Fritz v. Financialedge Cmty. Credit Union

• Decision Date: 12 December 2011
• Docket Number: Case No. 11–13879.
• Citation: 835 F.Supp.2d 377
• Parties: Trisha A. FRITZ, Plaintiff, v. FINANCIALEDGE COMMUNITY CREDIT UNION, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

835 F.Supp.2d 377

Trisha A. FRITZ, Plaintiff,

v.FINANCIALEDGE COMMUNITY CREDIT UNION, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 11–13879.

United States District Court,

E.D. Michigan,

Northern Division.

Dec. 12, 2011.

Trisha A. Fritz, pro se.

Thomas R. Bowen, Bowen, Anderson, Troy, MI, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S TITLE VII FAILURE–TO–PROMOTE CLAIM WITHOUT PREJUDICE

THOMAS L. LUDINGTON, District Judge.

Plaintiff Trisha Fritz filed a complaint against FinancialEdge Community Credit Union (the “Credit Union”) and certain employees of the Credit Union, alleging a failure to promote her to a full-time position based on her gender in violation of Title VII and Michigan's Elliot–Larsen Civil Rights Act (“ELCRA”), retaliation for complaining of sex discrimination, civil conspiracy to interfere with Plaintiff's right to seek recourse for sex discrimination, wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, an ADA claim, and a Michigan Persons with Disabilities Act claim. ECF No. 2.

Now before the Court is Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, contending that Plaintiff's failure to promote claims were filed outside the contractually-shortened statute of limitations. In their reply, Defendants alternatively contend that Plaintiff's Title VII failure to promote claim should be dismissed for failing to obtain a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) prior to filing her complaint. ECF No. 10.

A hearing was held on November 22, 2011, to address Defendants' motion. For the reasons provided herein, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment.

I

Plaintiff began working for the Credit Union in March 2010 as a part-time mortgage representative. Plaintiff, another female employee, and an outside male applicant applied for a loan officer position in October 2010. The outside male applicant was hired on or about December 17, 2010. After not receiving the promotion, she was told by Defendant Jason Ball that the hiring decision-maker did not like women. Based on this information, Plaintiff posted on Facebook that she did not get the promotion because she was a woman. Plaintiff took down the posting but not before someone at the Credit Union saw it. Plaintiff was advised on or about December 17 that her concerns would be addressed the following Monday. No meeting about Plaintiff's allegation of sex discrimination occurred. In January 2011, Plaintiff received a positive annual review and a wage increase.

The Credit Union instituted a policy limiting the statute of limitations on employment claims later in February 2011. Plaintiff signed the “Knowing and Voluntary Litigation Agreement and Waiver” (“Litigation Agreement”). In the Agreement, the Plaintiff agreed “to litigate any statutory or common law claims” involving her employment according to certain terms. Among those terms, was her agreement that any claim arising out of her employment must be filed “within on hundred and eighty (180) calendar days or less if a statute or common law requires a shorter period, from the date the alleged claim arose.” The Agreement further provides that if the Plaintiff fails to abide by the requirement, she “will forever lose [her] right to litigate [her] claim in any manner.” ECF No. 3 Ex. A. The Agreement further provides that Plaintiff was “responsible for carefully reading it and understanding it,” and that the Agreement was entered into “voluntarily.” In addition, just above the signature provisions, the Agreement indicated, again in boldface type, that the Plaintiff “had the opportunity to ask questions and/or to seek the advice of counsel at his/her expense before signing.” ECF No. 3 Ex. A.

Defendant required Plaintiff to submit to a drug test on July 18, 2011, which she failed as a result of being a medical marijuana user. After the drug test, Plaintiff was advised to go home and someone would be in contact with her. Plaintiff remained in contact with the Credit Union but has not been advised that she can return to work. Plaintiff concluded that her employment was terminated and filed the instant case on September 6, 2011.

II

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if the movant shows that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A party asserting that a fact cannot be proven or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(B). The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of informing the Court of the basis for its motion, and identifying where to look in the record for relevant facts “which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The burden then shifts to the opposing party who must “set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(e)(2); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If the opposing party fails to raise genuine issues of fact and the record indicates the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the court shall grant summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

The court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party and determine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The party opposing the motion may not “rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a disputed fact” but must make an affirmative showing with proper evidence in order to defeat the motion. Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir.1989). A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must designate specific facts in affidavits, depositions, or other factual material showing “evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

III

A

Defendants contend that, pursuant to its Litigation Agreement, Plaintiff's failure to promote claims were required to have been filed within 180 days from December 17, 2010, the date Plaintiff alleges her claims accrued. Defendants argue that provisions such as those included in the Litigation Agreement are valid and enforceable in Michigan, so long as they are clear and unambiguous, and do not violate law or public policy. Rory v. Continental Ins. Co., 473 Mich. 457, 470, 703 N.W.2d 23 (2005). “Reasonableness” is no longer a requirement to enforce such a provision. Id. at 470, 703 N.W.2d 23. Furthermore, both Michigan state courts and federal courts applying Michigan law consistently uphold similar 180–day statutes of limitation in employment cases, whether they allege federal or state claims. See Timko v. Oakwood Custom Coating, Inc., 244 Mich.App. 234, 625 N.W.2d 101 (2001); Clark v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 268 Mich.App. 138, 706 N.W.2d 471 (2005); Myers v. Western–Southern Life Ins. Co., 849 F.2d 259, 260 (6th Cir.1988); Thurman v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 397 F.3d 352, 354–59 (6th Cir.2004); see also Boensch v. Delta College, 2011 WL 1233301, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34512 (E.D.Mich. Mar. 30, 2011). Defendants submit that here, the 180–day limitation was clear and unambiguous and Plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily agreed to it when she signed the Litigation Agreement. Moreover, the fact that the Litigation Agreement was signed after the alleged wrongdoing was known to Plaintiff when she signed the agreement and should have no bearing on the instant motion.

Under Title VII, once an individual files a charge alleging unlawful employment practices, the EEOC must investigate the charge and determine whether there is “reasonable cause” to believe that it is true. See42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(b) (1998). By filing a charge, an individual does not file a complaint seeking relief but informs the EEOC of possible discrimination. See EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 68, 104 S.Ct. 1621, 80 L.Ed.2d 41 (1984). If the EEOC finds reasonable cause to believe that discrimination occurred, it must “endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.” Id. If the EEOC is unable to procure an acceptable conciliation agreement from the employer, it “may bring a civil action against any respondent not a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision named in the charge.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f) (1998). If the court agrees with the EEOC that the defendant-employer has intentionally engaged in unlawful discrimination, the court may order injunctive relief and such remedies as the reinstatement or hiring of employees, back pay, and compensatory and punitive damages. See42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(a)(1), 2000e–5(g)(1) (1998).

Where the EEOC investigates a charge and, after 180 days, either concludes that there is no “reasonable cause” to believe discrimination occurs or fails to make a finding of “reasonable cause,” the EEOC must notify the aggrieved individual. See42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1) (1998). If the EEOC finds “reasonable cause” to believe an employer has violated Title VII but chooses not to bring suit on behalf of the federal government, the EEOC will issue a “notice of right to sue” on the charge to the aggrieved party. See29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(b) (1998). Or, if after 180 days the EEOC fails to make a “reasonable cause” finding, the aggrieved individual may request a “right to sue” letter from the EEOC. See id....