Froman v. Madden

• Decision Date: 11 February 1907
• Citation: 13 Idaho 138,88 P. 894
• Parties: I. S. FROMAN, Respondent, v. ADA F. MADDEN, Appellant
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

88 P. 894

13 Idaho 138

I. S. FROMAN, Respondent, v. ADA F. MADDEN, Appellant

Supreme Court of Idaho

February 11, 1907

Syllabus by the Court.

One who purchases real estate without any knowledge or notice that the same has been previously conveyed to another party and pays a valuable consideration therefor and duly records his conveyance prior to the recording of the previously executed deed, takes a good title to the property so conveyed, and may maintain ejectment against such prior purchaser who goes into possession subsequent to the plaintiff's purchase.

[Ed Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 48, Vendor and Purchaser, §§ 583-594.]

Under the provisions of section 3001 of the Revised Statutes of 1887, " every conveyance of real property other than a lease for a term not exceeding one year, is void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee of the same property or any part thereof, in good faith and for a valuable consideration, whose conveyance is first duly recorded."

[Ed Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 48, Vendor and Purchaser, §§ 563-566.]

One who has notice or knowledge of a previous sale of real property, or who has notice or knowledge of such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably prudent man to discover that a previous sale had been made, is not a purchaser in good faith within the meaning of section 3001, Rev. St. 1887.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 48, Vendor and Purchaser, §§ 477-479.]

A plaintiff in ejectment who successfully establishes his own title and possession of the premises by the defendant and a withholding of the same from plaintiff makes a sufficient case to entitle him to recover.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 17, Ejectment, §§ 12-17, 65.]

One cannot be precluded the right of recovery under the doctrine of estoppel who has committed no act nor has made any statement or representation that would mislead or deceive the adverse party, or cause him to part with his property or labor either, to the prejudice of the one or the gain of the other.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 19, Estoppel, §§ 124, 144.]

APPEAL from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, for Canyon County. Hon. Frank J. Smith, Judge.

Action in ejectment. Judgment for the defendant. Plaintiff moved for a new trial and the motion was granted. Defendant appealed from the judgment and order granting a new trial. Affirmed.

Judgment affirmed. Costs awarded in favor of the respondent.

Griffiths & Griffiths and Rice & Thompson, for Appellant.

The plaintiff was obliged to allege and prove in this action for ejectment three things to entitle him to the verdict and judgment: 1. The right of possession in plaintiff at the time the action was begun; 2. Prior possession in the plaintiff; 3. Ouster of plaintiff by defendant. (McMasters v. Torsen, 5 Idaho 536, 51 P. 100; Owen v. Fowler, 24 Cal. 193; Owen v. Morton, 24 Cal. 373; 10 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., 494, and cases cited in note 7.)

One who enters into possession of real estate rightfully must have such possession changed by demand, notice or some act of the parties to make such possession wrongful before the action of ejectment can be maintained. (McNally v. Connolly (Cal.), 9 P. 169; Newell v. Woodruff, 30 Conn. 492; Prentice v. Wilson, 14 Ill. 91; Taylor v. McCracken, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 260; Stackhouse v. Reynolds, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 57; Bool v. Mix, 17 Wend. 119, 31 Am. Dec. 285; Chamberlain v. Donohue, 41 Vt. 306; Clark v. Davis, 22 Ky. Law Rep. 1231, 60 S.W. 396.)

The undisputed evidence and facts admitted show that plaintiff was never in possession, and was never ousted from possession by defendant. And the existence and proof of these facts are indispensable to plaintiff's right to recover in this case. (McMasters v. Torsen, supra; Watkins v. Winnings, 102 Ind. 330, 1 N.E. 638; Zilmer v. Gerichten, 111 Cal. 73, 43 P. 408; Chesser v. Harrelson, 119 Ala. 435, 24 So. 716; Watson v. Hue, 9 Pa. Dist. Ct. Rep. 519.)

The burden is on plaintiff to prove that he was an innocent purchaser for value and without notice of defendant's claim. The record is not sufficient. (2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, 3d ed., sec. 759, and notes.)

