Fulano v. Fanjul Corp.

• Decision Date: 10 July 2020
• Docket Number: No. 3291 EDA 2018,3291 EDA 2018
• Citation: 236 A.3d 1
• Parties: Juan FULANO and Juana Fulano, et al., Appellants v. FANJUL CORPORATION, Alcoholes Finos Dominicanos, Biesterfeld International GmbH and Biesterfeld U.S., Inc., Drexel Chemical Company, Inicia Group, UPL Limited
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

236 A.3d 1

Juan FULANO and Juana Fulano, et al., Appellants

v.FANJUL CORPORATION, Alcoholes Finos Dominicanos, Biesterfeld International GmbH and Biesterfeld U.S., Inc., Drexel Chemical Company, Inicia Group, UPL Limited

No. 3291 EDA 2018

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued May 22, 2020

Filed July 10, 2020

Robert Thomas Vance Jr., Philadelphia, for appellant.

David P. Helwig, Pittsburgh, for Drexel Chemical, appellee.

Edward Thomas Butkovitz, Philadelphia, for UPL, appellee.

Matthew Aaron Goldberg, Philadelphia, for Inicia, appellee.

Robert McCarthy Palumbos, Philadelphia, for Fanjul, appellee.

BEFORE: BOWES, J., SHOGAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.^*

OPINION BY PELLEGRINI, J.:

This is an appeal from the orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) sustaining the preliminary objections filed by Fanjul Corp. (Fanjul), Drexel Chemical Company (Drexel), Inicia Ltd. (Inicia) and UPL Limited (UPL) (collectively, "Defendants").¹ Appellants (Plaintiffs) are Dominican agricultural workers who filed a civil action alleging that they suffered adverse health effects through exposure to toxic pesticides while working in the Dominican Republic. The trial court determined that none of the Defendants, all foreign corporations, were subject to personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania. After review, we affirm.

I.

We first briefly summarize Plaintiffs’ civil action. On January 15, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a thirteen-count complaint in the trial court against six defendants. Plaintiffs are a group of forty-one Dominican residents claiming that they were exposed to toxic pesticides and herbicides while working as fumigators in the sugar cane industry in the Dominican Republic.² Through this exposure, Plaintiffs suffered, among other health effects, eye and skin irritation, headaches, difficulty breathing, chest and stomach pain, nausea and chronic coughing. Plaintiffs averred that they were injured while working for subsidiaries of Fanjul (a Florida corporation) and Inicia (a British Virgin Islands corporation),³ and that the pesticides were produced by Drexel (a Tennessee corporation) and UPL (an Indian corporation).⁴ In total, Plaintiffs raised six common law causes of action sounding in tort; one count for violation of International Law; and six causes of action for violations of Dominican Law.

Because Defendants were nonresident corporations, regarding jurisdiction, Plaintiffs generally averred that:

Th[e] [Trial] Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants under the Pennsylvania Long-Arm Statute, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5322, because, inter alia , Defendants transact business throughout the United States, including in Pennsylvania and in this judicial district. In addition, as set forth herein, Defendants maintain sufficient contacts with [Pennsylvania] such that this Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over them does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

Plaintiffs’ Complaint, 1/15/18, at Paragraph 97.

Plaintiffs asserted a "stream of commerce" theory for personal jurisdiction over Fanjul and Inicia, alleging that both controlled "sugar empires" through their various subsidiaries that produce and distribute sugar throughout the United States, including Pennsylvania. As for the pesticide producers, Plaintiffs averred that Drexel registers and sells its products in Pennsylvania while UPL has an in-state alter ego subsidiary, United Phosphorus, Inc. (UPI), based in Montgomery County.

Defendants all filed preliminary objections under Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(1) for lack of personal jurisdiction and included supporting affidavits that they had insufficient contacts—if any at all—with Pennsylvania to permit either general or specific personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs responded by requesting the trial court to allow jurisdictional discovery under Pa.R.C.P. 1028(c)(2).⁵ After the trial court entered 30-day orders for the parties to conduct discovery, Plaintiffs served interrogatories, document requests and deposition notices on Defendants. While Defendants objected to some of the document requests, each produced a corporate-designee to be deposed about their respective corporation's contacts with Pennsylvania.

After holding two hearings for argument, the trial court entered separate orders dismissing all claims against Drexel, Inicia and UPL.⁶ The trial court, however, deferred ruling on Fanjul's preliminary objections in order to allow Plaintiffs to conduct additional jurisdictional discovery. After Fanjul produced their corporate-designee for a second deposition, the trial court entered an October 22, 2018 order sustaining Fanjul's preliminary objections and dismissing all claims against it with prejudice. Because Fanjul was the final remaining defendant, Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal and asserted in their court-ordered Rule 1925(b) statement that the trial court erred in finding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Defendants.⁷

II.

