Fry v. Provident Sav. Life Assur. Soc.
Decision Date | 26 September 1896 |
Citation | 38 S.W. 116 |
Parties | FRY v. PROVIDENT SAV. LIFE ASSUR. SOC. OF NEW YORK. |
Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Appeal from chancery court, Hamilton county; T. M. McConnell, Chancellor.
Suit by George T. Fry against the Provident Savings Life Assurance Society of New York. There was a decree for defendant, and complainant appeals. Affirmed.
C. P. Goree, J. L. Faust, and Washburn, Peckle & Turner, for appellant. Brown & Spurlock and W. L. Eaiken, for appellee.
The bill was filed by the complainant, the insured under a policy of insurance executed by the defendant on the life of the complainant, to have a construction of the policy, and for an accounting of certain accumulations stored up by the defendant, alleged to have arisen from surplus premiums, and from lapsed policies, and from interest and profits on investments made by the defendant, in all of which complainant claims that he has a very large interest. The particulars of this claim, as far as may be necessary, will be stated further on. Before going into this matter, it will be necessary to first set out a sufficiency of the application and the policy to make these contentions comprehensible. So much of the application as need be copied is in the following words: "I hereby apply to the Provident Savings Life Assurance Society of New York for an insurance of $10,000, payable at my death, on the quarterly renewable term plan, with participating premiums, in behalf of and for the benefit of Mary Anna Amelia Fry, my wife." So much of the policy as need be copied is in the following words: Then follows a schedule of these rates for the ages from 25 years to 65 years, and then this statement: "The expense portion of each quarterly premium (included in the above rates) is limited to one dollar on each one thousand dollars insured; the residue is the insurance portion of the premiums." The application, a portion of which has been already copied, and which was made to and accepted by the defendant, states that it "shall be the basis of the contract with the society if a policy be issued thereon." This application was signed both by the complainant and his wife, the beneficiary, Mrs. Mary A. A. Fry.
The bill, as has been already stated, was filed by the insured alone, his wife, the beneficiary named in the policy, not being joined therein. The theory upon which the bill proceeds may be seen from the following: It charges: That the above-mentioned policy belonged to a special and peculiar class, designated as a "policy upon the renewable term plan with participating premiums." That under this special kind of policy the society became a trustee for the holder thereof. That for a fixed consideration, named in each policy contract, it agreed to receive and invest all premiums paid, That That That That That "the society contracted and agreed to receive, employ, and control all the insurance part of each premium solely for the use and benefit of the policy holders, and that the same should go into and constitute the death and guaranty funds, in the proportion hereinbefore stated." That, "in the conduct of the business of the society under this class of policies, there has annually accrued, and will continue to accrue, large sums of money, from the forfeiture of premiums on policies matured from deaths, subsequently lapsed, or forfeited for nonpayment; and that all such accretions or accumulations from deaths, forfeitures, and lapses belong, of right, as well as by the letter, and necessary implication growing out of the letter, of the contract, to the persistent policy holders in the special class, and each policy holder is entitled to an annual accounting with the trustee or society, and each is entitled to receive annually his pro rata share of all profits from all sources accruing to the death fund with which to reduce or pay his annual premiums on his policies, and...
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