Fuller v. Quesnel

• Decision Date: 24 December 1895
• Citation: 65 N.W. 634,63 Minn. 302
• Parties: FULLER v. QUESNEL.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

63 Minn. 302

65 N.W. 634

FULLER

v.QUESNEL.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Dec. 24, 1895.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. Evidence considered, and held, that it conclusively proved that defendant was a mere surety on the note sued on, and that, with knowledge of that fact, the plaintiff, without her consent, granted an extension of the time of payment to the principal debtor.

2. Reply construed as admitting that an extension was in fact given to the principal debtor.

3. To charge the plaintiff with notice that defendant was a surety, it was not necessary that he had actual knowledge of the fact, or was guilty of bad faith in not making inquiry. It was sufficient if he had knowledge of such facts as would have put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry, which, if followed up, would have presumably resulted in knowledge of the fact.

4. The first rule only applies to the purchase of negotiable paper for value before maturity, but in dealing with the parties to the paper after it is purchased the usual and ordinary rule as to notice applies.

Appeal from district court, Ramsey county; Charles E. Otis, Judge.

Action by John K. Fuller against Eleanor Quesnel, formerly Eleanor Langevin, on a note. From an order denying a new trial after a verdict for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Wm. G. White, for appellant.

J. L. Macdonald, for respondent.

MITCHELL, J.

Action on a promissory note. One of the defenses was, in substance, that if defendant executed the note, she did so merely as surety for her husband, who was also a maker, and that the plaintiff, without her consent, made an agreement with her husband whereby the time of payment was extended for five years, whereby plaintiff was released. When the evidence closed, the court, on this ground, directed a verdict for the defendant. To justify this, of course, the following facts must have been conclusively established: First, that defendant was a mere surety; second, that plaintiff was chargeable with notice of that fact; third, that plaintiff did make with the principal debtor a binding agreement extending the time of payment; and, fourth, that such extension was granted without defendant's consent. That defendant, if liable at all on the note, was a mere surety, and that the extention, if granted, was without her knowledge or consent, were so conclusively established that plaintiff's counsel does not seriously dispute the fact. That an extension was granted to the principal debtor, as alleged in the answer, is admitted in the reply. If the extension was not a binding one,-that is, for a valuable consideration and for a definite time,-it was not, in legal contemplation, an extension at all. The admissions in the reply must be construed as having been made with reference to this fact. We also think that the evidence conclusively proved an extension, but it is not necessary to place our decision on that ground.

The only question in the case worthy of special notice is whether the evidence conclusively established that plaintiff was chargeable with notice that defendant was a mere surety on the note. The point is made that the answer does not allege that the plaintiff had notice that defendant was only a surety. But the evidence on that point went in without objection, and upon the record...