Fuller v. State, 28984
| Decision Date | 25 July 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 28984,28984 |
| Parties | Hilton M. FULLER, Jr. v. STATE of Georgia et al. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Brent, Castellani & Smith, Robert J. Castellani, Atlanta, for appellant.
Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Lauren O. Buckland, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lewis R. Slaton, Dist. Atty., King & Spalding, Pope B. McIntire, Robert L. Steed, Gambrell & Mobley, John H. Mobley, II, Atlanta, for appellees.
The above stated case was originally assigned to the September Term of this court's calendar. By agreement of counsel for the parties, it was advanced to this court's April Term and given a special hearing in June.
This court has the authority under the Constitution to determine cases under such regulations as are prescribed by the court. Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. VII, (Code Ann. § 2-3707). This is so because this constitutional provision prevails over Code Ann. § 24-3801. However, it is this court's policy, because of Rule 33(b) which allows ten days after a judgment is rendered within which to file motions for rehearing, not to render decisions and judgments, except on motions for rehearing, during the last fifteen days of a term of this court. The April Term of this court ends at 4:30 p.m. on July 31. Therefore, if a judgment is rendered by this court during the last ten days of July, motions for rehearing, pursuant to Rule 33(b), must be filed and determined on or before that date.
Since counsel for the parties in this case joined in requesting determination of the issues in this case at the earliest practicable date, a judgment and decision in the case is being rendered during the last ten days of the April Term of this court.
However, counsel of record in the case are advised, and it is hereby ordered, that if counsel for any party in the case notifies the clerk of this court in writing by noon on July 31, 1974, that he intends to file a motion for a rehearing in the case, then the judgment and decision rendered in this case this date shall be vacated on July 31 and the opinion withdrawn. In such event, a judgment will be rendered in the case at the September Term, and any party will then have the usual time to file a motion for rehearing. If no such written notice is filed by noon on July 31, 1974, then the judgment as rendered shall become final.
If such a notice if filed by noon on July 31, 1974, then the clerk of this court is hereby directed to vacate the judgment, withdraw the opinion, and reassign the case for determination at the September Term of this court.
The clerk shall also immediately notify counsel of record for the parties of the entry of this order of court.
It is so ordered.
Syllabus Opinion by the Court
This appeal results from a judgment that validated 'general obligation debt' to be incurred by the State of Georgia pursuant to a constitutional amendment retified November 7, 1972 (Ga.Laws 1972, p. 1523; Code Ann. §§ 2-5601 through 2-5604.1, Const. art. VII, § III, pars. 1 to 4-A). This amendment provided that the state may incur general obligation debt, and it created the Georgia State Financing and Investment Commission (Code Ann. § 2-5603, Const. art. VII, § III, par. 3). It further provided: 'The Commission shall be responsible for the issuance of all public debt incurred hereunder and for the proper application of the proceeds of such debt to the purposes for which it is incurred: . . .'
This constitutional amendment also provided that debt incurred by the state pursuant to its provisions 'may be validated by judicial proceedings in the manner provided by the General Assembly and such validation shall be incontestable and conclusive.' Code Ann. § 2-5602, Const. art. VII, § III, par. 2.
In 1973 the General Assembly enacted the 'Georgia State Financing and Investment Commission Act' (Code Ann. Ch. 87-1A). Code Ann. § 87-103a(a) provides: 'Subject to the limitations contained in this Chapter, the commission shall be responsible for the issuance of all public debt incurred hereunder, for the proper application of the proceeds of such debt to the purposes for which it is incurred, and for the application and administration of the provisions of this Chapter: . . .' Code Ann. § 87-103a(b)(1) provides for a construction division of the Commission, and it further provides as follows: 'In carrying out its responsibilities in connection with the application of any funds under its control, (including the proceeds of any debt or any appropriation made directly to it for construction purposes) the commission is hereby specificially authorized to acquire and construct projects for the benefit of any department or agency of the State or to contract with any such department or agency for the acquisition or construction of projects under policies, standards and operating procedures to be established by the commission . . . The construction division also shall perform such construction-related services for State agencies and instrumentalities as may be assigned to the commission or to the construction division by executive order of the Governor.'
