Frye v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp., Inc.

• Decision Date: 26 March 2012
• Docket Number: No. 07–2708.,07–2708.
• Citation: 863 F.Supp.2d 701
• Parties: James Allen FRYE, on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. BAPTIST MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC. d/b/a Baptist Memorial Hospital–Memphis, Baptist Memorial Hospital–Collierville, and Baptist Memorial Hospital for Women, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee

863 F.Supp.2d 701

James Allen FRYE, on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff,

v.BAPTIST MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC. d/b/a Baptist Memorial Hospital–Memphis, Baptist Memorial Hospital–Collierville, and Baptist Memorial Hospital for Women, Defendant.

No. 07–2708.

United States District Court,

W.D. Tennessee,

Western Division.

March 26, 2012.

Alan G. Crone, Crone & McEvoy, PLC, Memphis, TN, for Plaintiff.

Paul E. Prather, Craig A. Cowart, Lisa L. Leach, Kiesewetter Wise Kaplan & Prather, PLC, Memphis, TN, for Defendants.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR TAXATION OF COSTS AND AWARDING COSTS

SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR., District Judge.

Plaintiff James Allen Frye (“Frye”) brought this action claiming that Defendant Baptist Memorial Hospital, Inc. (“Baptist”) had violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., by failing to compensate him and similarly situated hourly employees for time worked during meal breaks. ( See Compl. ¶¶ 8–9, 24–25, 33, ECF No. 1) (“Compl.”) On April 27, 2011, 2011 WL 1595458, the Court rejected Frye's claims and granted Baptist's motion for summary judgment. ( See ECF No. 409) (the “April 27 Order.”) On April 27, 2011, judgment was entered against Frye. ( See Judgment, ECF No. 410.)

On May 20, 2011, Baptist moved for a Bill of Costs under Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and requested $55,401.63 incurred for: (1) the service of subpoenas; (2) court reporter fees; and (3) printing and copying costs. ( See ECF No. 411.) The Clerk of Court granted Baptist's Bill of Costs on December 22, 2011. ( See ECF No. 419) (the “Bill of Costs.”) Frye timely appealed.

Before the Court is Frye's December 29, 2011 Motion for Taxation of Costs. ( See ECF No. 420.) He seeks reversal of the Clerk of Court's entry of the December 22 Bill of Costs. Frye argues that: (1) the FLSA is a remedial statute that does not provide for taxing costs to plaintiffs; (2) Baptist is not a “prevailing party” entitled to costs; (3) the December 22 Bill of Costs includes amounts that were not necessary to resolve Frye's substantive rights; (4) Baptist's Bill of Costs includes items not covered under federal law; and (5) Frye will be impoverished by the Bill of Costs. For the following reasons, Frye's Motion is DENIED.

I. Background

The Court discussed the factual background of this case in its April 27 Order.

On December 22, the Clerk of Court awarded $55,401.63 to Baptist. The Clerk of Court concluded that Baptist was entitled to costs because, “when it comes to the issue of awarding costs to a successful defendant, FLSA must be read in pari materia with Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 1920 .... It is quite possible that FLSA is silent on [awarding costs to defendants] precisely because Rule 54(d) and § 1920 are already in place and speak to this issue.” (Bill of Costs 3.) The Clerk of Court rejected Frye's argument that taxing costs would chill future FLSA claims, concluding that “Frye chose to put himself at risk by his role as the named party.” (Id. 4.) The Clerk also concluded that Baptist was the prevailing party in the action and that the costs associated with decertifying the collective action were necessary to resolve Frye's substantive rights. ( Id.) The Clerk of Court rejected Frye's argument that taxing costs would impoverish him, concluding that his evidence was insufficient. ( Id. 5–6.)

II. Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), “[u]nless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs-other than attorney's fees-should be allowed to the prevailing party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(1). Rule 54(d)(1) “creates a presumption in favor of awarding costs, but allows denial of costs” in the court's discretion. Knology, Inc. v. Insight Commc'ns Co., 460 F.3d 722, 726 (6th Cir.2006) (quoting Singleton v. Smith, 241 F.3d 534, 539 (6th Cir.2001)); accord McDonald v. Petree, 409 F.3d 724, 732 (6th Cir.2005) (citing White & White, Inc. v. Am. Hosp. Supply Corp., 786 F.2d 728, 730 (6th Cir.1986)); see also Cooley v. Lincoln Electric Co., 776 F.Supp.2d 511, 574 (N.D.Ohio 2011) (“Rule 54(d)(1) creates a presumption in favor of awarding costs to the prevailing party ....”) (citations omitted). “ ‘The function of the court in the process of taxing costs is merely to review the determination of the clerk.’ ” BDT Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 405 F.3d 415, 417 (6th Cir.2005) (quoting 10 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Mary Kay Kane & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2679 (3d ed. 1998)).

