Fugett v. Sec. Transp. Servs., Inc.

• Decision Date: 23 November 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. 14-2291-JAR
• Citation: 147 F.Supp.3d 1216
• Parties: Marshonda Fugett, Plaintiff, v. Security Transport Services, Inc., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas

147 F.Supp.3d 1216

Marshonda Fugett, Plaintiff,

v.Security Transport Services, Inc., Defendant.

Case No. 14-2291-JAR

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

Signed November 23, 2015

Christopher C. Barnds, Patrick G. Copley, Jason P. Roth, Copley Roth & Wilson, LLC, Overland Park, KS, for Plaintiff.

William Scott Hesse, Newman, Hesse & Associates, P.A., Topeka, KS, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JULIE A. ROBINSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Marshonda Fugett brings this action against her former employer, Defendant Security Transport Services, Inc. (“STS”), alleging claims of sexual harassment and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Kansas Act Against Discrimination (“KAAD”). Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 86), where she argues that findings made by the Kansas Department of Labor awarding her unemployment benefits are binding as to the claims in this case; and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 88) on the merits of Plaintiff's claims. The motions are fully briefed and the Court is prepared to rule. For the reasons explained in detail below, the Court denies Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and grants in part and denies in part Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Defendant's motion is granted on the sexual harassment claim and denied on the retaliation claim.

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.¹ In applying this standard, the court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.² “There is no genuine issue of material fact unless the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”³ A fact is “material” if, under the applicable substantive law, it is “essential to the proper disposition of the claim.”⁴ An issue of fact is “genuine” if “ ‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.’ ”⁵

The moving party initially must show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.⁶ In attempting to meet this standard, a movant that does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial need not negate the other party's claim; rather, the movant need simply point out to the court a lack of evidence for the other party on an essential element of that party's claim.⁷

Once the movant has met this initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”⁸ The nonmoving party may not simply rest upon its pleadings to satisfy its burden.⁹

Rather, the nonmoving party must “set forth specific facts that would be admissible in evidence in the event of trial from which a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmovant.”¹⁰ When the moving party also bears the burden of proof at trial,

a more stringent summary judgment standard applies. Thus, if the moving party bears the burden of proof, to obtain summary judgment, it cannot force the nonmoving party to come forward with “specific facts showing there [is] a genuine issue for trial” merely by pointing to parts of the record that it believes illustrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Instead, the moving party must establish, as a matter of law, all essential elements of the issue before the nonmoving party can be obligated to bring forward any specific facts alleged to rebut the movant's case.¹¹

The facts “must be identified by reference to an affidavit, a deposition transcript, or a specific exhibit incorporated therein.”¹² Rule 56(c)(4) provides that opposing affidavits must be made on personal knowledge and shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence.¹³ The non-moving party cannot avoid summary judgment by repeating conclusory opinions, allegations unsupported by specific facts, or speculation.¹⁴

“Where, as here, the parties file cross motions for summary judgment, [the Court is] entitled to assume that no evidence needs to be considered other than that filed by the parties, but summary judgment is nevertheless inappropriate if disputes remain as to material facts.”¹⁵ Cross motions should be considered separately.¹⁶ Just because the Court denies one does not require that it grant the other.¹⁷

Finally, summary judgment is not a “disfavored procedural shortcut;” on the contrary, it is an important procedure “designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.”¹⁸ In responding to a motion for summary judgment, “a party cannot rest on ignorance of facts, on speculation, or on suspicion and may not escape summary judgment in the mere hope that something will turn up at trial.”¹⁹

II. Uncontroverted Facts

As an initial matter, the Court admonishes both parties for failing to follow the federal and local rules governing summary judgment practice. While both parties present inappropriate legal arguments and conclusory assertions in their statements of fact, the Court is particularly discouraged by the vexatious presentation of facts in Defendant's memorandum in support of summary judgment and reply memorandum.²⁰

Defendant presents 476 numbered statements of fact in its opening brief, spanning 65 pages. To be sure, there is no page limit in this district for presentation of factual material in briefs; only for the argument section.²¹ But Rule 56.1(a) requires a “concise statement of material facts as to which the movant contends no genuine issue exists” in the supporting memorandum to a motion for summary judgment. Defendant's opening brief does not meet this requirement. Not only does it present an excessive amount of factual averments by any objective standard, its presentation is completely disproportionate to the complexity of legal and factual claims at issue in this case. Plaintiff alleges two claims: sexual harassment and retaliation. The facts giving rise to these claims occurred over a less than seven-month time span. The claims are neither lengthy in terms of duration, nor in terms of scope, and do not justify the 65-page recitation of facts by Defendant. The Court notes that Defendant's second “Statement of Facts” section in the opening brief, in an attempt to summarize the preceding 65-page recitation, is just over two pages—a synopsis that attempts to point the Court to the truly material facts in dispute here.²²

Nor did Plaintiff's mere 39-paragraph statement of additional facts in her response justify a reply brief comprised of 76 pages of additional factual material. Defendant's response to Plaintiff's statement of additional facts is replete with argument and non-responsive factual assertions that largely had been covered in Defendant's opening brief.²³ Defendant's overkill approach to the factual record has required the Court to expend excessive time and effort identifying and disregarding facts that are repetitive, duplicative, immaterial, conclusory or argumentative.

Finally, the Court must note both parties' failure to properly label and/or index the exhibits cited in support of and in opposition to summary judgment.²⁴ But the sheer amount of exhibits submitted by Defendant, makes it virtually impossible for the Court to locate Defendant's referenced exhibits in the record. Defendant's Index of Exhibits,²⁵ listing 12 numbered exhibits, bears no relation to the 104 attachments to that Index, which are all labeled in CM/ECF as “Exhibit.”²⁶ Most of these attachments have no label at all. The Court will not dig through these 104 unlabeled attachments in order to locate Defendant's many citations in the 476 statements of fact. Given the myriad failures to abide by the rules of summary judgment practice, the Court deems the facts presented by Defendant controverted to the extent Plaintiff's exhibits are easily identifiable and Defendant's are not.²⁷ The Court encourages defense counsel to carefully review the local rules and guidelines concerning summary practice and to follow both the letter and the spirit of those rules in the future.²⁸

With these observations in mind the Court determines that the following material facts are uncontroverted, stipulated to, or viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party for purposes of summary judgment.

Defendant STS is a business that transports convicted felons, prisoners, fugitives, mentally ill patients and other persons requiring secure transportation from one secure location to another secure location, including federal courthouses, state courthouses, prisons, jails, hospitals, and juvenile detention centers. Defendant employed Plaintiff, a Caucasian female, at its Topeka, Kansas location from on or about November 5, 2012, until November 1, 2013, as a Transport Specialist. She was an employee at-will. A Transport Specialist drives prisoners from one secure location to another. Upon being hired by Defendant, Plaintiff received an Employee Handbook which contained copies of Defendant's Standard Operating Procedures (“SOP”), including the STS Policy Prohibiting Sexual Harassment, SOP 004-106. She also signed and initialed the STS Driver Availability Policy. That policy required Plaintiff to acknowledge that “I understand that 40 hours per week is not guaranteed due to work fluctuations.”²⁹

Thomas Baumann is the President of Defendant STS. He has the sole authority to hire employees, terminate employees, discipline employees, reassign employees to other positions, assign wages, suspend employees from work, and investigate any violations of company policy.

Deb Ponton is an employee of Defendant STS, and has been employed in various positions by the company since April 22, 2003. In 2013, she was employed as a “Lead In-State Transport Coordinator.” During Plai...