H. E. Wallace and Stone & MacLane, for Respondent.

An examination of the evidence as disclosed by the transcript shows without any attempt at contradiction that plaintiff, when he purchased and paid for the lots in question, knew nothing of defendant's prior deed, and that there were no circumstances to put him on inquiry as to the same. The land was vacant and unoccupied. It had no improvements. Plaintiff did all that the law required of him when he searched the records and had an abstract of title prepared.

In order to create an equitable estoppel, there must be an admission, act or declaration intended to influence the conduct of another, and actually leading him into a line of conduct which would be prejudicial to his interests, unless the party estopped be cut off from the power of retraction. (Leland v. Isenbeck, 1 Idaho 469.)

"It seems to be in harmony with the trend of authority to say that a person may rest upon the constructive notice which the record of title imparts, and that he is under no duty or obligation to give any other notice to anyone who assumes to deal with other parties in reference to such property. He may remain silent and passive." (Eastwood v. Standard etc. Co., 11 Idaho 195, 81 P. 382.)

There is no evidence to show that plaintiff knew, before the construction of the fence by defendant, that defendant contemplated making such improvement. As to the house erected by defendant, it appears from her own testimony that she built the house after learning from plaintiff's brother that plaintiff would insist on his right to the land. In the face of this knowledge, defendant erected those improvements on account of which she claims an estoppel against plaintiff.

Plaintiff's right was fixed by the record of the deed in October. He then obtained the constructive possession of the land and held it until ousted by the act of defendant in entering on the same and building her fence. All that is necessary to constitute an ouster is that defendant wrongfully withhold possession from the plaintiff. (2 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 561; Rego v. Van Pelt, 65 Cal. 264, 3 P. 867.)

Proof of a paper title and a withholding of possession by defendant is sufficient to sustain an action of ejectment. It is only where plaintiff fails to prove title that he must show an actual prior possession. (Miller v. Shackleford, 33 Ky. (3 Dana) 289; Cornelius v. Ivens, 26 N.J.L. 376; Jackson v. Crysler, 1 Johns. Cas. 125; Polack v. McGrath, 32 Cal. 15; Page v. O'Brien, 36 Cal. 559.)

AILSHIE, C. J. Sullivan, J., concurs.

OPINION

AILSHIE, C. J.

This is an action in ejectment. The case was tried before the court with a jury and a verdict was returned in favor of the defendant, whereupon judgment was entered accordingly. Plaintiff moved for a new trial and the motion was allowed and a new trial granted. The defendant appealed from the order. The evidence in the case is very brief, and contains but slight, if any, material conflict. The essential and undisputed facts material to be considered in this case are as follows, as disclosed by the record presented on this appeal:

The defendant, Ada F. Madden, purchased of the Caldwell Land Company, Ltd., a corporation, block 123 in the town of Caldwell, and paid the purchase price therefor in the sum of $ 220, and received a deed dated August 1, 1904, which was acknowledged September 2d the same year. This deed was not filed for record with the recorder of Canyon county (the county in which the land was situated) until the tenth day of November following. In the latter part of September, 1904, I. S. Froman purchased from the same company this same tract of land and paid therefor the sum of $ 200. He received a deed dated September 28th, which was acknowledged on the thirtieth day of September, and filed for record in the recorder's office on the eleventh day of October following.

At the time of these purchases by both the plaintiff and the defendant the land was vacant, uninclosed and unoccupied land, covered with greasewood and salt grass. Neither purchaser appears to have had anything more than a constructive possession of the property until the early part of November, at which time the defendant caused the block to be fenced at an expense of about $ 25. In the following July she had a small house erected on the land at an expenditure of $ 230. She was absent from the state of Idaho from about the 3d of September, 1904, until the tenth day of June following, and did not learn of the sale of the property to the plaintiff until sometime in December of 1904, or January, 1905. The plaintiff testifies that the first time he ever learned that defendant claimed any right or title to this property was about two months after he bought it. This evidence is not disputed, either directly or by any circumstances. At the time of the plaintiff's purchase and payment of the purchase price, defendant's deed was unrecorded and remained so for about forty days thereafter. So far as the evidence discloses, the plaintiff was clearly a purchaser "in good faith and for a valuable consideration," and his deed was placed of record prior to the recording of defendant's deed.

The facts of this case seem to bring it clearly within the provisions of section 3001 of the Revised Statutes, which is as follows: "Every conveyance of real property other than a lease for a term not exceeding one year is void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee of the same property, or any part thereof, in...