“The costs that courts may tax under Rule 54(d)(1) are confined to the costs itemized in 28 U.S.C. § 1920.” In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 481 F.3d 355, 359 (6th Cir.2007) (citing Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 441, 107 S.Ct. 2494, 96 L.Ed.2d 385 (1987)); see also Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 297–98, 126 S.Ct. 2455, 165 L.Ed.2d 526 (2006).

Section 1920 provides that a judge or any clerk of the United States may tax as costs the following: “(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal; (2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case; (3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses; (4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case; (5) docket fees....” 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Courts have discretion under Rule 54(d)(1) to “decline requests for costs, not discretion to award costs that § 1920 fails to enumerate.” In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 481 F.3d at 359. The discretion granted by Rule 54 “is solely a power to decline to tax, as costs, the items enumerated in § 1920.” Crawford Fitting, 482 U.S. at 441–42, 107 S.Ct. 2494.

When faced with motions under Rule 54(d)(1), district courts review decisions by the clerk of court under a de novo standard. See BDT Prods., 405 F.3d at 419 (“[A]ny decision by the clerk would have been subject to de novo review by the district court.”). However, “[b]efore the district court, ‘it is incumbent upon the unsuccessful party to show circumstances sufficient to overcome the presumption’ favoring an award of costs to the prevailing party.” White & White, Inc., 786 F.2d at 732 (quoting Lichter Found., Inc. v. Welch, 269 F.2d 142, 146 (6th Cir.1959)); see also Cooley, 776 F.Supp.2d 511 at 574 (“Defendants, who have objected to the payment of costs, bear the burden of proving circumstances sufficient to overcome the presumption in favor of an award of costs.”) (citation omitted).

III. Analysis

A. The FLSA Allows Defendants to Recover Costs

Under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), “[a]n action ... may be maintained against an employer ... by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.” This provision is the exclusive procedural mechanism for certification of collective actions under the FLSA. See Brown v. Money Tree Mortgage, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 676, 679 (D.Kan.2004). Although the FLSA does not expressly permit defendants to recover costs, § 216(b) provides that, “in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiffs or plaintiffs, [to] allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.” The Sixth Circuit has not addressed whether § 216(b), or any other FLSA provision, permits defendants to recover costs.

Frye argues that neither the text nor the spirit of the FLSA contemplates awarding costs to defendants. He cites Fegley v. Higgins, 19 F.3d 1126, 1135 (6th Cir.1994), where the Sixth Circuit refused to award a successful defendant attorney's fees under the FLSA. He contends that if the FLSA does not provide for attorney's fees it must also exclude costs. Frye also argues that awarding costs to defendants would undermine the “broad remedial and humanitarian” purposes that the FLSA is designed to serve. See Fegley, 19 F.3d at 1132.

“An award of costs to a prevailing defendant in an FLSA case is clearly possible and is not merely theoretical.” Creten–Miller v. Westlake Hardware, Inc., No. 08–2351–KHV, 2009 WL 2058734, at *4, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60393, at *15 (D.Kan. July 15, 2009) (collecting cases); see also Gomez v. Reinke, No. CV91–299–SLMB, 2008 WL 3200794, at *2, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60547, at *6 (D.Idaho 2008) (awarding costs to defendants for prevailing on merits of an FLSA collective action claim). When confronted with defendants' requests for costs, district courts have analyzed those requests using the framework of Rule 54(d) and § 1920, rather than the FLSA itself. See, e.g., Johnson v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 639 F.Supp.2d 696, 707–08 (E.D.La.2009) (evaluating the defendant's request for costs under Rule 54(d)(1) without reference to the FLSA). When addressing whether defendants qualify for costs under Rule 54(d)(1), courts have focused on whether they are “prevailing parties.” See id. at 708. There is a “strong presumption” under Rule 54(d) that prevailing parties will be awarded costs. Id. (citing Cheatham v. Allstate Ins. Co., 465 F.3d 578, 586 (5th Cir.2006)). Baptist is entitled to recover costs, and that right flows from Rule 54(d) rather than the FLSA.

Frye's reliance on Fegley is misplaced. In Fegley, the Sixth Circuit concluded that defendants were not entitled to attorney's fees because § 216(b) “does not provide for plaintiffs to pay attorney fees to defendants; under the plain language of the statute, defendants' argument is meritless.” 19 F.3d at 1135. Although the Sixth Circuit did not directly address the issue of costs, it noted that § 216(b) distinguished between an “attorney's fee” and “the costs of the action.” Id. Rule 54 also distinguishes between attorney's fees and costs. CompareFed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(1) (“Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney's fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party.”) w...