Fuller v. State
| Decision Date | 23 January 1905 |
| Citation | 85 Miss. 199,37 So. 749 |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
| Parties | CHARLES FULLER v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI |
FROM the circuit court of, first district, Hinds county, HON DAVID M. MILLER, Judge.
Fuller the appellant, was indicted, tried, and convicted of the unlawful sale of intoxicants, and appealed to the supreme court. The facts upon which the decision turned are well stated in the opinion of the court.
Reversed, motion to quash sustained, and cause remanded.
Thompson & Stricker, for appellant.
The motion to quash the indictment in this case should have been sustained because of the improper remarks made by the trial judge in his charge to the grand jury which found the indictment. Welch v. State, 68 Miss. 341; Wilson v. State, 70 Miss. 595; Blau v. State, 82 Miss. 514.
In Wilson v. State, supra, the court laid down the correct lines upon which grand juries should act in the following words "Immunity from prosecution on indictable offenses, except by presentment by the grand jury, is declared and preserved by the organic law of this and all other states; and though, by reason of the secrecy of the proceedings of that body, its action is seldom brought into review, it cannot be doubted that one whose acts are there the subject of investigation is as much entitled to the just, impartial, and unbiased judgment of that body as he is to that of the petit jury on his final trial, nor that it is essential before the one body as before the other that private ill will or malevolence shall be excluded."
This principle was grossly disregarded in this case, and the grand jury went into their room, before having heard a word of testimony, with their minds biased against appellant. There is no answer to the query as to why the judge should have called the defendant by name in connection with his charge to the grand jury touching this crime, except that he, the judge, considered the defendant in the light of a lawbreaker and believed that he should be indicted.
The ancient practice of forcing grand juries by fines and imprisonment to bring in indictments against particular individuals has long since been regarded by civilized nations as a barbarity, and anything attempted along that line now would be regarded as criminal. The grand jury at any time may call upon the judge or district attorney for advice, and may, with all propriety, receive the same, but this advice must be confined to questions of law, and it is never the function of a court to charge a grand jury as to what particular person is guilty of a crime.
In the very recent case of Blau v. State this question is fully discussed by this court, and the principle distinctly laid down that our grand juries should be kept free from all outside influence whatsoever, and that any attempt by a trial judge to influence their findings constitutes reversible error.
It is always well for a prosecuting attorney and a circuit judge to be zealous in the discharge of their duties, and they should seek, by all lawful means, to free their district of vice and crime, but they should be exceedingly careful that their zeal for convictions does not lead them to do an injustice even to the humblest citizen. These same observations apply to the statement of the trial judge made when he denied appellant's motion for a continuance.William Williams, attorney-general, for the appellee.
[The brief of the attorney-general was lost or withdrawn from the record before it reached the reporter.]
Argued orally by Robert P. Thompson, for the appellant, and by J. N. Flowers, assistant attorney-general, for appellee.
The court met on the 5th day of September, 1904, and the grand jury returned the indictment against appellant on the fourth day of the term. When arraigned for trial, and before plea, appellant filed a motion to quash the indictment in his case. The ground on which this motion was based was the language of the trial judge in his charge to the grand jury at the impaneling thereof upon the organization of the court. The motion recites as follows: There was no denial on the part of the state of the facts alleged in the motion to quash, but the court, upon consideration, overruled the same, and this ruling of the court constitutes one of the assignments of error.
After the motion to quash had been by the court overruled, the appellant pleaded not guilty, and presented an application for a continuance of his case or postponement thereof to a future day of the term. We find it unnecessary to set out the grounds of the application in this connection. Upon presentation of the motion for a continuance the court overruled the same, and in his ruling remarked, "There has been much complaint over the state about the failure to convict these criminals;" the court continuing "that it feared much of this was due to the application of defendants' lawyers for continuance, the disposition of the courts to indulge it, and the lack of speedy trials." Exception was taken to this language, which was used in the presence and hearing of the petit jurors who had been impaneled for the week. The court stated, when the exception was presented, that he did not use the word "these;" the court only said "criminals throughout the state." Several lawyers, who were bystanders, were introduced to ascertain their remembrance of the exact language employed, and the majority of them were of the opinion that the court used the words as set out in the exception reserved by the defendant. This action and language of the court is also assigned for error. The motion for a continuance having been overruled, a jury was impaneled, the case tried, the defendant convicted, sentenced to the maximum penalty, and he appeals.
Many assignments of error are presented. Some we regard as not worthy of serious consideration. We confine our rulings to those questions involved in the necessary decision of the case. Those are two, and, as both are founded upon alleged improper language of the trial judge, as hereinbefore set out, though arising at different stages of the trial, we will consider them under the same head, without going into a refined discussion of each incident separately. It was said by this court in Blau v State, 82 Miss. 514 (34 So. 153), through Price, J.: "In directing the attention of the grand jury to particular offenses or classes of offenses, to crime and the necessity of suppressing it, a very large, necessary, and useful discretion is conferred upon the presiding judge, and this court will not undertake to control that discretion unless manifestly abused. " This was...
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Hoops v. State
...where the trial judge denounces individuals or specifically directs the grand jury's attention to any named person. Fuller v. State, 85 Miss. 199, 204, 37 So. 749, 750 (1905). In fact, it is not necessary that the individual's name be mentioned by the trial judge as long as there is no ques......
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Hood v. State
...a particular individual as a violator of the law and if he does the indictment on seasonable motion will be quashed. Fuller v. State, 85 Miss. 199, 37 So. 749 (1904). Logic then dictates that it was error to present Judge Barbour's opinion designating Hood as a criminal to the grand Applyin......
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State v. Beck
...it was the function of the grand jury to investigate this matter and determine the truth in that regard. As stated in Fuller v. State, 85 Miss. 199, 37 So. 749, 750: '* * * every man, whether accused or not, is entitled to the presumption of innocence until legally convicted. This presumpti......
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Price v. State
... ... nor had they had legitimate function to perform in connection ... with the examination nor any legal connection with the case ... Their purpose was to advance, in some way, the prosecution, ... and "this is precisely what the law prohibits to be ... done." Fuller v. State, 85 Miss. 199, 37 So ... 749; Blau v. State, 82 Miss. 514, 34 So. 153. These ... views are reaffirmed and approved in Collier v. State, 104 ... Miss. 602, 61 So. 689, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 599 ... In ... Callicoat v. State, 131 Miss. 169, 95 So. 318, the ... following ... ...