Fuentes v. Tucker

• Decision Date: 02 December 1947
• Docket Number: L. A. No. 20121.
• Citation: 31 Cal.2d 1
• Parties: PABLO FUENTES et al., Respondents, v. CLARENCE L. TUCKER, Appellant.
• Court: California Supreme Court

31 Cal.2d 1 (1947)

PABLO FUENTES et al., Respondents, v. CLARENCE L. TUCKER, Appellant.

L. A. No. 20121.

Supreme Court of California. In Bank.

Dec. 2, 1947.

Parker, Stanbury & Reese and White McGee, Jr., for Appellant.

V. P. Lucas for Respondents.

GIBSON, C.J.

The minor sons of the respective plaintiffs were killed by an automobile operated by defendant. The two actions were consolidated for trial, and in each case the verdict of the jury awarded the plaintiffs $7,500. Defendant appealed from the judgments claiming the trial court erred in permitting plaintiffs to present evidence of facts outside the issues framed by the pleadings.

On the day of the trial defendant filed an amended answer in each case which admitted "that he was and is liable for the death of the deceased ... and the damages directly and proximately caused thereby." Plaintiffs were nevertheless permitted to prove the circumstances of the accident, including the facts that defendant was intoxicated and that the children were thrown 80 feet by the force of the impact.

It is defendant's position that the introduction of evidence as to the circumstances of the accident was error because it was not relevant or material to the amount of the damages, which was the only issue to be determined by the jury.

Plaintiffs contend that defendant could not, by acknowledging legal responsibility for the deaths of the children, deprive them of the right to show the circumstances surrounding the accident, and that therefore it was not error to admit evidence of such facts. They do not claim, however, that the evidence was material to any of the facts in dispute under the pleadings as they stood at the commencement of the trial.

[1] It is a doctrine too long established to be open to dispute that the proof must be confined to the issues in the case and that the time of the court should not be wasted, and the jury should not be confused, by the introduction of evidence which is not relevant or material to the matters to be adjudicated. This is merely one aspect of the larger problem of delay in the conduct of litigation. Every court has a responsibility to the public to see that justice is administered efficiently and expeditiously and that the facilities of the court are made available at the first possible moment to those whose cases are awaiting trial. It would be an unwarranted waste of public funds, and a manifest injustice to the many litigants seeking an early trial date, to allow counsel in a particular case to occupy substantial periods of time in the useless presentation of evidence on matters not in controversy; and we know of no well-considered opinion which asserts such a right.

[2] One of the functions of pleadings is to limit the issues and narrow the proofs. If facts alleged in the complaint are not controverted by the answer, they are not in issue, and no evidence need be offered to prove their existence. (Travelers Ins. Co. v. Byers, 123 Cal.App. 473, 482 ; Code Civ. Proc., 462, 588, 1868, 1870 subds. (1), (15); see I Wigmore on Evidence [3d ed. 1940], p. 9, 2.) [3] Evidence which is not pertinent to the issues raised by the pleadings is immaterial, and it is error to allow the introduction of such evidence. (Estates of Boyes, 151 Cal. 143, 147 ; Moss v. Youngblood, 187 Ga. 188 ; Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Sloan,^* 227 N.C. 151 ; see 10 Cal. Jur. 797, 98; 21 Cal.Jur. 157, 106; Code Civ. Proc., 1868; cf. Kurn v. Counts, 247 Ala. 129 ; Hanskett v. Broughton, 157 Minn. 83 .)

[4a] It follows, therefore, if an issue has been removed from a case by an admission in the answer, that it is error to receive evidence which is material solely to the excluded matter. [5] This, of course, does not mean that an admission of liability precludes a plaintiff from showing how an accident happened if such evidence is material to the issue of damages. In an action for personal injuries, where liability is admitted and the only issue to be tried is the amount of damage, the force of the impact and the surrounding circumstances may be relevant and material to indicate the extent of plaintiff's injuries. (Johnson v. McRee, 66 Cal.App.2d 524, 527 ; Martin v. Miqueu, 37 Cal.App.2d 133, 137 .) Such evidence is admissible because it is relevant and material to an issue remaining in the case.

