Frudden v. Pilling

• Decision Date: 31 January 2012
• Docket Number: No. 3:11–cv–00474–RCJ–VPC.,3:11–cv–00474–RCJ–VPC.
• Citation: 842 F.Supp.2d 1265,281 Ed. Law Rep. 1110
• Parties: Mary FRUDDEN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Kayann PILLING, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Nevada

842 F.Supp.2d 1265

281 Ed. Law Rep. 1110

Mary FRUDDEN, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Kayann PILLING, et al., Defendants.

No. 3:11–cv–00474–RCJ–VPC.

United States District Court, D. Nevada.

Jan. 31, 2012.

Mary Frudden, Reno, NV, pro se.

Jon E. Frudden, Reno, NV, pro se.

Debra O. Waggoner, Michael E. Malloy, Maupin, Cox & Legoy, Reno, NV, for Defendants.

ORDER

ROBERT C. JONES, District Judge.

This case arises out of the adoption of a school dress code at a public elementary school. Defendants have moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. For the reasons given herein, the Court grants the motion.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Pro se Plaintiffs Mary and John E. Frudden are the parents of two minor children (the “Children”) who attend Roy Gomm Elementary School (“RGES”) in Reno, Nevada. (Compl. ¶¶ 4–5, Oct. 18, 2011, ECF No. 3). The RGES Parent Faculty Association, Inc. (“PFA”) is a non-profit fundraising organization with no statutory authority to make rules or regulations affecting RGES students. ( Id. ¶¶ 17–18). Nevertheless, at a January 19, 2010 PFA meeting, PFA President Mimi Butler asked the attendees about their interest in school uniforms, although nothing concerning a dress code was listed on the agenda. ( Id. ¶¶ 19, 21). At the March 16, 2010 PFA meeting, the dress code did appear on the agenda, though the agenda was not distributed prior to the meeting. ( Id. ¶ 26). An April 2010 issue of the RGES newspaper, the Gopher Gazette, noted that the PFA was recommending adoption of school uniforms for the 2010–2011 school year. ( Id. ¶ 29). At an April 13, 2010 PFA meeting, Butler noted that in order for the adoption of school uniforms to pass, two-thirds of the ballots returned would have to be in support, and all families would have to vote. ( Id. ¶ 32). The ballots were sent home with students, and each family was entitled to one vote regardless of the number of children it had at RGES. ( Id. ¶¶ 35–36). The ballots were not confidential, and no safeguards were used to ensure parents received the ballots or that parents actually cast the votes, as opposed to students. ( Id. ¶¶ 39–40). The May 2010 Gopher Gazette reported the results as 62% in favor of the dress code, which was not enough for the measure to pass. ( Id. ¶ 42). At the May 18, 2010 PFA meeting, Butler reported the defeat of the measure and noted the PFA would try again the following year. ( Id. ¶ 47).

At a PFA meeting on February 11, 2011, RGES Principal KayAnn Pilling appointed a uniform committee (the “Committee”) to gather information and educate parents about the proposed dress code. ( Id. ¶¶ 49–51). At the March 2011 PFA meeting, Butler reported that a parent information night and fashion show would be held on April 26, 2011, and the April 2011 Gopher Gazette contained the same announcement. ( Id. ¶¶ 58–59). Parents had no meaningful opportunity to submit opposing data or argument at the April 26, 2011 meeting. ( Id. ¶ 63). On April 27, 2011, Plaintiff Mary Frudden requested certain information by email from Defendant Dina Hunsberger, the chairwoman of the Committee and Vice President of the PFA. ( Id. ¶ 82). Later that day, Frudden sent an email to Hunsberger, Pilling, and Washoe County School District (“WCSD”) Superintendent Heath Morrison asserting that the school had no authority to adopt a dress code and that the action was unconstitutional. ( Id. ¶ 83). The May 2011 Gopher Gazette, published on April 29, 2011, noted that ballots had to be returned by May 2, 2011. ( Id. ¶ 89). As with the previous ballots, the ballots were not confidential, and no safeguards were used to ensure parents received the ballots or that parents actually cast the votes, as opposed to the students. ( Id. ¶¶ 92–93, 96). Some ballots were sent home with students, but some were handed out at the April 26, 2011 meeting. ( Id. ¶¶ 94–95).

