Fukuda v. City of Angels

• Decision Date: 21 June 1999
• Docket Number: No. S071467,S071467
• Citation: 20 Cal.4th 805,85 Cal.Rptr.2d 696,977 P.2d 693
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 977 P.2d 693, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4822, 1999 Daily Journal D.A.R. 6215 Timothy FUKUDA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF ANGELS, Defendant and Appellant

Page 696

85 Cal.Rptr.2d 696

20 Cal.4th 805, 977 P.2d 693, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4822,

1999 Daily Journal D.A.R. 6215

Timothy FUKUDA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF ANGELS, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S071467.

Supreme Court of California

June 21, 1999.

Franscell, Strickland, Roberts & Lawrence, David D. Lawrence, S. Frank Harrell and Ann M. Maurer, Pasadena, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Lawrence J. Friedman; Silver, Hadden & Silver, Stephen H. Silver and Susan Silver, Santa Monica, for Peace Officers' Research Association of California Legal Defense Fund et al. as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Lackie & Dammeier and Michael D. Lackie, Ranch Cucamonga, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Curiale, Dellaverson, Hirschfeld, Kelly & Kraemer, McKenna & Cuneo, Liebert, Cassidy & Frierson, San Francisco, Jeffrey Sloan and Jayne Benz Chipman for Defendant and Appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, and Susan A. Ruff, Deputy Attorney General, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Michael Asimow as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Best, Best & Krieger, John E. Brown, Jeffrey V. Dunn and Marco A. Martinez, Riverside, for California School Boards Assocation etc. et al. as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

GEORGE, C.J.

We granted review to address two important questions of administrative law arising in instances in which a trial court is required to exercise "independent judgment" review of an agency determination. First, in exercising such review, must a trial court afford a "strong presumption" that the administrative findings are correct? Second, does the petitioner seeking a writ of administrative mandamus pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, bear the burden of proving that these findings are incorrect?

The Court of Appeal answered both questions in the negative, reasoning that presuming the correctness of administrative findings and placing the burden of proof on the petitioner would be incompatible with independent judgment review. We conclude that the Court of Appeal was in error, and that the judgment of the Court of Appeal must be reversed. As we shall explain, long-established case law demonstrates that neither presuming the correctness of administrative findings, nor placing the burden on the petitioner, is inconsistent with independent judgment review as that term has been understood in this state.

After we accepted review in this matter, we granted the requests of a number of amici curiae to file briefs addressing, among other things, whether this court should continue to apply -- or should abrogate -- the independent judgment rule. As explained below, in view of the longstanding duration of the judicial precedent establishing and reaffirming independent judgment review, and the legislative history of section 1094.5, which implicitly recognizes the rule, we conclude that it would be inappropriate to judicially abrogate the independent judgment rule at this point, and that the policy arguments advanced in support of such a change properly should be directed to the Legislature.

I

This matter commenced as a disciplinary proceeding against Timothy Fukuda, a veteran police officer of the City of Angels (City), ¹ based upon his conduct during and following the chase and apprehension of a reckless and erratic driver of a vehicle around midnight sometime in mid-August 1992.

The police department's internal affairs unit investigated Fukuda's conduct, and in mid-November 1992, after Fukuda had waived a "pre-disciplinary meeting," Police Chief John Bart advised Fukuda in writing that he was dismissed from the police department. Chief Bart asserted that Fukuda's conduct during the chase which included driving in the opposite direction of traffic, engaging in a "rolling roadblock" ² in violation of department policy, and very nearly being rammed by the suspect's automobile had been unreasonably dangerous, and that Fukuda, in his written report and in his interviews with the department's internal affairs unit, had lied about his conduct.

