Froistad v. State
Decision Date | 18 March 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 20010111.,20010111. |
Citation | 2002 ND 52,641 N.W.2d 86 |
Parties | Larry FROISTAD, Petitioner and Appellant v. STATE of North Dakota, Respondent and Appellee. |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Monte L. Rogneby, Vogel Law Firm, Bismarck, N.D., for petitioner and appellant.
Steven J. Wild, State's Attorney, Bowman, N.D., for respondent and appellee.
[¶ 1] Larry Froistad appealed from a Southwest Judicial District Court order denying his petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm, concluding the district court did not err in denying Froistad's petition for post-conviction relief.
[¶ 2] On August 7, 1998, Froistad pled guilty to murdering his daughter. He filed a motion for post-conviction relief on June 14, 2000. Froistad argued he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea for several reasons: (1) the court failed to honor his request to withdraw his guilty plea, (2) the court failed to establish a factual basis for his guilty plea, (3) the court failed to ensure his plea was voluntary, (4) the court violated his right to be present during the proceedings, and (5) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. His petition was denied after a post-conviction relief hearing held January 31 and February 1, 2001.
[¶ 3] The district court had jurisdiction under N.D.C.C. §§ 27-05-06 and 29-32.1-03. This Court has jurisdiction under N.D. Const. art. VI, § 6, and N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-14.
[¶ 4] An attempt to withdraw a guilty plea is treated as a motion to withdraw under N.D.R.Crim.P. 32(d). Abdi v. State, 2000 ND 64, ¶ 10, 608 N.W.2d 292 (citing State v. Hendrick, 543 N.W.2d 217, 218 (N.D.1996)); State v. Abdullahi, 2000 ND 39, ¶ 7, 607 N.W.2d 561. Rule 32(d), N.D.R.Crim.P., provides:
[¶ 5] The standard for withdrawal differs depending upon when the motion to withdraw is made. See, e.g., State v. Klein, 1997 ND 25, ¶¶ 12-16, 560 N.W.2d 198.
State v. Millner, 409 N.W.2d 642, 644 (N.D.1987) (quoting Kadwell v. United States, 315 F.2d 667, 670 (9th Cir.1963)).
[¶ 6] A defendant has a right to withdraw a guilty plea before it is accepted by the court. State v. Klein, 1997 ND 25, ¶ 12, 560 N.W.2d 198; State v. Welch, 356 N.W.2d 147, 149 (N.D.1984). Klein also held, when a defendant's guilty plea is part of a plea agreement, the guilty plea cannot be accepted until the plea agreement is accepted. Klein, at ¶ 19. Klein sought to follow federal case law regarding the acceptance of guilty pleas as part of plea agreements, but the case Klein followed is no longer good law. Klein relies upon United States v. Cordova-Perez, a Ninth Circuit case, for the proposition a "`plea agreement and the plea are "inextricably bound up together" such that deferment of the decision whether to accept the plea agreement carried with it postponement of the decision whether to accept the plea.'" Klein, at ¶ 19 (quoting United States v. Cordova-Perez, 65 F.3d 1552, 1556 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Sanchez, 609 F.2d 761, 762 (5th Cir.1980))). United States v. Cordova-Perez was overruled by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 117 S.Ct. 1630, 137 L.Ed.2d 935 (1997). The Court, in Hyde, held that when a defendant has pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, and the district court accepts the plea but defers decision on whether to accept the plea agreement, a "defendant may not withdraw his plea unless he shows a `fair and just reason' under Rule 32(e)." Id. at 671, 117 S.Ct. 1630. "The Court ultimately held that when the district court has accepted a defendant's plea but deferred accepting the plea agreement, the plea may not be withdrawn unless the defendant provides a `fair and just reason' under Rule 32(e)." United States v. Grant, 117 F.3d 788, 791 (5th Cir.1997) ( ). The portion of Klein relying on Cordova-Perez is overruled, and we accept the standard set forth in Hyde. Id.
[¶ 7] If a district court rejects a plea agreement after a defendant has pled guilty, the court shall "afford the defendant the opportunity to then withdraw the plea." N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(d)(4).