On May 8, 2011, Pilling announced via “connect-ed” that over 70% of families had returned their ballots and 66% of families had voted in favor of uniforms, so uniforms would be required the following year. ( Id. ¶ 103). On May 9, 2011, Frudden emailed Hunsberger to determine when the ballots would be available for review. ( Id. ¶ 106). After several more attempts to contact Hunsberger and others, and after being directed to Pilling and others, ( see id. ¶¶ 107–26), Pilling eventually sent Frudden the ballot report and vote summary to Frudden by email on May 16, 2011, ( id. ¶ 127). The vote summary did not indicate how many ballots were issued and returned, but only that 70% of families voted, and it noted that three late “yes” votes were not counted. ( Id. ¶ 128). The summary indicated that 183 of the 276 votes cast were cast in favor of uniforms. ( Id. ¶ 129). Although Plaintiffs do not point it out, 183 of 276 is 66.3%, which is less than two-thirds.¹ Two-thirds of 276 is exactly 184, so although Plaintiffs emphasize that one single fewer vote would have resulted in the measure failing under the two-thirds requirement, ( see id. ¶ 130), the measure in fact failed to pass under the two-thirds requirement according to Pilling's own records.

On May 31, 2011, RGES sent home a pre-order form, to the back of which was attached the written uniform policy (the “Policy”). ( Id. ¶¶ 144–46). On June 2, 2011, Frudden and two other parents of RGES students met with Defendant WCSD Area Superintendent Lynn Rauh. ( Id. ¶ 148). Frudden asked Rauh what authority an individual school had to implement a uniform policy, and Rauh stated there was no written authority and that Rauh had the ability to prevent the Policy from being acted upon but would not make a decision at that time. ( Id. ¶¶ 150–52). On June 6, 2011, Frudden delivered to the WCSD Board of Trustees, Morrison, Rauh, Pilling, and WCSD Attorney Chris Reich a request to declare the Policy void or to revoke it. ( Id. ¶ 154). No party responded to this request. ( Id. ¶ 161).

Plaintiffs sued Pilling, Hunsberger, Morrison, Rauh, Reich, the Committee, and WCSD in this Court on eighteen causes of action. The First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) omits Reich as a Defendant and lists sixteen causes of action: (1) Declaratory Judgment that the Committee and RGES had no power to enact the Policy under Nevada Revised Statutes (“NRS”) section 392.458; (2) violation of the Children's First Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due to the requirement to wear particular clothing; (3) violation of associational rights between Plaintiffs and the Children pursuant to § 1983; (4) Procedural and Substantive Due Process violations pursuant to § 1983; (5) violation of Substantive Due Process pursuant to § 1983; (6) Failure to Train and Supervise pursuant to § 1983; (7) violation of the Equal Protection Clause pursuant to § 1983; (8) violation of Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights pursuant to § 1983 due to RGES's viewpoint discrimination in the unequal use of facilities as between supporters and opponents of the Policy; (9) Violation of NRS section 392.4644; (10) Declaratory Judgment of the violation of open meetings laws under NRS Chapter 241; (11) “Breach of Special Relationship”; (12) Intentional and Negligent Misrepresentation; (15) Declaratory Judgment of the violation of access to public records laws under NRS Chapter 239; (14) Attorney's Fees and Costs under § 1988; (15) Injunctive Relief; and (16) Declaratory Relief. Defendants have moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) mandates that a court dismiss a cause of action that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the complaint's sufficiency. See N. Star Int'l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir.1983). When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, dismissal is appropriate only when the complaint does not give the defendant fair notice of a legally cognizable claim and the grounds on which it rests. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a claim, the court will take all material allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir.1986). The court, however, is not required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.2001). A formulaic recitation of a cause of action with conclusory allegations is not sufficient; a plaintiff must plead facts showing that a violation is plausible, not just possible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

“Generally, a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. However, material which is properly submitted as part of the complaint may be considered on a motion to dismiss.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n. 19 (9th Cir.1990) (citation omitted). Similarly, “documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss” without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir.1994). Moreover, under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a court may take judicial notice of “matters of...