Fuentes v. Hampden County Sheriff's Dept.
| Decision Date | 31 March 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A. 02-30173MAP.,CIV.A. 02-30173MAP. |
| Citation | 429 F.Supp.2d 253 |
| Parties | Orlando FUENTES and International Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, Local No. 248, Plaintiffs v. HAMPDEN COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, Michael Ashe, as Sheriff, and Diane Jimenez, Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Christopher M. Browne, National Association of Government Employees, Springfield, MA, for International Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, Local No. 248, Orlando Fuentes, Plaintiffs.
Michael P. Clancy, Falls, MA, for International Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, Local No. 248, Orlando Fuentes, Plaintiffs.
Edward J. McDonough, Jr., Egan, Flanagan & Cohen, PC, Springfield, MA, for Hampden County Sheriffs Dept., Diane Jiminez, Michael Ashe, Defendants.
Michael P. Sheridan, Hampden County Sheriffs Department, Ludlow, MA, for Hampden County Sheriffs Dept., Diane Jiminez, Michael Ashe, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs Orlando Fuentes and the International Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, Local No. 248 (the "Union"), brought an eleven-count complaint against Defendants Hampden County Sheriff's Department ("Sheriff's Department"), Michael Ashe in his official capacity as Sheriff, and Diane Jimenez.
Three sets of claims now remain in the case: (1) Fuentes' claim against Jimenez for defamation (Count III); (2) the Union's civil conspiracy claim against all Defendants (Count X); and (3) First and Fourteenth Amendment claims against all Defendants in their official capacities (Counts V, VII, and IX). The court dismissed all other claims in the case on June 25, 2004.
Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, arguing that no genuine issues of material fact remained for trial. Defendants' motion was referred to Magistrate Judge Kenneth P. Neiman ("Magistrate Judge"), who issued a Report and Recommendation suggesting that Defendants' motion be allowed with respect to all claims except one portion of Plaintiffs' First Amendment causes of action.
Defendants thereafter filed an objection to the Report and Recommendation, alleging that the Magistrate Judge erred in failing to recommend that summary judgment be allowed on all remaining claims. Although Plaintiffs have opposed Defendants' objection, they do not themselves separately object to the Report and Recommendation.
Defendants' objection requires this court to analyze the relevant issues de novo.
Based on this review, the court will adopt the Magistrate Judge's recommendation and grant summary judgment on all counts except one portion of the First Amendment claims.
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). An issue is "genuine" if "the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the nonmoving party," and a fact is "material" if "it is one that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law." Velez-Rivera v. Agosto-Alicea, 437 F.3d 145 (1st Cir.2006).
The parties have not objected to the Magistrate Judge's summary of the facts. Additional background facts can be found in the Report and Recommendation on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (See Dkt. No. 13.) The facts are summarized below.
At all relevant times, Plaintiff Fuentes was an employee of the Sheriffs Department and a shop steward of the Union. In late July 2002, Fuentes heard a rumor that a certain Primary Captain was engaging in sexual harassment. Fuentes mentioned the rumor to Kathy Silva, a co-worker and member of the Union board. Fuentes also made inquiries with other employees regarding the Primary Captain's management style. Fuentes determined that he did not have enough information to report the matter to management.
On July 8, 2002, Sergeant Derek Woods overheard Silva discussing the rumor with another co-worker. He thereafter reported the rumor to Assistant Deputy Superintendent John Kenney, who then asked Woods to submit a written incident report. On July 21, 2002, Kenney contacted Defendant Jimenez, the Assistant Deputy Superintendent of Personnel. Jimenez then conducted meetings with Fuentes, Silva, Kenney, and a Union representative, during which Fuentes and Silva gave conflicting statements.