[¶ 8] "After a guilty plea is accepted, but before sentencing, the defendant may withdraw a guilty plea if necessary to correct a manifest injustice, or, if allowed in the court's discretion, for any `fair and just' reason unless the prosecution has been prejudiced by reliance on the plea." Klein, 1997 ND 25, ¶ 13,560 N.W.2d 198; see also State v. Sisson, 1997 ND 158, ¶ 14, 567 N.W.2d 839.
[¶ 9] "When a court has accepted a plea and imposed sentence, the defendant cannot withdraw the plea unless withdrawal is necessary to correct a `manifest injustice.'" Klein, 1997 ND 25, ¶ 15, 560 N.W.2d 198; see also Abdi v. State, 2000 ND 64, ¶ 10, 608 N.W.2d 292. The finding of whether a manifest injustice exists, which would necessitate the withdrawal of a guilty plea, rests within the court's discretion and will not be reversed on appeal except for an abuse of discretion. Abdi, 2000 ND 64, ¶ 10, 608 N.W.2d 292. "An abuse of discretion under N.D.R.Crim.P. 32(d) occurs when the court's legal discretion is not exercised in the interests of justice." Abdi, at ¶ 10 (citing State v. Dalman, 520 N.W.2d 860, 862 (N.D.1994)).
[¶ 10] A defendant's oral statement may be treated as a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. State v. Farrell, 2000 ND 26, ¶ 7, 606 N.W.2d 524. In Farrell, the district court refused to accept the sentence recommendation the State and Farrell had agreed upon. Id. at ¶ 4. After he was given a lengthier sentence than recommended, Farrell specifically asked, "Well then I have a right to change my plea then also, don't I?" Id. at ¶ 5. The district court responded he did not have a right to change his plea and proceeded with the sentencing hearing. Id. at ¶ 5. The case was remanded to the district court to permit Farrell to withdraw his guilty plea because the district court did not substantially comply with the requirements of N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(c). Id. at ¶¶ 21-22.
[¶ 11] Other jurisdictions have treated oral statements at sentencing hearings as motions to withdraw guilty pleas. See Connecticut v. Johnson, 253 Conn. 1, 751 A.2d 298, 329 (2000) (); United States v. Casey, 951 F.2d 892, 893 (8th Cir.1991) (); United States v. Turner, 898 F.2d 705, 713 (9th Cir.1990) ().
[¶ 12] Froistad entered his guilty plea on August 7, 1998. The district court conducted a Rule 11 inquiry and approved the plea agreement in all respects, subject to a review of the presentence report. In the two months between his plea of guilty and his sentencing hearing, Froistad claims he made six attempts to withdraw his guilty plea. Of the six attempts, only two were directed to the district court and could possibly be considered attempts to withdraw his guilty plea. In his October 8, 1998, response to the presentence investigation report, Froistad wrote,
[¶ 13] At his sentencing hearing, also held on October 8, 1998, the district court provided Froistad with several opportunities to request a withdrawal of his guilty plea.
At this point, the district court "accepted the negotiated plea agreement in all respects."
[¶ 14] Again before the district court imposed Froistad's sentence, it gave him an opportunity to speak.
To continue reading
Request your trial-
U.S. v. Patterson
...in United States v. Hyde, 92 F.3d 779 (9th Cir.1996). See Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 117 S.Ct. 1630, 137 L.Ed.2d 935; see also Froistad v. State, 641 N.W.2d 86, 90 (N.D. 2002) (noting that Cordova-Perez is no longer good law as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Hyde). In fact, although t......
-
State v. Kaulia
...FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2). Rule 11 does not specifically require federal courts to inquire about medication. 18.See Froistad v. State, 641 N.W.2d 86 (N.D.2002) (court's inquiry into defendant's use of prescription medication was sufficient where court confirmed that the medication had no ef......
-
Davies v. State
...ensure that the defendant is fully aware of the consequences of a guilty plea before he enters his plea." Yost , at ¶ 17 (quoting Froistad v. State, 2002 ND 52, ¶ 25, 641 N.W.2d 86 ) (internal citations omitted). Rule 11(b), N.D.R.Crim.P., provides, in pertinent part:(3) Determining the Fac......
-
State v. Bates
...See id. III [¶6] The standard for a plea withdrawal differs depending upon when the motion to withdraw the guilty plea is made. Froistad v. State, 2002 ND 52, ¶ 5, 641 N.W.2d 86. A defendant has a right to withdraw a guilty plea before it is accepted by the court. Id. at ¶ 6. "`After a guil......