Frizzell v. Deyoung

• Decision Date: 04 December 2020
• Docket Number: Docket No. 47543
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Parties: Donald Craig FRIZZELL, individually and as a beneficiary of the Clifton and Majorie Frizzell Family Trust, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Edwin DEYOUNG, individually and in his capacity as trustee of the Clifton and Majorie Frizzell Family Trust; Darlene DeYoung, individually and in her capacity as a beneficiary of the Clifton and Majorie Frizzell Family Trust; et. al. Defendants/Respondents.

167 Idaho 801

477 P.3d 236

Donald Craig FRIZZELL, individually and as a beneficiary of the Clifton and Majorie Frizzell Family Trust, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.Edwin DEYOUNG, individually and in his capacity as trustee of the Clifton and Majorie Frizzell Family Trust; Darlene DeYoung, individually and in her capacity as a beneficiary of the Clifton and Majorie Frizzell Family Trust; et. al. Defendants/Respondents.

Docket No. 47543

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, November 2020 Term.

Filed: December 4, 2020

GIANTlegal PLLC, Spokane, attorneys for appellant. Robin Haynes argued.

Scot D. Nass, Coeur d'Alene, attorney for respondent. Scot Nass argued.

BEVAN, Justice

This appeal arises from a district court's alleged failure to follow this Court's holding in Frizzell v. DeYoung , 163 Idaho 473, 415 P.3d 341 (2018) (hereinafter Frizzell I ) upon remand. In Frizzell I , we held that an agreement entered into pursuant to the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act ("TEDRA"), Idaho Code sections 15-8-101, et seq. , by Donald Craig Frizzell and Edwin and Darlene DeYoung was only enforceable to the extent that it settled past claims. As a result, the provisions that purported to exculpate Edwin from liability for future negligence or breaches of fiduciary duty after the agreement was executed were deemed void as against public policy. In this appeal, Frizzell argues that after the case was remanded, the district court failed to follow the law of the case by erroneously allowing the DeYoungs to introduce evidence, testimony, and argument concerning conduct that occurred before the agreement was executed. Frizzell also asserts the district court abused its discretion in awarding the DeYoungs attorney fees without considering the factors in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e). For the following reasons, we disagree with Frizzell's arguments and affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case arises from a dispute between Donald Frizzell, a beneficiary of the Clifton and Marjorie Frizzell Family Trust ("Trust"), Edwin DeYoung, the trustee of the Trust and Frizzell's brother-in-law, and Darlene DeYoung, a beneficiary of the Trust and Frizzell's half-sister. In 2013, Frizzell sued Edwin in his capacity as trustee. That dispute was resolved when the parties entered into a nonjudicial dispute resolution agreement (the "TEDRA Agreement"). The TEDRA Agreement modified portions of the underlying Trust and directed distributions be made to the beneficiaries under it. The TEDRA Agreement also contained various provisions purporting to release, indemnify, and hold Edwin harmless for all actions taken in his role as trustee. The parties disagreed about whether these provisions applied only to claims that arose prior to the TEDRA Agreement or if they also released Edwin from liability for all future claims.

On October 6, 2016, Frizzell sued the DeYoungs to enforce provisions of the TEDRA Agreement and brought suit against Edwin individually for breach of fiduciary duty as trustee. Frizzell I , 163 Idaho at 475, 415 P.3d at 343. Frizzell alleged that after the TEDRA Agreement was signed and filed, Edwin breached his fiduciary duty by not following through with his obligations under the Agreement. This included Edwin's failure to notify Frizzell that one of the properties Frizzell thought he would be receiving was not actually part of the Trust. Id . In addition, Frizzell claimed Edwin failed to pay all net rental income to him as was required under the Agreement. The DeYoungs moved to dismiss, arguing the TEDRA Agreement's indemnity clause shielded Edwin from all liability for his administration of the Trust. Id . at 476, 415 P.3d at 344. The district court agreed and dismissed Frizzell's complaint. Id . On appeal, this Court held the district court erred in dismissing Frizzell's complaint because the TEDRA Agreement could not waive Frizzell's claims for a future breach of fiduciary duty against Edwin. Id . at 476–77, 415 P.3d at 344–45. The Court held the provisions in the TEDRA Agreement exculpating Edwin from liability were only enforceable to the extent that they settled past claims of negligence and breach of fiduciary duty committed before the Agreement was executed in 2014. Id . at 478, 415 P.3d at 346. The Court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Id . at 480, 415 P.3d at 348.

