Fritz v. Mascotech Automotive Systems Group, Inc.

• Decision Date: 13 February 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-CV-71595-DT.,95-CV-71595-DT.
• Citation: 914 F. Supp. 1481
• Parties: Jeffery FRITZ, Plaintiff, v. MASCOTECH AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS GROUP, INC., d/b/a Mascotech Engineering, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

914 F. Supp. 1481

Jeffery FRITZ, Plaintiff, v. MASCOTECH AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS GROUP, INC., d/b/a Mascotech Engineering, Defendant.

No. 95-CV-71595-DT.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

February 13, 1996.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ronald M. Rothstein, Southfield, Michigan, for Plaintiff.

Melanie T. LaFave, Detroit, Michigan, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ROSEN, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Jeffery Fritz ("Plaintiff") commenced this action in Wayne County Circuit Court on March 21, 1995, alleging that Defendant Mascotech Automotive Systems Group, Inc. ("Defendant"), his employer from November 1, 1993, through August 25, 1994, unlawfully discriminated against him because of his disability, juvenile onset diabetes. Defendant removed this action to this Court based on Plaintiff's assertion of a federal claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Plaintiff also alleges a violation of Michigan's Handicappers' Civil Rights Act ("MHCRA"), Mich.Comp.Laws § 37.1101 et seq.

On October 31, 1995, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff's record of absences and tardiness renders him ineligible for consideration as either a "qualified individual with a disability" under the ADA or a "handicapped" individual under the MHCRA. Plaintiff responds that his ongoing absences and tardiness were attributable to Defendant's discriminatory imposition of various terms and conditions on his employment. According to Plaintiff, these onerous conditions were imposed because of the skepticism of Clifton Tally, Jr., Defendant's senior engineering manager, that Plaintiff's initial tardiness was in fact due to his diabetic condition.

Counsel for the parties addressed this motion at a hearing before this Court on January 25, 1996. After considering the arguments made at that hearing and reviewing the materials submitted by the parties, the Court finds that some key issues remain unresolved under the present record. Accordingly, for the reasons stated below, the Court denies Defendant's motion for summary judgment.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a computer-aided designer ("CAD designer") from October 25, 1993, through August 25, 1994.¹ Plaintiff worked at Defendant's Dearborn facility, at which Defendant's employees engaged in the design and prototype development of motor vehicle components. This facility was managed by Clifton Tally, Jr. ("Tally"), a senior engineering manager. Plaintiff was paid at the rate of $30 per hour, and his work largely consisted of using a computer to draft designs of various automotive components.

At age eleven, Plaintiff was diagnosed as having juvenile onset diabetes. He gives himself insulin injections at least once a day, and monitors his blood sugar level two or three times a day. In addition, he suffered a heart attack and underwent heart bypass surgery in 1992, when he was 32 years old.

Plaintiff disclosed these health conditions in an interview with Tally shortly before he was hired by Defendant. During that interview, Plaintiff indicated that he had not had any recent problems with his diabetes. Plaintiff further stated that the 50 to 56 hours per week demanded by the job would be satisfactory. Finally, Plaintiff and Tally discussed the starting time for the job, which ranged between roughly 6:00 and 8:00 a.m.

In his first month of employment with Defendant, Defendant's records indicate that Plaintiff was late for work fourteen times. This tardiness was often substantial; the records indicate that on nine occasions, Plaintiff did not arrive at work until after noon. At his deposition, Plaintiff testified that adjustments to his schedule had altered his insulin requirements during this time period. These schedule changes caused him to awake in the morning with hypoglycemic (low blood sugar) reactions and occasional insulin shock, which rendered him unable to drive to work or otherwise function normally until he could restore his blood sugar level by eating or drinking something with a high sugar content. According to Plaintiff, this process of restoring his blood sugar level could take anywhere from fifteen minutes to two hours. Moreover, Plaintiff states that he could avoid further hypoglycemic reactions only through trial-and-error adjustment of his insulin intake. An affidavit submitted by Plaintiff's physician, Dr. Aronsson, indicates that it took several months of adjusting Plaintiff's insulin dosage to solve this problem.