Before addressing Plaintiffs’ personal jurisdiction challenges, we must first address whether this appeal should be quashed, as both Drexel and UPL have raised several arguments that Plaintiffs violated the Rules of Appellate Procedure.⁸

A.

Drexel and UPL first argue that this appeal should be quashed because Plaintiffs did not file notices of appeal from the separate orders sustaining their preliminary objections. Rule of Appellate Procedure 341 defines a "final order" as, among other things, any order that "disposes of all claims and of all parties." Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1). Because several co-defendants were still in the case when the trial court dismissed Drexel and UPL, neither order sustaining their preliminary objections was final and appealable. See K.H. v. J.R. , 573 Pa. 481, 826 A.2d 863, 869 (2003) ("[I]n an action involving multiple defendants, and in the absence of an express determination by the trial court under [Pa.R.A.P.] 341(c), an order granting summary judgment as to one party is treated as appealable as of right only after the disposition of the claims involving the remaining parties."). Plaintiffs thus correctly waited to file their appeal until the final remaining defendant Fanjul was dismissed.

Drexel and UPL also argue that Plaintiffs’ notice of appeal incorrectly listed only the trial court's October 22, 2018 order dismissing Fanjul rather than listing all of the trial court's orders dismissing the other Defendants. However, "in the circumstance where each of the defendants in a single action is dismissed prior to trial, an appeal from the order dismissing the remaining claim or party is sufficient to bring for review the earlier issued orders." K.H. , 826 A.2d at 871 (citation omitted). "Any concern as to the intended scope of the appeal may be addressed through the filing of a statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Appellate Procedural Rule 1925(b)." Id . Plaintiffs stated in their Rule 1925(b) statement that they were challenging the orders dismissing Defendants and attached each order that they now seek to challenge. Any ambiguity as to the scope of the appeal was clarified through the Rule 1925(b) statement. We therefore find no error.

B.

Drexel and UPL next argue that Plaintiffs waived their challenges by filing a vague, imprecise Rule 1925(b) statement. Plaintiffs’ statement read, in relevant part:

1. The trial court abused its discretion and committed an error of law in sustaining Drexel's Preliminary Objections to the Complaint and dismissing Drexel as a defendant for want of personal jurisdiction.

2. The trial court abused its discretion and committed an error of law in sustaining Inicia's Preliminary Objections to the Complaint and dismissing the claims asserted against Inicia with prejudice.

* * *

4. The trial court abused its discretion and committed an error of law in sustaining UPL's Preliminary Objections to the Complaint and dismissing the Complaint as to UPL.

Plaintiffs’ Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), 11/29/18, at 2.

"The [ Rule 1925(b) ] Statement shall concisely identify each error that the appellant intends to assert with sufficient detail to identify the issue to be raised for the judge." Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii). "[T]he [Rule] 1925(b) statement must be sufficiently ‘concise’ and ‘coherent’ such that the trial court judge may be able to identify the issues to be raised on appeal, and the circumstances must not suggest the existence of bad faith." Commonwealth v. Vurimindi , 200 A.3d 1031, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2018). "[A] Rule 1925(b) statement is a crucial component of the appellate process because it allows the trial court to identify and focus on those issues the party plans to raise on appeal." Id . (citing Riley v. Foley , 783 A.2d 807, 813 (Pa. Super. 2001). "[W]hen issues are too vague for the trial court to identify and address, that is the functional equivalent of no concise statement at all." Commonwealth v. Smith , 955 A.2d 391, 393 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citing Commonwealth v. Dowling , 778 A.2d 683, 686 (Pa. Super. 2001) ). "When the trial court has to guess what issues an appellant is appealing, that is not enough for meaningful review." Commonwealth v. Lemon , 804 A.2d 34, 37 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citing Dowling , 778 A.2d at 686 ).

First, Plaintiffs specifically identified the issue of personal jurisdiction as to Drexel, and the trial court explained its reasoning for finding that it lacked jurisdiction over Drexel in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, expressing no confusion as to Plaintiffs’ challenge. See Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O.), 1/14/19, at 8-10. In this regard, Drexel does not argue that the trial court's analysis is either lacking or insufficient in any manner as a result of Plaintiffs’ Rule 1925(b) statement. Moreover, Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b)(4)(v) provides, in relevant part, "[e]ach error identified in the Statement will be deemed to include every subsidiary issue that was raised in the trial court[.]" Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(v). Accordingly,...