Frudden v. Pilling

• Decision Date: 16 December 2014
• Docket Number: No. 61932,61932
• Parties: MARY FRUDDEN AND JON E. FRUDDEN, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS PARENTS AND GUARDIANS OF THEIR MINOR CHILDREN, Appellants, v. KAYANN PILLING, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE PRINCIPAL OF ROY GOMM ELEMENTARY SCHOOL AND IN HER CAPACITY AS AN EXECUTIVE BOARD MEMBER OF THE ROY GOMM ELEMENTARY SCHOOL PARENT-FACULTY ASSOCIATION, INC.; WASHOE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF NEVADA; AND ROY GOMM ELEMENTARY SCHOOL PARENT-FACULTY ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondents.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

MARY FRUDDEN AND JON E. FRUDDEN, INDIVIDUALLY,AND AS PARENTS AND GUARDIANS OF THEIR MINOR CHILDREN, Appellants, v. KAYANN PILLING,

INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE PRINCIPAL OF ROY GOMM ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

AND IN HER CAPACITY AS AN EXECUTIVE BOARD MEMBER OF THE ROY GOMM ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

PARENT-FACULTY ASSOCIATION, INC.;

WASHOE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF NEVADA;

AND ROY GOMM ELEMENTARY SCHOOL PARENT-FACULTY ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondents.

No. 61932

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

December 16, 2014

An unpublished order shall not be regarded as precedent and shall not be cited as legal authority. SCR 123.

ORDER AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART AND REMANDING

This is an appeal from a district court order granting summary judgment in an open meeting law action. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Brent T. Adams, Judge.

Roy Gomm Elementary School (Roy Gomm), a school in respondent Washoe County School District (WCSD), implemented a mandatory school uniform policy for the 2011-12 school year. Unhappy with Roy Gomm's uniform policy, which was allegedly prepared by respondent Roy Gomm Elementary School Parent-Faculty Association (the PFA) and its Uniform Committee, appellants Mary and Jon E. Fruddensued WCSD; Roy Gomm's principal, respondent KayAnn Pilling; and other defendants in federal court. The Fruddens alleged multiple claims, including First Amendment violations, violations of NRS Chapter 241, breach of a special relationship, negligent misrepresentation, and failure to comply with Nevada's education laws. The federal district court dismissed the Fruddens' First Amendment and tort claims with prejudice and declined to take jurisdiction over their other state law claims. Frudden v. Pilling, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1270-71, 1282 (D. Nev. 2012), rev'd, 742 F.3d 1199, 1208 (9th Cir. 2014). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the dismissal of the Fruddens' First Amendment claims. Frudden v. Pilling, 742 F.3d 1199, 1208 (9th Cir. 2014).

The Fruddens then filed the present lawsuit in the state district court, originally naming only WCSD and Pilling as defendants. The Fruddens argued that the PFA's Uniform Committee violated NRS Chapter 241's open meeting requirements when preparing Roy Gomm's uniform policy and that WCSD and Pilling violated multiple Nevada education statutes by enforcing the uniform policy.

Instead of filing an answer, WCSD and Pilling filed a motion for summary judgment against the Fruddens' claims. After WCSD's and Pilling's motion was briefed, but before it was decided, the Fruddens filed an amended complaint in which they restated their allegations against Pilling and WCSD and added the PFA as a defendant. The amended complaint sought (1) a declaration that the uniform policy was void and (2)compensatory and punitive damages.¹ The district court granted WCSD and Pilling's motion for summary judgment. The district court found that the PFA was not a public body under NRS 241.015 and thus was not subject to NRS Chapter 241's open meeting requirements. The district court also found that the Fruddens did not have an implied private right of action for the alleged violations of Nevada's education statutes.²

Nine days after the district court granted WCSD's and Pilling's motion for summary judgment, the Fruddens obtained a clerk's entry of default against the PFA for the PFA's failure to respond to the Fruddens' amended complaint. NRCP 55(a). WCSD, Pilling, and the PFA then filed a motion to vacate the entry of default. The Fruddens filed motions to vacate and revise the district court's summary judgment order.

The district court denied the Fruddens' motions and granted WCSD, Pilling, and the PFA's motion. The district court explained that its original summary judgment order applied to the Fruddens' claims against the PFA. In doing so, the district court set aside the entry of default against the PFA ''because [the Fruddens] did not inquire about [WCSD's, Pilling's, and the PFA's] intent to proceed or respond and did not satisfy the notice requirements as required under NRCP 55(b)(2)." The Fruddens now appeal, challenging the district court's orders granting summary judgment and vacating the entry of default.