Code Ann. § 87-103a(d) vests the Commission with powers in addition to those powers contained in the constitutional amendment.
Code Ann. § 87-105a(c) provides for the issuance of debt pursuant to written resolutions adopted by the commission. This section also provides for the legal procedure for validating the debt to be incurred by the state.
It is clear that under this new constitutional method of incurring state debt, if the legislature authorizes the commission to incur debt in a specified amount for a specified purpose and makes the specified appropriation to the 'State of Georgia General Obligation Debt Sinking Fund' (as was done in this case), then the commission created by the Constitution can resolve to incur the authorized debt, have it procedurally validated, deliver evidence of the state debt to the lenders, and receive the proceeds from the lenders; and once the commission created by the Constitution receives the proceeds of the debt incurred from the lenders, then the commission itself is responsible for 'the proper application of the proceeds of such debt to the purposes for which it is incurred.' Code Ann. § 2-5603.
In this case the General Assembly appropriated $3,043,478 for the purpose of financing and constructing and equipping a World Congress Center in the City of Atlanta and authorized the issuance of $35 million in principal amount of general obligation debt. The General Assembly then provided: 'Should the Georgia State Financing and Investment Commission elect to issue General Obligation Debt to finance said undertaking, said amount shall be appropriatted to the 'State of Georgia General Obligation Debt Sinking Fund. " Ga.Laws 1973, p. 1361.
These legislative requisites having been accomplished, the commission created by the Constitution then resolved to issue $35 million of general obligation debt for the purpose specified. The commission then took the necessary legal steps to validate the debt in advance of its being incurred. The appellant here intervened in the validation proceedings in the trial court to contest the validation of the proposed debt, his reasons for opposing validation were held by the trial judge to be without merit, and the trial judge entered a judgment validating $35 million of general obligation debt.
The appellant has come here seeking review of that judgment validating the debt.
The appellant first contends that a proposed World Congress Center is not a purpose for which the power of taxation over the whole state may be exercised. This contention is without merit, because the 1972 constitutional amendment provides that general obligation debt may be incurred to acquire, construct, develop, extend, enlarge and improve land, waters, property, highways, buildings, structures, equipment or facilities of the state, its agencies, departments, and institutions. The constitutional amendment also provides that once such debt is incurred, the General Assembly shall raise by taxation such amounts as are necessary to pay the annual debt service requirements on all general obligation debt incurred pursuant to the constitutional amendment. Such amount shall be raised by taxation and appropriated by the General Assembly to the 'State of Georgia General Obligation Debt Sinking Fund.'
Appellant's second contention is that the proposed World Congress Center is not a public purpose for which public debt may be incurred pursuant to subparagraph (c) of the 1972 constitutional amendemtn. This provision provides that general obligation debt may be incurred by issuing obligations to acquire, construct, develop, extend, enlarge or improve land, waters, property, highways, buildings, structures, equipment or facilities of the state, its agencies, departments, and institutions.
The General Assembly in 1973 authorized $35 million of state debt to be incurred for the purpose of constructing a World Congress Center. It also appropriated the sum of $3,043,478 to the 'State of Georgia General Obligation Debt Sinking Fund' as an amount sufficient to pay the highest annual debt service requirements for such $35 million of indebtedness to be incurred.
This court cannot hold that the debt authorized by the legislature to finance a World Congress Center is not for a public purpose, because we believe the 1972 constitutional amendment permits the legislature to authorize such debt for any purpose that is consistent with the terms, noted above, of subparagraph (c).
Appellant's third contention is that 'no authorized user agency of the state has requested the issuance of state general obligation bonds to construct a World Congress Center.' This contention has no merit. Under the 1972 constitutional amendment (Code Ann. § 2-5603) the Georgia State Financing and Investment Commission is responsible for the issuance of all public debt incurred pursuant to the...
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