U.S. v. Casey, 90-1368

• Decision Date: 11 December 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90-1368,90-1368
• Citation: 951 F.2d 892
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Richard CASEY, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 892

951 F.2d 892

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Richard CASEY, Appellant.

No. 90-1368.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Aug. 26, 1991.

Decided Dec. 11, 1991.

Curtis Blood, Collinsville, Ill., argued, for appellant.

James Steitz, Asst. U.S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo., argued, for appellee.

Before McMILLIAN, WOLLMAN and MAGILL, Circuit Judges.

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.

Richard Casey appeals from a final judgment entered in the District Court ¹ for the Eastern District of Missouri, following Casey's guilty plea to two counts each of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1341, and tax evasion, 26 U.S.C. § 7201. The district court sentenced Casey to a non-guidelines sentence of two years imprisonment to run concurrently on each of the mail fraud counts followed by three years of probation to run concurrently on each of the tax evasion counts and a special assessment of $100.00 on the mail fraud counts. For reversal, Casey argues that the district court erred in not holding an evidentiary hearing prior to denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

FACTS

Richard Casey, a medical doctor, was charged by a seven-count indictment alleging four counts of mail fraud for obtaining insurance payments by mail for medical services not performed or covered by insurance, two counts of tax evasion for the years 1983 and 1984, and one count of obstruction of justice. Casey initially pleaded not guilty to all charges, but on February 3, 1989, following plea negotiations and a hearing, Casey entered a guilty plea to two counts each of mail fraud and tax evasion. The other three charges were dismissed. At the February plea hearing, the district court explained to Casey his right to a jury trial, that the verdict must be unanimous, and his right to appeal any verdict from trial. Additionally, the district court asked if anyone had threatened him into pleading guilty or if the plea was against his will and Casey responded "no" to each question. The district court explained that he would not be permitted to change his mind and that the guilty plea was final, and asked Casey several times if he had any questions or wished to speak to his attorney. Following the government's summary of the facts and a statement of the maximum penalty, the district court asked Casey about the mail fraud counts as follows:

The Court: [D]id you mail these claims to the insurance companies or to the Medicaid officials, asking for money for services which had not been rendered or for services which were unnecessary?

The Defendant: Yes, an employee of mine did that.

The Court: And you knew that?

The Defendant: Yes.

The district court then asked about the tax evasion counts and Casey responded that he was guilty of those charges. The district court then gave Casey a final opportunity to speak to his attorney and accepted the guilty plea.

On January 19, 1990, following a psychiatric evaluation of Casey, a sentencing hearing was held. Casey requested a continuance of his case and that request was denied. Casey then stated "Well, quite honestly, Judge, because of the prosecution's intimidation, coercion, threats of scandal and slander, and almost downright blackmail, I think, under any ordinary circumstances, one might consider a plea of guilty." Casey stated that he was not guilty. The district court explained to Casey why it believed that his plea was voluntary, citing Casey's education and his responses to the district court's questions. The district court stated, however, that it would treat Casey's comments as an oral motion to set aside his guilty plea. Casey responded by explaining that he did not file income taxes because of his emotional state and had always intended to file. Additionally, Casey said that the government owed him $15,000, so if he did have any tax liability, which according to his calculations he did not, it would be offset by the money owed him. As to the mail fraud counts, Casey said that he did not pay close attention to what his employees were doing and was unaware that his employees were filing false claims. Furthermore, he claimed that his employees intercepted the money and thus profited from the false claims. Finally, Casey argued that he had over

                $200,000 in legitimate Medicaid claims which he did not submit, and thus he did not profit from any scheme to defraud.   The district court denied his request to vacate the guilty plea and sentenced Casey to a total of two years in prison and three years probation under the pre-guidelines sentencing scheme.   Additionally, the district court filed a written order denying Casey's request to vacate his plea.   United States v. Casey, No. 88-048-CR(4) (E.D.Mo. Feb. 12, 1990).   Casey now appeals to this court
                

ANALYSIS

Casey argues that he is entitled to a hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and that the district court abused its discretion in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(d), a motion for the withdrawal of a plea of guilty prior to sentencing may be permitted "upon a showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason." The burden of proving a fair and just reason is on the defendant. United States v. Thompson, 906 F.2d 1292, 1298 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 530, 112 L.Ed.2d 540 (1990) (citations omitted) (Thompson ). We review a district court's denial of an evidentiary hearing under the abuse of discretion standard. United States...