As we explain below, we conclude that the district court (1) erred in finding that the PFA was not a "public body" under NRS 241.015(3)(a) before July 1, 2011; (2) did not err in finding that the PFA was not a "public body" under NRS 241.015{3)(a) after the 2011 amendment to this statute took effect on July 1, 2011; and (3) correctly vacated the clerk's entry of default against the PFA but did so for the wrong reason.³The PFA could have been a public body under NRS 241.015(3)(a) before July 1, 2011; however, it was not a public body under the amended version of NRS 241.015(3)(a) on and after July 1, 2011

NRS Chapter 241 establishes Nevada's open meeting law. It states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by specific statute, all meetings of public bodies must be open and public, and all persons must be permitted to attend any meeting of these public bodies." NRS 241.020(1) (2009); see also NRS 241.020(1) (2011) (stating the same). If the PFA was a public body prior to the 2011 amendments, its meetings should have been open and public as provided for by NRS 241.020.

Until July 1, 2011, NRS 241.015(3)(a) (2009) defined a public body for purposes of NRS Chapter 241 by the entity's identity and function:

Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, "public body" means:

(a) Any administrative, advisory, executive or legislative body of the State or a local government which expends or disburses or is supported in whole or in part by tax revenue or which advises or makes recommendations to any entity which expends or disburses or is supported in whole or in part by tax revenue, including, but not limited to, any board, commission, committee, subcommittee or other subsidiary thereof and includes an educational foundation as defined in subsection 3 of NRS 388.750 and a university foundation as defined in subsection 3 of NRS 396.405.

In 2011, the Legislature amended NRS 241.015(3)(a) by adding the qualifier that a public body is created by one of seven authorities listed in sub-subparagraphs 1-7, thereby narrowing thedefinition of a public body. 2011 Nev. Stat., ch. 383, § 4, at 2385-86. This amendment became effective on July 1, 2011.⁴ Id. at § 8, at 2390. Though at least some of the PFA's meetings occurred before the 2011 amendment became effective, the parties do not address which version applies in the present case or whether it matters. The Fruddens argue that the PFA is, and has been, a public body subject to the open meeting law because it is an educational foundation as defined in NRS 388.750 and is thus expressly included in the statute. WCSD, Pilling, and the PFA argue that the PFA was never a public body because it was not created by one of the authorities listed in NRS 241.015(3)(a)(1)-(7) (2011).

Standard of review

We review de novo a district court's order granting summary judgment and view "the evidence, and any reasonable inferences drawn from it, . . . in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005).

We also review de novo a district court's interpretation of a statute. Cromer v. Wilson, 126 Nev. 106, 109, 225 P.3d 788, 790 (2010). When interpreting a statute, legislative intent "is the controlling factor." Robert E. v. Justice Court of Reno Twp., Washoe Cnty., 99 Nev. 443, 445, 664 P.2d 957, 959 (1983). "When a statute is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words and do not resort to the rules of construction." Cromer, 126 Nev. at 109, 225 P.3d at 790. "In assessing a statute's plain meaning, provisions are read as awhole with effect given to each word and phrase." City of Las Vegas v. Evans, 129 Nev. ___, ___, 301 P.3d 844, 846 (2013).

The 2011 amendment to NRS 241.015(3)(a) only applies prospectively

A preliminary issue in our analysis concerns which version of NRS Chapter 241 applies. The district court concluded, without reference to authority, that because the Fruddens filed their first federal complaint after the effective date of the 2011 amendment to NRS 241.015, the amended version of the law applied to this case. The district court's conclusion that the date on which the Fruddens filed their first complaint dictates which version of the statute applies is incorrect because NRS Chapter 241's substantive requirements govern how public bodies conduct meetings and not subsequent litigation that may arise about them. See NRS 241.020 (establishing requirements for open meetings). Therefore, the version of NRS 241.015 that existed at the time of a meeting applies to the meeting unless later amendments to the statute apply retroactively.

The 2011 amendment does not discuss whether it was intended to apply retroactively. "[W]e generally presume that [newly enacted statutes] apply prospectively unless the Legislature clearly indicates that they should apply retroactively or the Legislature's intent cannot otherwise be met." Valdez v. Emp'rs Ins. Co. of Nev., 123 Nev. 170, 179, 162 P.3d 148, 154 (2007). The Legislature's intent, as articulated by NRS 241.015(3)(a) (2011)'s plain meaning, was to identify which entities must comply with the open meeting law. 2011 Nev. Stat., ch. 383, § 4, at 2385-86. We conclude that the 2011 amendment to NRS 241.015(3)(a) applies prospectively. Therefore, we hold that the pre-amendment version of NRS 241.015(3)(a) applied before July 1, 2011, and the amended version of NRS 241.015(3)(a) applied on and after July 1, 2011.

There is a genuine issue of fact as to whether the PFA is an educational foundation pursuant to NRS 388.750

One type of entity that is identified in both versions of NRS 241.015(3)(a)'s definition of "public body" is an "educational foundation."...