Fulenwider v. Firefighters Ass'n Local Union 1784

Decision Date12 October 1982
Citation649 S.W.2d 268
Parties114 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2171 Howard FULENWIDER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION LOCAL UNION 1784, et al, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtTennessee Supreme Court

Thomas R. Prewitt, Fred M. Ridolphi, Jr., Jon P. McCalla, Michael P. Waters, William A. Cohn, Memphis, for plaintiff-appellee; Armstrong, Allen, Braden, Goodman, McBride & Prewitt, Memphis, of counsel.

Allen S. Blair, James R. Newsom, III, Memphis, Edward J. Hickey, Jr., Michael S. Wolly, Richard J. Hirn, Washington, D.C for defendants-appellants; Hanover, Walsh, Jalenak & Blair, Memphis, Mulholland & Hickey, Washington, D.C., of counsel.

OPINION

HARBISON, Chief Justice.

The question presented in this case is whether a private action for damages may be maintained by a property owner incidentally affected by an illegal work stoppage by members of a public employee union. Other remedies, both civil and criminal, may be appropriate under certain circumstances, but the question presented here is whether or not a private damage suit will lie under the common law, there being no applicable state statutes on the subject.

The trial court overruled motions for dismissal filed by the defending parties but permitted an interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals held that no action would lie by the private property owner upon the contract, or memorandum of understanding, existing between the municipal employer and a local chapter of a national firefighters' union. It likewise held that no action in tort would lie except for one predicated upon common-law nuisance. It found the allegations of the complaint sufficient to state a claim based upon that theory.

This Court granted review, and we are of the opinion that the complaint should be dismissed in its entirety. We agree with the reasoning of the Court of Appeals on the issues of contract and tort generally. However, we do not find that the allegations of the present complaint sufficiently state a claim for relief upon the theory of a public nuisance.

The complaint alleged that firemen employed by the City of Memphis, members of a local chapter of a national firefighters' union, went on strike on July 1, 1978, in violation of state law. It was alleged that on that same evening at about 10 p.m. a fire started in a shed located behind commercial property owned by the plaintiff on Cooper Street in Memphis. It was alleged that the fire spread slowly to the main structure and burned until about 3 a.m. Plaintiff alleged that he summoned the Memphis Fire Department and that the Fire Department answered the call. The allegations of the complaint are that the Department sent an insufficient number of trained men and insufficient equipment to control the fire. It was alleged that because of the illegal strike citizens of Memphis had inadequate fire protection and that plaintiff's property was destroyed as a consequence.

It should be noted that the complaint contains no allegation that the union or its members started the fire, were responsible for it, blocked the streets or access to plaintiff's property, or otherwise impeded the use of such men and equipment as were in fact dispatched. In essence, the complaint is that there was an insufficient response to the fire, allegedly because otherwise available men and equipment could not be utilized as a result of the strike.

The original complaint was a tort action. By amendment plaintiff also claimed to be a third-party beneficiary of the labor agreement between the City and the union.

The City of Memphis was initially joined as a defendant. Subsequently it was voluntarily dismissed. Apparently this was a recognition by the plaintiff and an acquiescence in the general rule of law that a city is not liable in a private damage suit to individual citizens for failure to furnish adequate fire or police protection. For a comprehensive discussion of current law in that regard, see Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1, (D.C.App.1981) (limited duty of municipality does not extend to claims by victims of crime). See also Burnett v. Rudd, 165 Tenn. 238, 54 S.W.2d 718 (1932); Irvine v. Chattanooga, 101 Tenn. 291, 47 S.W. 419 (1898). The latter cases were decided prior to the enactment of the present Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, T.C.A. Secs. 29-20-101 to -407. They may be affected to some extent by that statute, but since the City is no longer a party to the action, we need not decide that question. Whether based upon aspects of governmental immunity or upon the principle that duties of municipal corporations in furnishing fire and police protection are limited and do not extend to private individuals, most jurisdictions have not recognized municipal tort liability to private citizens in situations like that alleged in the instant case.

