Fruman v. City of Detroit

Decision Date31 March 1998
Docket NumberNo. 96-CV-75170-DT.,96-CV-75170-DT.
Citation1 F.Supp.2d 665
PartiesAlbert FRUMAN, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF DETROIT, a Michigan Municipal Corporation, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

David M. Fried, Paul Weisberger, Bingham Farms, MI, Lee S. Fruman, Franklin, MI, for Plaintiff.

Diane Hutcherson, Alan Carlton, Detroit, MI, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ROSEN, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Albert Fruman commenced this action against the City of Detroit on October 2, 1996 in Wayne County Circuit Court. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, in demolishing a vacant building he owned, the City violated his procedural due process rights and is liable to him for damages for trespass and inverse condemnation. The property in question is located at the northeast corner of Gratiot and French Roads in the immediate vicinity of the Detroit City Airport. Defendant timely removed the action to U.S. District Court on federal question grounds.

This action is presently before the Court on the City's Motions for Summary Judgment.1 Having reviewed the parties' briefs and supporting documents, the Court has determined that oral argument is not necessary. Therefore, pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(e)(2), this matter will be decided on the briefs. This Opinion and Order sets forth the Court's ruling.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Albert Fruman is the owner of a building located at 10533 Gratiot Road, on the corner of Gratiot and French Roads in the City of Detroit (the "Gratiot property"). From 1961 until 1987, Plaintiff operated a metal fabrication business at this location.

Plaintiff claims that in the summer of 1987 the City of Detroit represented to him and his real estate agent that the property would either be purchased or condemned by the City for the expansion of Detroit City Airport. The Detroit City Council had approved a project for the airport expansion in June 1987, and in July of that year the City Building Authority and the City of Detroit entered into a contract for funding the expansion of the airport.

On or about July 11, 1987, Fruman's property was appraised at $227,500.00 by Burton Altman of the City's Community and Economic Development Department ("CEDD"). On September 28, 1987, Mr. Altman sent a letter to George Koulouras, Fruman's real estate agent, offering to purchase the property for $150,000.00. Through his agent, on October 9th Plaintiff presented a counteroffer of $195,000.00 to Mr. Altman. Plaintiff was subsequently directed, sometime in late October 1987, to undertake the drafting of purchase documents for the purpose of review by City's attorney at an agreed upon sales price of $195,000.00.

Relying on these representations of the City's intent to purchase his property, Plaintiff subsequently relocated his business to 6455 Kingsley Street in Dearborn, Michigan. When he relocated, Plaintiff changed his address on the City's tax roll for the Gratiot property to the Kingsley address, and from 1989 on, all Wayne County and Detroit City tax bills for the Gratiot property were sent to Plaintiff at the Dearborn address.

On January 20, 1988, after he had vacated the Gratiot property, the City sent Fruman a letter informing him that it would not be able to purchase Plaintiff's property because of insufficient funding. Meanwhile, Plaintiff's building on Gratiot remained vacant from the time he moved his business in 1987 until June 14, 1994 when the structure was demolished by the City. The building, despite Plaintiff's attempts to secure it, suffered vandalism and was deemed unsafe by Defendant.

Prior to the building's demolition, from 1989 to 1993, several hearings took place regarding the condition of the property and the City's proposed demolition of it as an unsafe structure. On February 2, 1991, Detroit City Council held a hearing regarding the property's condition at which time it ordered the removal of the structures from the property. Plaintiff however, never received notice of that hearing.

During this same pre-demolition time span, between 1989 and 1993, at least three appraisals and environmental assessments were done by the City, which was attempting to gain funding from the Federal Aviation Agency to purchase properties deemed obstructions to airport airspace. This included Plaintiff's property as part of a "runway protection zone." The appraisals were done by Marcus G. Woodson, Peggy Young & Associates, and Juanada, Inc. The appraisals were as follows: (1) on September 1, 1989, the property was appraised at $180,000.00 using the market value approach to value; (2) on June 22, 1993, the property was appraised at $166,500.00 using the sales comparison approach to value; and (3) on July 9, 1993, the property was appraised at $187,000.00 using the highest and best use approach to value. Prior to these appraisals, in 1987, when talks first began concerning the City's purchase of the property, the City had also ordered an appraisal to be done by its staff. This appraisal, which was done by using both the market approach to value and the income approach to value, indicated that as of August 28, 1987 the property was valued at $388,000.00 and $315,000.00, respectively.

On November 12, 1993, the City once again made an offer to purchase Plaintiff's property. [See Exhibit C of Defendant's Brief which does not indicate the amount of the offer]. This offer was delivered to Plaintiff at his Dearborn address. Apparently, Plaintiff did not accept the offer.

Despite the City's obvious awareness of Plaintiff's Dearborn address as indicated above, between 1989 and 1992, it sent eight notices of hearings and/or demolition by certified mail, return receipt requested to the vacant 10533 Gratiot address. Plaintiff did not receive any of these notices, nor did the City ever receive any certified mail return receipts acknowledging receipt of the notices by anyone. Not having received any of the notices, Plaintiff was unaware of any hearings concerning his property. On or about June 14, 1994, without notice to Plaintiff, the City demolished Plaintiff's Gratiot property.

On October 3, 1996, Plaintiff initiated this action alleging that the City's actions with respect to the demolition of his building violated his procedural due process rights and entitle him to damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He also alleges state law claims of trespass, inverse condemnation and "de facto taking."2

III. DISCUSSION
A. STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary Judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c).

Three 1986 Supreme Court casesMatsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) — ushered in a "new era" in the standards of review for summary judgment motion. These cases, in the aggregate, lowered the movant's burden on a summary judgment motion.3 According to the Celotex court,

In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322

After reviewing the above trilogy, the Sixth Circuit established a series of principles applied to motions for summary judgment. They are summarized as follows:

* Case involving state of mind issues are not necessarily inappropriate for summary judgment.

* The movant must meet the initial burden of showing "the absence of a genuine issue of material fact" as to an essential element of the non-movant's case. This burden may be met by pointing out to the Court that the respondent, having had a sufficient opportunity for discovery, has no evidence to support an essential element of his or her case.

* The respondent cannot rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a disputed fact, but must "present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment."

* The trial court no longer has the duty to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.

* The trial court has more discretion than in the "old era" in evaluating the respondent's evidence. The respondent must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Further, "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find" for the respondent, the motion should be granted. The trial court has at least some discretion to determine whether the respondent's claim is plausible.

Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479-80 (6th Cir.1989). See also, Nernberg v. Pearce, 35 F.3d 247, 249 (6th Cir.1994).

The court will apply the above principles in deciding Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment in this case.

B. PLAINTIFF'S SECTION 1983 CLAIM OF VIOLATION OF HIS PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS

42 U.S.C. § 1983 furnishes a substantive right and civil cause of action for deprivation of one's civil rights, including the right to procedural due process guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any other person...

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