canty, Judge.

Action for personal injuries by Lucius E. Watson against the Minneapolis Street-Railway Company. Plaintiff had judgment for $6,000, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Koon, Whelan & Bennett, for appellant.

Merrick & Merrick and H. H. Merrick, for respondent.

GILFILLAN, C. J.

The witness Walden showed himself competent to state within what distance an electric railway car going at the rate of 14 miles per hour (at which rate some of the evidence indicated the car which injured plaintiff was going) can be stopped. He had been conductor on such a car two months, must have seen such cars stopped many hundreds of times, when going at as high a rate of speed as they ordinarily attain, and was at the time conductor on the car which did the injury. It must be presumed that he was an ordinarily observant man, and, if so, he must have been able to express a pretty accurate opinion on the point.

The evidence made a fair case for the jury, both as to the negligence of the defendant and the contributory negligence of the plaintiff; so that the 3d, 4th, and 5th assignments of error are not well taken. And it is the same with the 18th to the 22d, both inclusive, and the 26th and 27th.

Whether, when a jury comes into court, and reports that it cannot agree, it shall thereupon be discharged, or shall be again sent out to deliberate further upon the case, is in the discretion of the trial court; and, before this court could order a new trial because of the jury having been sent out again, clear abuse of discretion, resulting in prejudice to the party complaining, would have to appear. Nothing of the kind appears in this case.

There was no impropriety in the court urging upon the jury to use all reasonable efforts to come to an agreement, and stating, as a reason why they should do so, that the case was an expensive one to try, both to the county and the parties.

The court below, in its general charge, in connection with some requests to charge, given and not excepted to, stated clearly and concisely the rules of law applicable to the respective rights of the parties upon the street, and the duty of each in respect to care in making the crossing, and the matter of negligence or absence of negligence on the part of either or both the parties. The only objection to the general charge, insisted upon in appellant's brief, is to a part where the court, after stating the degree of care required of each of the parties, said: “If two teams collide in the street, you must determine by the same rules whether they were using reasonable care towards each other, and, if not, who is to blame.” The only suggestion in the brief, of error in this, is that there is a difference between an electric car, running on a fixed track, and a team able to turn to the right or left. That is an important consideration when at the time of the collision the car and other vehicle are passing along the same streets, and the question is which ought to have made way for the other. But the collision in this case was at a crossing, and there is no question which ought to have turned to the right or left to let the other pass. Requiring of those in...