Pursuant to the City's "Memorandum of Understanding" with the police officers' association, Fukuda exercised his right to "appeal" the termination. The city council designated a hearing officer who was "not ... from the office of the City Attorney," who had been "licensed [and] ... admitted to practice in this State for at least 10 years," and who was a "member of the American Arbitration Association." (Mem. of Understanding, art. XIV, § 14.03.) There followed a seven-day transcribed hearing held in accordance with Government Code sections 11507.6 and 11513 (setting out rules for discovery and evidence), at which Fukuda and numerous other witnesses testified and at which voluminous evidence was received. The hearing officer rendered a written recommendation concerning the "appropriate disposition of the case." (See Mem. of Understanding, art. XIV, § 14.04.) The recommendation (i) adopted the nine written findings of Chief Bart, (ii) rejected as unsupported by the evidence Fukuda's assertion that the termination decision was motivated by retaliation against him for having engaged in union activities, and (iii) sustained the termination recommendation.

Two of the findings addressed Fukuda's conduct during the pursuit: first, that he engaged in a pursuit outside the City, in conjunction with allied agencies, without being requested or authorized to do so; and second, that Fukuda engaged in a rolling roadblock in violation of department policy. The remaining findings addressed Fukuda's conduct after the pursuit: that he misrepresented the facts in his report on the incident and lied to investigators after the incident.

Thereafter, in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding, the hearing officer's findings were forwarded to the city council. After consideration, the city council followed the recommendation of the hearing officer and dismissed Fukuda.

Fukuda sought a writ of administrative mandamus to challenge the action of the city council. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5; hereafter section 1094.5.) The trial court, observing that Fukuda's "right to continued employment is a fundamental right," stated that the City "must therefore establish that the weight of the evidence supports the findings. This means that [the City] has the burden of proof to produce a preponderance of evidence in support of the findings." ³ Discounting the evidence upon which the hearing officer and the city council had relied, the trial court concluded that in most respects the City had "failed to establish" the various findings against Fukuda. The court found that Fukuda had engaged in a prohibited roadblock, but also concluded that the city council abused its discretion by imposing the penalty of termination. At the same time, the trial court also rejected Fukuda's assertion that the proceedings were instituted against him in retaliation for his union activities. As noted, the Court of Appeal affirmed, rejecting the City's assertion that the superior court erred by placing the burden of proof on the City.

II

Section 1094.5 sets out the procedure for obtaining judicial review of a final administrative determination by writ of mandate. Two subdivisions of section 1094.5 are relevant here. Subdivision (b) provides that "[t]he inquiry in such a case shall extend to the questions whether the [agency] proceeded without, or in excess of jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is established if the [agency] has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence."

Subdivision (c) of section 1094.5 provides in full: "Where it is claimed that the findings are not supported by the evidence, in cases in which the court is authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence, abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported by the weight of the evidence. In all other cases, abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whole record."

Section 1094.5 does not, on its face, specify which cases are subject to independent judgment review. Nor does it expressly allocate the burden of proof or articulate any presumption concerning the correctness of administrative findings in cases in which a trial court exercises independent judgment review. As explained below, however, each of those issues was squarely resolved by case law that preceded the enactment of section 1094.5 in 1945, and each has been reaffirmed repeatedly by subsequent case law that has governed the application of section 1094.5 for the past half century.

A

In the mid-1930's this court held that the determinations of state administrative agencies are not judicially reviewable by writ of certiorari or prohibition (Standard Oil Co. v. State Board of Equal. (1936) 6 Cal.2d 557, 59 P.2d 119; Whitten v. California State Board. Etc. (1937) 8 Cal.2d 444, 65 P.2d 1296), but instead are reviewable by writ of mandamus (often denominated writ of mandate; see § 1084). (Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors (1939) 13 Cal.2d 75, 87 P.2d 848 (Drummey )). The issues presented by this case have their origin in the Drummey decision.

In Drummey, supra, 13 Cal.2d 75, 87 P.2d 848, a statewide administrative board, after a hearing, suspended the petitioner's embalming license for one year. Upon the petitioner's request, the trial court issued first an alternative writ and then a peremptory writ of mandate commanding the board to dismiss the proceedings and restore the petitioner's license. On review of the appeal filed by the administrative board, we affirmed. We first explained that review by writ of...