Fuessel v. Cadillac Bar Corp.

• Decision Date: 31 October 1960
• Docket Number: No. A--898,A--898
• Citation: 164 A.2d 821,63 N.J.Super. 430
• Parties: Rudolph FUESSEL, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CADILLAC BAR CORP., and John Panasowich, also known as John Pann, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 430

63 N.J.Super. 430

164 A.2d 821

Rudolph FUESSEL, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CADILLAC BAR CORP., and John Panasowich, also known as John Pann, Defendants-Appellants.

No. A--898.

Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division.

Argued Oct. 24, 1960.

Decided Oct. 31, 1960.

Edward A. Costigan, Trenton, argued the cause for defendants-appellants.

Nathan N. Finkle, Trenton, argued the cause pro se.

Before Judges Goldmann, Conford and Freund.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

CONFORD, J.A.D.

Defendant Panasowich appeals from the award by the Mercer County Court of a judgment against him in the sum of $2,109 with interest and costs in favor of the petitioner, attorney of the plaintiff, on an application for the fixing and enforcement of an attorney's lien pursuant to N.J.S. 2A:13--5, N.J.S.A. Defendant asserts the matter was erroneously treated as a summary proceeding and determined without a jury as a matter of law, and that the amount allowed was, in any event, arrived at improperly. Study of the case satisfies us that the points urged are well taken.

Plaintiff retained Casimir E. Bugdal, Esq., an attorney, to prosecute his claim of $5,000 against the defendants on a loan. The client was to advance court costs, and it was agreed that compensation of the attorney should be 'on the basis of a one-third contingent attorney's fee * * * one-third of the amounts collected.' Thereafter, with plaintiff's consent, the handling of the matter was referred to petitioner on the same fee arrangement. A judgment was recovered on the claim for $5,833.33 and costs of $73.75. From time to time defendants paid petitioner sums aggregating $660, and he remitted two-thirds to plaintiff. Thereafter the corporate defendant was adjudicated bankrupt in the federal court. The individual defendant acquired real property, and later contracted to sell it for a sum not fixed in the record. Although petitioner notified the attorneys for the seller and prospective buyer of his lien claim, the plaintiff, acting independently of petitioner, settled the balance due on the judgment directly with defendant for a cash payment of $1,000 to plaintiff, and executed and delivered to defendant a general release and warrant for satisfaction of the judgment. Thereafter, the sale of the property was consummated, an amount sufficient to satisfy the attorney's lien here asserted being deposited in escrow with a title company.

Thereupon petitioner filed his petition in the cause asking for allowance of an attorney's lien for one-third of the face amount of the judgment less what he had retained from prior receipts on account of the judgment debt. The matter came on to be heard on an order to show cause, at which only petitioner and defendant were represented. Defendant demanded a jury trial. The court deemed it unwarranted, holding that defendant had no proper concern with the fee arrangement between plaintiff and his attorneys and that the issue was one of law--whether the one-third contingency should be applied to the full judgment balance or the amount accepted in settlement by plaintiff. After hearing the foregoing facts established by Bugdal's testimony and petitioner's representations, and defendant declining to adduce any testimony, the court made the determination that petitioner was entitled to judgment for one-third of the balance due on the face of the judgment, with accrued interest.

In the colloquy between the parties and the court before decision petitioner remarked that the property owned by the defendant 'was sold for such a price that there were more than enough moneys to pay this judgment.' This was forthwith denied by defendant. The facts as to this circumstance are not established on this record.

Under N.J.S. 2A:13--5, N.J.S.A., an attorney instituting an action has a lien for compensation upon his client's cause of action which attaches to the judgment 'and the proceeds thereof in whosesoever hands they may come.' It is further provided that:

'The lien shall not be affected by any settlement between the parties before or after judgment or final order, nor by the entry of satisfaction or cancellation of a judgment on the record. The court in which the action or other proceeding is pending, upon the petition of the attorney or counsellor at law, may determine and enforce the lien.'

Where, as here, the action has been brought in the Law Division of the Superior Court or County Court, the filing of such a petition activates a plenary proceeding within the main action to be determined by court and jury by the procedure in the ordinary course of actions in the Law Division. H. & H. Ranch Homes, Inc. v. Smith, 54 N.J.Super. 347, 148 A.2d 837 (App.Div.1959); and see Artale v. Columbia Insurance Co., 109 N.J.L. 463, 467--468, 162 A. 585 (E. & A.1932); Levy v. Public Service Railway Co., 91 N.J.L. 183, 186, 103 A. 171 (E. & A.1918). It is at once apparent, therefore, that unless there were no disputed questions of fact legally material to the determination of petitioner's claim, it was incorrect to decide the matter in the summary manner employed below.

Where the attorney and client have expressly contracted as to the basis for the fee, that agreement will ordinarily control the determination of its amount in the statutory p...