Nevertheless plaintiff insists in the present case that because the work stoppage or strike was "illegal", employees of the City and their union representatives are in some manner rendered legally liable to private citizens for the inadequate rendition of municipal services, even though neither they nor the municipality would otherwise have such liability under the common law. As stated previously, there are no applicable state statutes dealing with municipal employees such as those involved here or their right to engage in collective bargaining or to strike. 1

Previous cases in this state have held that strikes by public employees are illegal and that contracts between municipal corporations and unions representing their employees are unenforceable. See City of Alcoa v. IBEW Local Union 760, 203 Tenn. 12, 308 S.W.2d 476 (1957); Weakley County Municipal Electric System v. Vick, 43 Tenn.App. 524, 309 S.W.2d 792 (1957).

We are not asked to disturb those rules in the present case, although plaintiff is somewhat ambivalent as to the "legality" of the memorandum of understanding between the City and the union, recognizing that such agreements have generally been held unenforceable but nevertheless insisting that plaintiff has enforceable rights arising therefrom as a third-party beneficiary.

We are satisfied with the rationale of the Court of Appeals in holding that plaintiff had no enforceable rights arising out of this informal labor contract, the principal terms of which appear, in all events, to have expired more than four months prior to the date of the alleged strike. We likewise approve the result reached by the Court of Appeals in denying liability under principles of negligence applicable to claims such as that asserted here.

We do not agree with the Court of Appeals, however, that the allegations of the complaint sufficiently allege the commission of a common-law public nuisance. As stated previously, there is no claim that the union or its members blocked streets, obstructed access to plaintiff's property, caused the fire, directly damaged the buildings involved, or committed any other act creating a condition amounting to a nuisance. The only claim is that the work stoppage itself--the collective bargaining activities and failure of the employees to report to work--constituted a public nuisance. We are not prepared to so hold.

In our opinion any strike--whether legal or illegal--could result in the creation of a nuisance by conduct such as that mentioned above: the obstruction of streets and highways, disorder and public disturbance, etc. We are not aware of any case which has held that the labor activity alone, whether legal or illegal, amounted to a nuisance in and of itself. We are aware that such theories have been asserted in legal periodicals. See Notes, 91 Harv.L.Rev. 1309 (1978); 80 Mich.L.Rev. 1271 (1982). In our opinion, however, this is a drastic conclusion and one which we find difficult to sanction.

Principally relied upon by the plaintiff, and perhaps the strongest case in support of his claim of common-law nuisance, is the case of Caso v. District Council 37, A.F.S.C.M.E., 43 A.D.2d 159, 350 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1973). In that case striking union members caused raw sewage and garbage to contaminate public waters and beaches, thereby endangering public health.

In the course of its opinion the Court emphasized:

"The conduct here, with the resultant damage, was willful and malicious, while in Jamur, 2 decided under the Condon- Wadlin Act, the damages were more tangential, only secondarily causing the damages claimed by the businessmen." 350 N.Y.S.2d at 177.

The principal holding in the Caso case, supra, was that a New York labor relations statute did not preclude a private tort claim such as was being asserted there. The court stated:

"A common-law cause of action in nuisance would appear to be the appropriate remedy in the instant case. Of course, the plaintiffs at trial will have to adduce facts to support such a cause of action. The claim itself, however, does represent a cause of action, aside from the sufficiency of the pleadings, which the defendants do not challenge on this appeal." 350 N.Y.S.2d at 178.

Of course there is little doubt that a condition such as that deliberately created by the employees in the Caso case, supra, amounts to a public nuisance. Even a municipal corporation itself can be held liable to private property owners for creating such contamination. See Kolb v. Knoxville, 111 Tenn. 311, 76 S.W. 823 (1903); Knoxville v. Klasing, 111 Tenn. 134, 76 S.W. 814 (1903). Had the union and its members in the present case caused pollution of the atmosphere, obstructed streets, set fires to property, or engaged in other such conduct, creating a condition such as that described in the Caso case, supra, there might well be liability upon them, whether their work stoppage was legal and proper or otherwise. In our opinion a legal right to strike does not carry with it the right to create a public nuisance. On the other hand, absence of a right to strike does not automatically convert into a...

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