Concerned with this habitual tardiness, Tally met with Plaintiff on December 3, 1993. The parties dispute the conversation at that meeting. Plaintiff contends that Tally fired him, based on his disbelief that Plaintiff's late arrivals were due to his diabetic condition. According to Plaintiff, he returned to work only after he appealed to Defendant's human resources department and someone within that department ordered him reinstated. Tally, on the other hand, testified at his deposition that he merely warned Plaintiff that further tardiness would lead to his dismissal. According to Tally, Plaintiff was instructed to produce documentation verifying his medical condition and his need for occasional time off before returning to work.

The parties agree about the ultimate outcome of the December 3 meeting. Although Plaintiff continued to work for Defendant, several conditions were imposed upon him. He was placed on probation for ninety days, and was assigned a task that, in Tally's words, was "kind of boring work," "less demanding," and typically required fewer hours per work week. During the probationary period, Plaintiff was forbidden to work later than 6:00 p.m. At his deposition, Tally testified that this restriction was dictated by the need of evening-shift workers to gain access to computer equipment, the need to supervise and communicate with Plaintiff as he performed his work, and Tally's concern that Plaintiff might experience a diabetic reaction in an unoccupied section of the facility. Tally also insisted that Plaintiff punch a time clock, counter to the typical practice for daytime employees.

In addition, after the December 3 meeting, Plaintiff was required to obtain a note from his physician whenever his diabetic condition caused him to be late or absent. Tally's deposition testimony reveals his suspicion, formed prior to the December 3 meeting, that at least some of Plaintiff's tardiness might be attributable to factors other than his diabetic condition. (Tally Dep. at 57-60). Accordingly, Tally testified that he imposed the doctor's note requirement in order to verify both that Plaintiff had in fact suffered a diabetic reaction and that he was fit to return to work. (Tally Dep. at 81-82).

Plaintiff, however, protests that this last condition was at best useless and at worst counterproductive. In his account, by the time he recovered sufficiently from his hypoglycemic reactions to drive to his physician's office, he would no longer exhibit any symptoms of his earlier reaction, and his doctor therefore would be unable to verify his illness. Plaintiff's physician corroborates this claim in his affidavit, stating that by the time Plaintiff appeared at his office, "I had no way of determining objectively whether or not he had suffered hypoglycemic shock or very low blood sugar." (Aronsson Aff. at 5). Plaintiff further states that he had to travel a significant distance out of his way and often wait a substantial amount of time in order to obtain a doctor's note. Thus, Plaintiff contends that this requirement actually exacerbated his attendance problems. At his deposition, Tally conceded that he "may have been unreasonable initially" in imposing this requirement, and he noted that he eventually permitted Plaintiff to obtain a doctor's note by telefax.

After these conditions were imposed, Plaintiff's attendance problems persisted. Defendant's records indicate that, in a fourteen-week period between January and April, 1994, Plaintiff missed seventeen days of work and achieved a forty-hour work week only twice. Accordingly, Tally again met with Plaintiff on April 11, 1994; Tally's report from this meeting lists the subject as Plaintiff's "excessive, non diabetes related absenteeism," and specifically expresses the concern that Plaintiff's poor attendance "makes it difficult to assign work to Jeff." Following this meeting, Plaintiff was again placed on probation, was limited to forty-hour work weeks and eight-hour days, was forbidden from working on weekends, and was required to call and speak personally to his direct supervisor, Gary Mathiak, whenever he was going to be late or absent. Plaintiff was further advised that three violations of his probation would lead to his dismissal, but that late arrivals or absences due to his diabetic condition would not count as probation violations provided that Plaintiff properly advised his supervisor and obtained a doctor's written authorization to return to work. Plaintiff acknowledged these additional conditions, but opined that they were unfair and unnecessary.

Plaintiff's attendance problems continued beyond the April 11 meeting and until his layoff in late August or early September, 1994.² Defendant's records indicate that Plaintiff worked a forty-hour week only five times in the nineteen weeks prior to his layoff; three of these forty-hour weeks followed immediately after the April 11 meeting. In the brief supporting its motion for summary judgment, Defendant summarizes Plaintiff's overall attendance record during his 45-week tenure: he missed 30 full days, representing 13.3% of the total work days, and he was absent during some portion of 76 days, comprising 33.7% of the total.

Despite this attendance record, Defendant cited a general reduction in staff, rather than attendance problems, as the reason for Plaintiff...