Fromm-Vane v. Lawnwood Medical Center
| Decision Date | 12 December 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-14244-CIV.,96-14244-CIV. |
| Citation | 995 F.Supp. 1471 |
| Parties | Linda FROMM-VANE, Plaintiff, v. LAWNWOOD MEDICAL CENTER, INC. d/b/a HCA Lawnwood Regional Medical Center, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
Lance M. McKinney, Pavese, Garner, Haverfield, Dalton, Harrison & Jensen, Cape Coral, FL, Scott R. Schomber, Strauss, Schomber & Williams, Coconut Grove, FL, for Plaintiff.
Mark E. Edwards, Jeanne Casstevens Thomas, Nashville, TN, Alexander D. Del Russo, Levy, Kneen, Wiener, Kornfeld & del Russo, PA, West Palm Beach, FL, for Defendant.
THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant Lawnwood Medical Center, Inc.'s ("Lawnwood") Motion for Summary Judgment ("Motion") (DE # 31).
UPON CONSIDERATION of the Motion, response, reply, materials submitted, the pertinent portions of the record, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, the Court enters the following Order.
Plaintiff, Linda Fromm-Vane ("Fromm") was employed as the Chief Nursing Officer at Lawnwood on or about October 1, 1992.2 As Chief Nursing Officer, Fromm was responsible for the Department of Nursing. Fromm reported directly to Lawnwood's Chief Executive Officer, Jon C. Trezona ("Trezona"). During Fromm's employment at Lawnwood, William Vaschon ("Vaschon") served as Lawnwood's Chief Financial Officer ("CFO"). Vaschon, like Fromm, was one of four senior managers who reported directly to the CEO.
On or about July 27, 1993, Fromm began to see a psychologist, C. Jonathan Ahr, Ph.D. At some point between Fromm's first visit and August 17, 1993, Ahr diagnosed Fromm as suffering from a depressive disorder. Dr. Ahr described Fromm as overloaded, hyper vigilant and suffering from disturbed thinking. Dr. Ahr opined that Fromm was undergoing severe marital dysfunction and that her job was an additional stressor. According to Dr. Ahr, Fromm's depression was of such a nature that she could not carry on her daily routine.
During the summer of 1993, concerns arose over Fromm's job performance at Lawnwood. In August of 1993, a group of nurse managers met with David Riley ("Riley"), Lawnwood's Director of Human Resources, to complain about Fromm's abilities and inabilities as a manager and director. The nurse managers told Riley that they were prepared to resign because of Fromm. In addition, the nurse managers prepared a statement setting forth approximately twenty-two expectations the nurse managers had of Fromm. Several assistant directors of nursing also went to Riley with concerns about Fromm. Riley met with Trezona, Lawnwood's CEO, and informed him about the nurse managers and assistant directors' complaints. At the meeting, Trezona decided to terminate Fromm. On September 10, 1993, Trezona met with Fromm and encouraged her to resign from her position at Lawnwood.3 Fromm did not report to work after the September 10, 1993 meeting with Trezona. Not having heard from Fromm on the issue of her resignation, Trezona officially terminated Fromm's employment by letter dated September 20, 1993.
Dr. Ahr's notes on Fromm from September 10, 1993 state, On September 13, 1993, Dr. Ahr prepared a letter to Lawnwood asking that Fromm be granted a leave of absence for at least four weeks. In the letter, Dr. Ahr described Fromm as "under so much pressure now due to environmental stressors that she is unable to function in the work setting." In Dr. Ahr's opinion, Fromm would benefit from intense outpatient psychotherapy and would be able to return to work within four to six weeks. The letter from Dr. Ahr was Fromm's first request for a leave of absence or for any type of accommodation relating to her mental state. According to Dr. Ahr, Fromm's depression abated by April 15, 1994 and no longer affected Fromm's ability to carry on her daily routine. Dr. Ahr reached this conclusion sometime during the first three months of 1994.
In support of her sexual harassment hostile work environment claim, Fromm offers the following undisputed facts. Vaschon, Lawnwood's CFO, frequently talked dirty, made sexual jokes and used offensive language in Fromm's presence. On one occasion, Vaschon made a reference to the size of Fromm's husband's penis. Vaschon spoke about his visits to whorehouses and about women's breasts. He invited Fromm to lunch a number of times in order to talk about his sexual exploits with his girlfriend. Fromm could not recall if any of Vaschon's comments were directed at her or her physical appearance. It is undisputed, however, that Vaschon never touched Fromm.
People at the hospital were generally aware of Vaschon's "dirty talk" — it was part of his personality. Vaschon spoke this way in front of other people besides Fromm. When Fromm approached other people about Vaschon's comments, people would say, "that's just Bill." In response to Vaschon's comments, Fromm would say, "Oh, Bill," or "Please," "Please, Bill, don't," or that she did not want to hear it. Fromm may have told Vaschon that she did not like his talk. Fromm thought Vaschon's behavior was inappropriate in a business setting. She was shocked by Vaschon's statements and felt uncomfortable. On one occasion, she may have laughed nervously at one of his comments. When asked how Vaschon's statements affected her job, Fromm testified that she knew she had to humor him because Vaschon was unofficially in charge of her budget and any financial resources she needed. Fromm never filled out a written complaint about Vaschon's behavior.
The standard to be applied in reviewing a summary judgment motion is stated unambiguously in Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Summary judgment may be entered only where there is no genuine issue of material fact. See Twiss v. Kury, 25 F.3d 1551, 1554 (11th Cir.1994). The moving party has the burden of meeting this exacting standard. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). An issue of fact is "material" if it is a legal element of the claim under the applicable substantive law which might affect the outcome of the case. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.1997). It is "genuine" if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Id.
In applying this standard, the district court must view the evidence and all factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Id. However, the non-moving party:
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Rule 56(e), Fed.R.Civ.P. "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant]." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In other words, the party opposing summary judgment "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). In determining whether this evidentiary threshold has been met, the trial court "must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden" applicable to the particular cause of action before it. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254, 106 S.Ct. at 2513. If the non-movant fails to adduce evidence which would be sufficient, when viewed in a light most favorable to the non-movant, to support a jury finding for the non-movant, summary judgment may be granted. Id. at 254-55, 106 S.Ct. at 2513-14.
Additionally, the non-moving party must "make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial and requires the court to grant the motion for summary judgment. Id.
Fromm has filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 ("ADA").4 To establish a prima facie case under the ADA, Fromm must show the following: 1) she has a disability, 2) she is a qualified individual and 3) she was discriminated against because of the disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132; Pritchard v. Southern Company Services, 92 F.3d 1130, 1132 (11th Cir.), amended on reh'g in part, 102 F.3d 1118 (11th Cir.1996) (), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 2453, 138 L.Ed.2d 211 (1997). In moving for summary judgment, Lawnwood presents the following arguments: 1) Fromm is not disabled within the meaning of the ADA and 2) Lawnwood had no duty to accommodate Fromm because she failed to advise the hospital of her disability.5
Lawnwood initially argues that Fromm did not suffer from a disability within the meaning of the ADA. A disability under the ADA is defined as: A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; B) a record of such impairment; or C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. §...
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