Fritz v. State
| Decision Date | 24 August 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 48403,49521.,48403 |
| Citation | 284 NW 2d 377 |
| Parties | David Joseph FRITZ, Petitioner, Respondent, v. STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, and David J. FRITZ, Petitioner, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota and the Commissioner of Public Welfare, State of Minnesota, Respondents. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., Richard B. Allyn, Sol. Gen., Paul G. Zerby, Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Robert W. Johnson, County Atty., Dan M. Kammeyer and Edwin M. Wistrand, Asst. County Attys., Anoka, for State in both cases.
Evalynn Welling, Asst. Public Defender, Minneapolis, for Fritz in No. 49521.
C. Paul Jones, Public Defender, and J. Christopher Cuneo, Asst. Public Defender, Minneapolis, for Fritz in both cases.
Ellen C. Dubuque, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for State et al., in No. 49521.
Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.
Appellant was convicted of criminal sexual misconduct based on a guilty plea. Imposition of sentence was stayed for 10 years on the condition that appellant be treated by the Department of Public Welfare (DPW) under the Minnesota Sex Offender Act. After treatment and various postconviction proceedings, the trial court continued appellant's commitment with the DPW and vacated appellant's 10-year probationary sentence to the commissioner of corrections. Pursuant to a postconviction hearing, the trial court also concluded that (1) appellant was entitled to a hearing when any attempt is made to transfer him from a DPW institution to prison, and (2) the appellant should not be transferred from the DPW program to prison because to do so would be contrary to appellant's needs and contravene the purposes of the Sex Offender Act. The state challenges the trial court's order vacating appellant's 10-year probationary sentence, and appellant makes various constitutional challenges to the Sex Offender Act. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
In 1976, appellant, then 27 years old, had offered to pay an 11-year-old boy to pose for photographs in the nude. Appellant also kissed the boy and placed his mouth on the boy's penis for a short time. Based on this conduct, appellant entered a plea of guilty to criminal sexual conduct in the first degree under Minn.St. 609.342(a). The trial court ordered a presentence social, physical, and mental examination pursuant to the Sex Offender Act, Minn.St. 246.43, subd. 1, which compels the examination upon conviction of such a crime. The DPW, based on a psychologist's report, recommended special treatment for appellant's mental and physical aberrations.
The trial court followed the recommendation. Imposition of sentence was stayed and appellant was placed on probation to the commissioner of corrections for a period of 10 years, subject to the condition that appellant be committed to the commissioner of public welfare pursuant to the Sex Offender Act, Minn.St. 246.43. Appellant was sent to the Minnesota Security Hospital at St. Peter. Appellant was first treated in the Intensive Treatment Program for Sexual Aggressives and subsequently on other wards within the state hospital.
Because it was felt that the treatment was unsuccessful, the probation officer recommended that the stay of sentence be revoked and that appellant be committed to the commissioner of corrections at the Minnesota State Prison. Instead of sending appellant to prison, the trial court vacated the sentence to the commissioner of corrections and continued appellant's commitment with the DPW. The state appealed from that order.
During the pendency of the state's appeal from the order, the commissioner of public welfare transferred appellant to the State Prison at Stillwater. Appellant challenged the transfer and also raised new issues pursuant to the state's appeal. This court stayed the state's appeal and remanded the case for a postconviction hearing. In the meantime, appellant was returned to the state hospital.
After the postconviction hearing, the trial court ordered that appellant cannot be transferred to the State Prison because it would be contrary to his needs and the purposes of the Sex Offender Act. Thus, appellant is still committed at the state hospital. Secondly, the trial court ordered that any attempt to transfer appellant to the prison must be preceded by a hearing.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the postconviction order on the basis that the order did not give him appropriate relief. This appeal also involves the state's appeal from the trial court's order in which the 10-year probationary sentence to the commissioner of corrections was vacated.
The issues presented on this appeal are:
(1) Was appellant denied due process or equal protection when he was initially committed to the DPW for specialized treatment?
(2) Is Minn.St. 246.43, subd. 8, unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes the transfer of sex offenders from a DPW institution to prison?
(3) Do the discharge provisions of the Sex Offender Act violate equal protection or due process?
(4) Did the trial court err in vacating the 10-year probationary sentence to the commissioner of corrections?
1. Precommitment Procedure. Appellant argues that he was denied due process and equal protection when he was initially committed for specialized treatment to the DPW without precommitment procedures similar to civil commitments. The state, on the other hand, argues that the commitment to the DPW is a sentencing alternative which does not require the same procedures as civil commitments.
The Sex Offender Act, repealed as of May 30, 1979,1 has several provisions concerning procedures for commitment to the DPW. Upon conviction of certain sex crimes, such as the one in this case, the offender must be sent by the court to the commissioner of public welfare or private facility for a presentence social, physical, and mental examination evaluation. Minn.St. 246.43, subd. 1. Upon conviction of other sex crimes, the court may, in its discretion, commit the offender for a presentence evaluation if the commissioner has adequate facilities and is willing to accept the commitment. Minn.St. 246.43, subd. 2. The reports of the examination are submitted to the court. Minn.St. 246.43, subd. 4.
If specialized treatment is not recommended by the commissioner, the court shall impose a criminal sentence. Minn.St. 246.43, subd. 5. On the other hand, if the commissioner recommends specialized treatment for the offender's mental and physical aberrations, the judge may, in his discretion, either (1) place the offender on probation with the condition of out-patient treatment, or (2) commit the offender to the commissioner of public welfare. Minn.St. 246.43, subd. 6. There is some question whether the judge may also impose a criminal sentence in addition to commitment.
No formal hearing on the determination of commitment or out-patient treatment is provided by the statute, but the offender is given notice of commitment to the DPW. Minn.St. 246.43, subd. 8(a).
Appellant bases his constitutional argument on cases which indicate that a person convicted of a crime cannot be committed for mental illness without affording the person the same precommitment procedural safeguards which are given to persons civilly committed. In Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 86 S.Ct. 760, 15 L.Ed.2d 620 (1966), a prisoner, near the expiration of his prison term, was transferred to an institution for the mentally ill without a jury review which is available to persons civilly committed. The Supreme Court held this procedure violated equal protection. The court said (383 U.S. 114, 86 S.Ct. 764, 15 L.Ed.2d 625):
In Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 87 S.Ct. 1209, 18 L.Ed.2d 326 (1967), the petitioner was convicted of indecent liberties but not sentenced under the criminal statute; instead, he was sentenced without a hearing under a Colorado sex offender act for an indefinite term of 1 day to life because the trial court concluded that the sex offender "constitutes a threat of bodily harm to members of the public, or is an habitual offender and mentally ill." The Supreme Court concluded that due process was violated because the Sex Offender Act imposed punishment on the basis of a new finding of fact which was not an element of the crime for which the offender was convicted. The court concluded that due process requires counsel, an opportunity to be heard, subpoena power, and the right of cross-examination.
More recently in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972), a mentally defective deaf-mute had been found incompetent to proceed in a criminal trial, and after a hearing he was committed under an Indiana statute which provided for less precommitment safeguards than the civil commitment statute. The offender argued that the commitment would amount to a life sentence, and that he was deprived of equal protection because absent the criminal charges pending against him, the state would have had to proceed under the statutes generally applicable to commitment of feeble-minded persons and mentally ill persons....
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