Frumkin v. Board of Trustees, Kent State University
| Decision Date | 18 July 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 78-3129,78-3129 |
| Citation | 626 F.2d 19 |
| Parties | Robert FRUMKIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, KENT STATE UNIVERSITY, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Eugene Sidney Bayer, Roy M. Kaufman, Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiff-appellant.
Stephen T. Parisi, Burke, Haber & Berick, Anthony J. DiVenere, Cleveland, Ohio, John R. Climaco, Climaco, Goldberg, Boukalik & Seminatore Co., L. P. A., Cleveland, Ohio, (Kent State) Thomas L. Colaluca, Cleveland, Ohio, for defendants-appellees.
Before MERRITT, MARTIN and JONES, Circuit Judges.
This case is a result of plaintiff-appellant Robert Frumkin's dismissal from the faculty of Kent State University on July 17, 1975. Dr. Frumkin was a tenured Associate Professor of Special Education in a program funded by the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare. By letter of March, 1973, the Dean of the College of Education informed Frumkin that a possible loss of federal funding would result in termination of Frumkin's employment.
Funding for the program was in fact curtailed; consequently, the College of Education was forced to reduce the number of faculty positions in Frumkin's classification from 3 to 2. A committee composed of the Dean and three department members, including Frumkin, agreed that this selection decision should be based on criteria of training, experience, skills and performance. On August 27, 1974, department members voted to release Frumkin if additional funds continued to be unavailable. This decision, reached pursuant to guidelines Frumkin helped to formulate, was transmitted to the Dean of the College of Education.
On March 12, 1975, in a proceeding unrelated to the University budget, the department issued a document entitled "Recommendation and Rationale for Dismissal of Dr. Robert Frumkin." In support of its recommendation that Frumkin be terminated, the report listed the following reasons: unsatisfactory performance as Grant Director, recurring unproven charges against faculty members, unprofessional conduct, false charges against the Department, and violation of University policy. The University President decided that this report stated a prima facie case against Frumkin's continued employment. Frumkin elected to dispute the department's judgment, and a hearing was scheduled as required by the University's "Academic Policy Book."
Frumkin requested, and was granted, the right to legal representation at the hearing; his attorney's role, however, was restricted to consulting with and advising his client. The University expressed a desire to avoid a full-blown adversary proceeding and denied requests by Frumkin's lawyer to cross-examine witnesses, conduct direct examination, and make objections to testimony. Counsel did present Frumkin's closing argument and summation to the Hearing Committee.
Between May 31, 1975 and June 12, 1975, the Hearing Committee met 9 times and heard the testimony of 16 witnesses, 10 of whom Frumkin had asked the Committee to call on his behalf. On June 16, 1975, the Committee determined by a vote of 4-1 that there was evidence to justify Frumkin's dismissal, but recommended 3-2 against termination. A month later, at a meeting of the Board of Trustees, the University President recommended that Frumkin be dismissed. Frumkin and his attorney were both permitted to argue against the President's resolution. After deliberation, the Board of Trustees voted 5-2 to terminate Frumkin's employment.
In December, 1975, Frumkin filed suit in District Court, naming as defendants the Kent State Board of Trustees, four individual Trustees, and the University President. The issue presented below, and argued to us on appeal, is whether the University's refusal to allow Frumkin's lawyer to conduct direct and cross-examination at the hearing constituted a denial of Fourteenth Amendment due process. The trial court found that the pretermination hearing, as conducted, satisfied the applicable requirements of procedural due process. We agree.
We note at the outset that the trial court evaluated Dr. Frumkin's argument in light of the correct legal standard. The criteria which determine the parameters of procedural due process are set out in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976):
(I)dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
The Supreme Court has consistently rejected a concept of due process which would afford all complaining parties, whatever the context of the dispute, an inflexible "checklist" of legal rights. On the contrary, procedural due process issues, originating as they may in diverse situations, demand a more sensitive judicial approach. Thus, we find in Mathews, supra, an analysis designed to balance competing interests in lieu of imposing rigid legal formulae. See also Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 1748, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972); and Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167-8, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 1650-51, 40 L.Ed.2d 15 (1974).
Our threshold inquiry is whether Dr. Frumkin has a substantial...
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