On May 18, 2018, Frizzell filed an amended complaint against the DeYoungs alleging damages arising from Edwin's post-TEDRA actions and inactions, including: lost rental income, unmitigated and unrepaired flood and storm damage to a property, losses related to deferred and needed maintenance to certain properties, failure to return or transfer rental and utility deposits, and attorney fees. The DeYoungs filed an answer and counterclaim, asserting Frizzell breached his obligations under the TEDRA Agreement by failing to timely transfer the four properties at issue and failing to pay for the associated legal costs.

After a four-day trial, the jury returned a verdict for the DeYoungs, finding that Frizzell breached the TEDRA Agreement. The jury awarded the DeYoungs $70,000. The DeYoungs later filed a motion requesting attorney fees and costs under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, the TEDRA Agreement, and Title 15 of the Idaho Code. In support, the DeYoungs filed an affidavit of counsel that addressed the Rule 54 factors and detailed the billing entries in this case. The DeYoungs sought $98,478.80 in attorney fees and costs: $91,240 in attorney fees, $6,213.80 for costs as a matter of right, and $1,025 in discretionary costs. Frizzell did not file an objection to the DeYoungs’ motion.

On October 1, 2019, the district court entered a judgment awarding the DeYoungs $168,478.80 against Frizzell individually and as a beneficiary of the Trust. On November 4, 2019, Frizzell filed a timely notice of appeal.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Whether the district court admitted evidence inconsistent with the Court's ruling

in Frizzell v. DeYoung , 163 Idaho 473, 415 P.3d 341 (2018).

2. Whether the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees by failing to comply with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e).

3. Whether either party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Decisions regarding the admission of evidence are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Dep't of Envtl. Quality v. Gibson , 166 Idaho 424, 432–33, 461 P.3d 706, 714–15 (2020) (citing Karlson v. Harris , 140 Idaho 561, 564, 97 P.3d 428, 431 (2004) ). We review discretionary decisions under the familiar four-part standard, asking whether the trial court: "(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason." Lunneborg v. My Fun Life , 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018). "The party asserting the abuse of discretion carries the burden of demonstrating that an abuse of discretion occurred." Nielson v. Talbot , 163 Idaho 480, 489, 415 P.3d 348, 357 (2018) (citing Green River Ranches, LLC v. Silva Land Company, LLC , 162 Idaho 385, 397 P.3d 1144, 1151 (2017) ).

"Unless justice requires otherwise, no error in admitting or excluding evidence, or any other error by the court or a party, is ground for granting a new trial, for setting aside a verdict, or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order. At every stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party's substantial rights." I.R.C.P. 61. "Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless the ruling is a manifest abuse of the trial court's discretion and a substantial right of the party is affected." Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co ., 127 Idaho 565, 574, 903 P.2d 730, 739 (1995) (citing I.R.E. 103 ; I.R.C.P. 61 ). Error that does not affect a substantial right is considered harmless and is disregarded. Bolger v. Lance , 137 Idaho 792, 797, 53 P.3d 1211, 1216 (2002) (citing I.R.C.P. 61 ; Perry v. Magic Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr ., 134 Idaho 46, 50–51, 995 P.2d 816, 820–21 (2000) ).

IV. ANALYSIS

In general, this Court "will uphold a jury verdict if there is evidence of sufficient quantity and probative value that a reasonable mind could reach a similar conclusion to that of the jury." Chapman v. Chapman , 147 Idaho 756, 759, 215 P.3d 476, 479 (2009) (internal citation omitted). The appellant bears the burden of proving error. Id . at 764, 215 P.3d at 484 (citing Garcia v. Pinkham , 144 Idaho 898, 900, 174 P.3d 868, 870 (2007) ). While Frizzell acknowledges the high bar to overturn a jury verdict in Idaho, he contends a remand for further proceedings is appropriate where a district court violates the law of the case. Frizzell maintains that he did not receive a fair trial based on the district court's evidentiary rulings that allowed the DeYoungs to introduce evidence concerning the settlers’ intent and prior lawsuits. We disagree and will address each issue in turn.

A. The district court did not admit evidence inconsistent with this Court's holding in Frizzell I .

Frizzell argues that the law of this case is simple: the TEDRA Agreement did not resolve any future claims between Frizzell and the DeYoungs; it only resolved claims up to the date the TEDRA Agreement was executed, October 1, 2014. Frizzell alleges the district court acted contrary to the law of the case when it admitted, over objection, testimony that the TEDRA Agreement resolved all future claims and that Frizzell was merely bringing "the same lawsuit." The DeYoungs agree that this Court's decision in Frizzell I clearly dictated that the TEDRA Agreement could not waive future acts of negligence or breach, but argue the district court correctly applied the law of the case upon remand. While ...