Fruehauf Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd.

• Decision Date: 14 May 1968
• Citation: 68 Cal.2d 569,68 Cal.Rptr. 164,440 P.2d 236
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 440 P.2d 236 FRUEHAUF CORPORATION et al., Petitioners, v. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD and Thomas C. Stansbury, Respondents. L.A. 29507.

Page 164

68 Cal.Rptr. 164

68 Cal.2d 569, 440 P.2d 236

FRUEHAUF CORPORATION et al., Petitioners, v. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD and Thomas C. Stansbury, Respondents.

L.A. 29507.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

May 14, 1968.

Zonni, Ginocchio & Taylor and Ralph J. Ginocchio, Los Angeles, for petitioners.

Everett A. Corten, San Francisco, Edward A. Sarkisian, Los Angeles, Rupert A. Pedrin, San Francisco, and Willis T. Lyman, Long Beach, for respondents.

MOSK, Justice.

Petitioners, Fruehauf Corporation and its insurance carrier, seek review of a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board (hereinafter board) awarding compensation to Thomas C. Stansbury, an employee who suffered an industrial injury arising out of and in the course of his employment by Fruehauf.

Section 5405 of the Labor Code ¹ provides, with exceptions not relevant here, that proceedings for the collection of disability payments and payments for medical and hospital treatment under the workmen's compensation law must be commenced without one year from the date of injury. The term 'injury' includes any injury or disease arising out of the employment. (§ 3208.) Section 5411 states, 'The date of injury, except in cases of occupational disease, is that date during the employment on which occurred the alleged incident or exposure, for the consequences of which compensation is claimed.' Section 5412 provides, 'The date of injury in cases of occupational diseases is that date upon which the employee first suffered disability therefrom and either knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that said disability was caused by his present or prior employment.'

The perplexing question at issue here is whether a repeated series of traumas to an employee's back which are cumulative in nature and finally culminate in disability are to be classified as an occupational disease within the meaning of section 5412 or whether such an injury is covered by the provisions of section 5411.

Stansbury was employed by Fruehauf from July 21, 1962 to July 5, 1964, as an assembler. This work required him to lift weights up to 75 or 80 pounds. In September 1963 he began to experience sharp pains in his groin. He complained to his foreman, who suggested that he consult his own doctor. The doctor prescribed a rest, and in compliance Stansbury took a month off from work. He returned to his employment in November, was assigned to the same job, and began to have stiffness and soreness in the low back. The pain was located in his spine and spread outward from that location. The onset of the pain was 'a gradual sort of thing that was coming on.' It persisted while he was at home and when he was in bed at night, as well as at work. On July 2, 1964, the pain was so acute that he felt compelled to consult another doctor to obtain relief.

Stansbury was hospitalized about a week later and remained in the hospital under traction until July 26. His condition continued to worsen, he consulted another doctor, and on the latter's recommendation an operation was performed in which three protruded lumbar intervertebral discs were removed from Stansbury's back. About October 10, after the operation, he was told by the doctor for the first time that his disability was due to the fact that his work at Fruehauf required an excessive amount of heavy lifting, twisting and stooping. Stansbury filed an application for compensation benefits on July 12, 1965, more than one year from the date of his disability, which occurred on July 2, 1964, but less than one year from the date he knew that his disability was of industrial origin. He did not work for Fruehauf after July 2, 1964.

The board found that Stansbury had sustained an industrial injury during the period between July 21, 1962, and July 5, 1964, and that his claim for benefits was not barred by section 5405 because he was suffering from an occupational disease within the meaning of section 5412. It found that he did not know and in the exercise of reasonable diligence should not have known prior to October 1964 that his disability was due to his employment and that petitioners were not prejudiced by lack of notice of the injury. If Stansbury's disability is not deemed to have resulted from an occupational disease, his application is barred under the provisions of section 5411 as not being filed within one year from the date of the 'alleged incident or exposure, for the consequences of which compensation is claimed.' Petitioners do not challenge the board's findings that Stansbury's injury occurred over a period of approximately two years.

