Frizzell v. Southwest Motor Freight, Inc.
Citation | 906 F. Supp. 441 |
Decision Date | 20 November 1995 |
Docket Number | No. 1:95-CV-275.,1:95-CV-275. |
Parties | Carla D. FRIZZELL, Plaintiff, v. SOUTHWEST MOTOR FREIGHT, INC., and Matthew Cacace, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee |
Gary R. Patrick, Cara J. Alday, Patrick, Beard & Richardson, P.C., Chattanooga, TN, for plaintiff.
Frank P. Pinchak, Leigh Anne Battersby, Witt, Gaither & Whitaker, Chattanooga, TN, for defendants.
This is a civil action brought by plaintiff, Carla D. Frizzell (hereinafter Frizzell) against defendants Southwest Motor Freight, Inc. and Matthew Cacace (hereinafter Cacace), alleging her civil rights were violated.
Before the Court is defendant Cacace's Motion to Dismiss the complaint (Court File No. 2). Plaintiff opposes the motion (Court File No. 6).
For the following reasons, the Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED.
On July 25, 1995, plaintiff filed the instant action in the Chancery Court of Hamilton County, Tennessee. The complaint filed in state court alleged violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq., and the Tennessee Human Rights Act (hereinafter referred to as THRA), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-21-101, et seq. On August 11, 1995, defendants removed the case to federal court. On August 20, 1995, defendant Cacace filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint as to him pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
Plaintiff filed a response to the motion to dismiss. In her response, plaintiff argues the recently issued decision in Arnold v. Welch, No. 1:92-CV-562, 1995 WL 785572 (E.D.Tenn., July 5, 1995) (Edgar, J.), was incorrect. Plaintiff asks this Court to reject the decision in Arnold and hold that individual liability exists under the THRA.
A. A Motion to Dismiss under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)
A motion to dismiss under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) requires the Court to construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all the complaint's factual allegations as true, and determine whether the plaintiff undoubtedly can prove no set of facts in support of the claims that would entitle relief. Meador v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 902 F.2d 474, 475 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 867, 111 S.Ct. 182, 112 L.Ed.2d 145 (1990); see also Cameron v. Seitz, 38 F.3d 264, 270 (6th Cir.1994). The Court may not grant such a motion to dismiss based upon a disbelief of a complaint's factual allegations. Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1199 (6th Cir.1990); Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 377 (6th Cir. 1995) ( ). The Court must liberally construe the complaint in favor of the party opposing the motion. Miller, 50 F.3d at 377. However, the complaint must articulate more than a bare assertion of legal conclusions. Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir.1988). "The complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." Id. (citations omitted).
Cacace argues that the complaint must be dismissed as to him, because it does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. His argument rests on the recent decision of this Court in Arnold v. Welch. In Arnold, the Court held individuals who are not otherwise employers are not liable under the THRA.
In response to this motion plaintiff challenges the correctness of Arnold. Plaintiff's argument contains four components. First, plaintiff argues that the clear weight of Tennessee authority is contrary to the decision in Arnold; second, she argues that decisions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit allow individual liability under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e through 2000e-7 (Title VII); third, she argues that cases from other circuit courts of appeal support her position; and last, she points to distinctions between the THRA and Title VII which she contends support the notion of allowing individual liability.
In deciding this motion the Court will examine the decision in Arnold, the precise language of the THRA and Title VII, the purpose of the THRA, and the applicable case law construing Title VII.
Arnold involved claims under both the THRA and Title VII. After the Court dismissed the claims against defendant Welch, Arnold requested reconsideration on the THRA claims. Arnold contended individual liability under the THRA existed and as support provided the Court with an unpublished Tennessee Court of Appeals decision, Wood v. Emerson Electric Co., No. 01-A-9310-CH-00467, 1994 WL 716270 (Tenn.Ct.App. Aug. 12, 1994). Arnold argued Wood established that individuals may in fact be liable under the THRA.
In reconsidering its decision, the Court examined Wood and another unpublished Tennessee Court of Appeals decision, Gifford v. Premier Mfg. Corp., No. 18, 1989 WL 85752 (Tenn.Ct.App. Aug. 1, 1989). It decided the THRA and Title VII should be construed similarly with respect to the definition of employer and the liability of individuals. Since the clear weight of authority under Title VII is individual liability does not lie, the Court was of the opinion that the Tennessee Supreme Court, if called upon to decide this issue, would decide individuals are not liable under the THRA.