On August 16, 2002, Fuentes received a letter (the "Letter") suspending him without pay for five days. The basis for his suspension was identified as "your failure to follow the clear contract immediate reporting requirement,1 your lack of candor during the investigation, your conducting `union' or personally motivated business on work time without permission and engaging in conduct under the guise of an investigation that was reckless and damaging to the reputation of a supervisor." Fuentes grieved the suspension and filed this lawsuit.
The Magistrate Judge has recommended that summary judgment be allowed on Count III (defamation). He concluded that Defendants had introduced sufficient evidence to establish that Jimenez's actions were privileged as a matter of law. See Masso v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., 884 F.Supp. 610, 622 (D.Mass.1995). Moreover Fuentes could not name a single individual who believed that his reputation had been damaged by his suspension claim. See Draghetti v. Chmielewski, 416 Mass. 808, 626 N.E.2d 862, 866 (Mass. 1994).
The Magistrate Judge has also recommended that summary judgment be entered in favor of Defendants on Count X (civil conspiracy). In his deposition, Fuentes conceded the absence of any information regarding a conspiracy; the only other potential evidence regarding this claim is too tenuous to support a civil conspiracy claim.
It should be noted that although the Report and Recommendation mentions only the Sheriff's Department, Count X is a claim against all Defendants. (See June 25, 2004, Endorsed Order (allowing Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend).) This does not affect the analysis in the case, and the Magistrate Judge's reasoning should be read to apply equally to all Defendants.
Finally, the Magistrate Judge has recommended that Defendants' motion be allowed with respect to all Due Process claims (Counts V and VII). As this court noted earlier in disposing of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, "the Due Process claim must be dismissed if, after discovery, it materializes that there is no official policy or custom which caused Constitutional injury to Fuentes." See Fuentes v. Hampden Cty. Sheriff's Dep't., No. 02-30173, 2004 WL 1490434, at *5 n. 3 (D.Mass. June 25, 2004) (citing Monell v. Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). Fuentes admitted at his deposition that there is no evidence of any such official policy at the Sheriffs Department, and Plaintiffs have not offered any other evidence to rebut this fact.
The Magistrate Judge also found that Fuentes was afforded all the process that was due, based on the Defendants' undisputed facts.
Neither party has offered any objection to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that summary judgment enter in Defendants' favor with regard to the defamation, civil conspiracy, and Due Process claims. The court will adopt the Magistrate Judge's persuasive analysis with respect to these issues.
Defendants have objected to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that summary judgment be granted only on a portion of the First Amendment issues. These include Counts V and VII, in which Fuentes seeks judgment against Defendants for violation of his First Amendment rights. In addition, Count IX is the Union's equitable relief claim against the Sheriffs Department for free speech violations. The parties address all three counts together.
The First Circuit uses a three-part test to analyze First Amendment freedom of speech claims brought by public employees against their employers. Tang v. R.I. Dep't. of Elderly Affairs, 163 F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir.1998). First, the court must decide whether the employee's speech concerned "matters of public concern." Id. Next, the court must perform a balancing test and "weigh the strength of the employee's and the public's First Amendment interests against the government's interest in the efficient performance of the workplace." Id. (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968)). Finally, the employee must demonstrate that "the protected expression was a substantial or motivating factor in an adverse employment action." Id.
The first task in evaluating Fuentes' First Amendment claim is to identify the speech at issue. Plaintiffs fail to do so. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 39, at 11 ().) The record indicates that Fuentes discussed the alleged sexual harassment with both the unidentified colleague who first made him aware of the rumor and with Silva. In addition, Fuentes made general inquiries among his colleagues regarding the management style of the alleged harasser.
A public employee's speech is eligible for First Amendment protection "only when the employee speaks as a citizen upon matters of public concern rather than as an employee upon matters only of personal interest." City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83, 125 S.Ct. 521, 160 L.Ed.2d 410 (2004) (quotations omitted). During his deposition, Fuentes stated repeatedly and unequivocally that his inquiries regarding the Primary Captain's management style were personally-motivated and unrelated to the sexual harassment rumor. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 38, Fu...
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