The leading case on the subject of limitations applicable to workmen's compensation claims is Marsh v. Industrial Accident Commission (1933) 217 Cal. 338, 18 P.2d 933, 86 A.L.R. 563, decided 14 years before the enactment of sections 5411 and 5412. The petitioners in Marsh were two widows of employees who had died as the result of silicosis and an employee who sought disability benefits because he had contracted silicosis. At that time, a claim for workmen's compensation benefits was required to be filed within six months from the date of injury and for death benefits within one year from the date of death, except that the right to death benefits was barred unless death ensued one year from the date of injury. Marsh determined for the first time in this state in the event of a latent and progressive disease, such as silicosis, it cannot reasonably be said that the injury dates from the last day of exposure to a dust-laden atmosphere and that the limitation period does not begin to run from that date; rather, the date of injury in such a case is the time when the accumulated effects of the disease culminate in a disability traceable to the latent disease as the primary cause, and it is or should be apparent by the exercise of reasonable care and diligence that the employment was the cause of the disability.

In reaching its conclusion the court in Marsh employed the following rationale: When a disease is of a latent and progressive character, the specific date of origin is impossible to determine, and it is the cumulative effect of exposure which produces disability. Thus, the date of injury must refer to a period of time rather than to a point in time. Accidents frequently occur in which the true nature of the injury and the resulting disability are not readily discernible even with the benefit of scientific skill. When latent injuries from accidents do not at first indicate a disability which is compensable, an employee is not to be deprived of compensation for failure to demand his rights under the act before the disability reasonably can be ascertained. An accident resulting in an injury which proves to be progressive in nature belongs in that category. An employee is not to be deprived of compensation for his failure to make a correct medical diagnosis of his own condition. The term 'injury' means a compensable injury or an incapacity or disability justifying the award of compensation, and it is at the time when disability occurs that the employer's liability becomes fixed and the employee has suffered an injury in a legal sense. In jurisdictions where occupational diseases are compensable, it is the universal rule that the injury is deemed to occur only when ascertainable disability is or should be manifest. This construction of the limitations provisions in the workmen's compensation law is consistent with the rules of liberal construction required in interpreting that law.

For the purposes of discussion, we observe that compensable injuries under the workmen's compensation law generally fall into four categories: (1) specific injuries incurred as the result of one incident or exposure in the employment, the effects of which are immediately realized or realizable; (2) industrial injuries suffered as the result of a specific incident or exposure but which have latent effects; (3) continuous cumulative traumatic injuries, such as that involved here, suffered as the result of a number of minor strains over a period of time; (4) cumulative injuries, such as silicosis, resulting from continuous exposure to harmful substances.

Under the March rule the statute of limitations began to run at the time of disability and discovery of industrial causation if the injuries suffered fell into any of the last three categories. The rule was applied whether an employee's disability resulted from a single, specific incident the effects of which were latent (e.g., Associated Indem. Corp. v. Ind. Acc. Comm (1945) 71 Cal.App.2d 820, 823, 163 P.2d 771 (hernia caused by lifting heavy timbers); Continental Cas. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Comm. (1936) 11 Cal.App.2d 619, 623, 54 P.2d 753 (broken wrist)), from continuous cumulative traumatic injuries incurred over a period of time (Pullman Co. v. Ind. Acc. Comm. (1946) 28 Cal.2d 379, 383--384, 170 P.2d 10 (bursitis caused by repeated motions of hand and arm while sewing heavy carpets over a period of years)), or from the inhalation of deleterious substances, as in Marsh. However, when an injury was manifest at the time it occurred, the statute of limitations ran from the date of the accident because the employee knew or should have known that the accident had resulted in a compensable injury. (Travelers Ins. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Comm. (1939) 32 Cal.App.2d 643, 90 P.2d 327.)

There appear to be no definitive historical indicia of the Legislature's intention in enacting sections 5411 and 5412 in 1947. ² A number of different interpretations of the legislative objective have been advanced. The Industrial Accident Commission has expressed the belief that the purpose underlying these sections may have been merely to codify the rule of the Marsh case so that section 5412 applies to all industrial injuries except injuries resulting from one specific incident or exposure whose effects and industrial connection are immediately realized...