As was stated in Arnold, the THRA and Title VII should be similarly construed since both have the same purpose. "It is the purpose and intent of the general assembly by this chapter to (p)rovide for execution within Tennessee of the policies embodied in the federal Civil Rights Act() of 1964...." Tenn.Code Ann. § 4-21-101(a)(1). Thus, analysis under the THRA should be the same as under Title VII. Trentham v. K-Mart Corp., 806 F.Supp. 692, 705 (E.D.TN.1991); Bruce v. Western Auto Supply Co., 669 S.W.2d 95, 97 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1984).
The term "employer" under the THRA is defined in Tenn.Code Ann. § 4-21-102(5). This definition reads:
"Employer" includes the state, or any political or civil subdivision thereof, and persons employing eight (8) or more persons within the state, or any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly;
Section 2000(e)(b) of Title VII defines "employer" as:
... a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person....
Both the THRA and Title VII proscribe similar conduct with respect to employers. Title VII reads in pertinent part:
The relevant portion of the THRA reads:
As between these statutes, there is no meaningful difference in the language setting forth discriminatory conduct on the part of an employer.
Plaintiff set out the correct standard for the Court's determination of state law:
As this Court stated in the Arnold case, No. 1:92-CV-562, 1995 WL 785572 (July 5, 1995), "In ascertaining the law of a state, a federal court must look to the decisions of the highest court of the state." Arnold, supra p. 2, citing Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 822, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). This Court further stated, "If the state's highest court has not decided the applicable law, the federal court must predict how the highest state court would decide the law were it presented for decision." Arnold, supra p. 2, citing Anderson Development Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 49 F.3d 1128, 1131 (6th Cir.1995); Mahne v. Ford Motor Co., 900 F.2d 83, 86 (6th Cir.); cert denied 498 U.S. 941, 111 S.Ct. 349, 112 L.Ed.2d 313 (1990). Citing the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of West v. AT & T Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237, 61 S.Ct. 179, 183, 85 L.Ed. 139 (1940), the Court further stated, "In predicting the decision of the highest state court, the federal court may not disregard the decision of an intermediate appellate state court unless it is convinced by other persuasive data-e.g., decisions from other jurisdictions, treatises, law review, commentaries, or the majority rule—that the highest state court would decide the matter otherwise." Arnold, supra p. 2.
(Plaintiff's Response, Court File No. 6, p. 7, ¶ 2).
Plaintiff points out that West requires the Court to look to the complete body of state law in reaching a decision on what the highest court of the state would...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Knussman v. State of Md., Civil No. B-95-1255.
...Cir. 1987)); see also, McKiernan v. Smith-Edwards-Dunlap Co., 1995 WL 311393 (E.D.Pa.1995). However, in Frizzell v. Southwest Motor Freight, Inc., 906 F.Supp. 441, 449 (E.D.Tenn.1995), the court looked to the line of authority involving individual capacity suits under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §......
-
Mitchell v. Chapman
...state highway patrol); Freemon, 911 F.Supp. at 330-31 (allowing FMLA supervisory liability claim against state hospital employee); Frizzell, 906 F.Supp. at 449 (determining no supervisory liability for public officials under the Our independent examination of the FMLA's text and structure r......
-
Buser v. Southern Food Service, Inc.
...under the FMLA. See, e.g., Carter v. Rental Uniform Svc. of Culpeper, Inc., 977 F.Supp. 753 (W.D.Va.1997); Frizzell v. Southwest Motor Freight, Inc., 906 F.Supp. 441 (E.D.Tenn.1995). However, the majority view is otherwise. See. e.g., Carpenter v. Refrigeration Sales Corp., 49 F.Supp.2d 102......
-
Kilvitis v. County of Luzerne
...759 (W.D.Va.1997) (following Title VII case law and finding no individual liability under the FMLA); Frizzell v. Southwest Motor Freight, Inc., 906 F.Supp. 441, 449 (E.D.Tenn.1995) (same). In Carter, the court recognized the similarity between the FMLA and the FLSA and that individual liabi......