[6] The defendant here by an unqualified statement in his answer admitted liability for the deaths of the children, and the sole remaining question in issue was the amount of damages suffered by the parents. In an action for wrongful death of a minor child the damages consist of the pecuniary loss to the parents in being deprived of the services, earnings, society, comfort and protection of the child. (Bond v. United Railroads, 159 Cal. 270, 285 [113 P. 366, Ann.Cas. 1912C 50, 48 L.R.A.N.S. 687].) [7] The manner in which the accident occurred, the force of the impact, or defendant's intoxication could have no bearing on these elements of damage. The evidence, therefore, was not material to any issue before the jury, and its admission was error.

In support of their contention that they had a right to prove the circumstances of the accident, although such evidence had no relation to the sole remaining issue of damages, plaintiffs strongly rely on Martin v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 203 Cal. 291 . The plaintiff in that case was injured by contact with a highly-charged power line owned and operated by defendant. The complaint alleged in one paragraph that defendant so negligently maintained the line that a wire broke and fell to the ground, and in a separate paragraph it was alleged that defendant negligently left the wire unguarded on the ground. At the opening of the trial defendant admitted that it was negligent in allowing the wire to remain on the ground and that plaintiff was thereby injured. Plaintiff was nevertheless permitted to present evidence in support of all acts of negligence alleged in the complaint, and a judgment in his favor was affirmed on appeal.

The views of the justices who participated in the Martin decision (203 Cal. 291) were expressed in four separate opinions with the unfortunate result that considerable confusion has arisen with respect to the holding of the case. Three members of the court, in an opinion written by Justice Preston, took the position that defendant's admission covered only one of two specific acts of negligence charged in the complaint and that therefore the trial court properly refused to limit the proof. In a separate opinion, two justices expressed the view that, since it was not alleged that one of the asserted acts of negligence constituted a proximate cause of the injury, it was error to allow the introduction of evidence of that act. They were of the opinion, however, that it was not reversible error because the verdict was not excessive. These two justices did not discuss the propriety of presenting evidence of the circumstances of an accident after an admission of liability. A sixth justice stated that, while it might have been error for the trial court to permit proof of negligence after defendant's admission, the judgment should be affirmed because there was no miscarriage of justice. The seventh justice dissented on the grounds that defendant's admission amounted to a withdrawal of every denial of negligence, that it was error to allow any evidence of matters which were no longer at issue, and that the error was prejudicial. It thus appears that, although six justices were of the view that the judgment should be affirmed, a majority of the court did not agree upon the reasons for the result.

[4b] The Martin case does not hold that it is proper to introduce evidence of the circumstances of an accident after a full and complete admission of liability where such evidence is not material to the sole remaining issue of damages. The most that can be said in that regard is that three members of the court took the position that it was not error to allow proof of the circumstances of the accident because the oral admission made on behalf of defendant at the opening of the trial was so limited that it did not constitute a full admission of liability. There is, however, an erroneous statement in the opinion written by Justice Preston which the trial court relied on in the present case and which has been followed in three District Court of Appeal decisions (House v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 35 Cal.App.2d 336, 342 ; Rowe v. Rennick, 112 Cal.App. 576, 579- 580 ; Behrendt v. Times-Mirror Co., 30 Cal.App.2d 77, 83 ). The statement reads: "Indeed it never has been the law that it was or could be error to prove even admitted allegations of the pleadings if the patience of the trial court would permit it." (203 Cal. 291, 299.) We do not agree. The test of the admissibility of evidence, so far as relevancy and materiality is concerned, is not whether the judge presiding at the trial is patient or impatient but whether the evidence is relevant and material.

[8] It is true that the trial judge may, in his discretion, exclude cumulative, although relevant, evidence to avoid confusing the jury or wasting the time of the court. (Douillard v. Wood, 20 Cal.2d 665 ; Estate of Wineteer, 176 Cal. 28 ; VI Wigmore on Evidence [3d ed., 1940] 576-578.) A different rule applies, however, to evidence offered with respect to an issue entirely removed by the pleadings. Such evidence is not merely cumulative on a material issue but is completely irrelevant and there is no room for the exercise of discretion. The cases of House v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 35 Cal.App.2d 336 , Rowe v. Rennick, 112 Cal.App. 576 , and Behrendt v. Times-Mirror Co., 30 Cal.App.2d 77, , are disapproved insofar as they are inconsistent with the views expressed herein.

[9] The introduction of evidence of admitted facts is permissible in cases where the admission is ambiguous in form or limited in scope or where, during the trial of a case, a party seeks to deprive his...