Fullerton-Krueger Lumber Co. v. Northern Pacific Railway Co.

• Decision Date: 01 June 1923
• Docket Number: 23,401
• Citation: 194 N.W. 9,156 Minn. 20
• Parties: FULLERTON-KRUEGER LUMBER COMPANY v. NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY AND MINNESOTA AND INTERNATIONAL FALLS RAILWAY COMPANY
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

194 N.W. 9

156 Minn. 20

FULLERTON-KRUEGER LUMBER COMPANY v. NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY AND MINNESOTA AND INTERNATIONAL FALLS RAILWAY COMPANY

No. 23,401

Supreme Court of Minnesota

June 1, 1923

Action in the district court for Hennepin county to recover $871.96 excess freight charges. The case was tried before Waite, J who made findings and ordered judgment in favor of plaintiff for $782.21 and interest. From the judgment entered pursuant to the order for judgment for $1,126.54, defendant appealed. Reversed.

SYLLABUS

Action barred by Minnesota statute not revived by Federal Act of 1920.

The enactment by Congress of section 206 (f) of the Federal Transportation Act of 1920 did not have the effect of reviving causes of action which had theretofore become barred by the statute of limitations of this state.

Charles W. Bunn, D. F. Lyons and D. R. Frost, for appellants.

P. L Solether, for respondent.

OPINION

LEES, C.

This is an action by a lumber company to recover freight charges paid in excess of the amount a railroad company might lawfully charge under section 4347, G.S. 1913. The statute of limitations, section 7701, G.S. 1913, was pleaded as a defense. The parties agreed upon the facts and the court adopted their statement of them in the findings. Suit was begun January 24, 1921. Payment of all of the items of the alleged overcharges was made during the years 1912 and 1913, the date of the last payment being September 16, 1913. Upon this state of facts, no action to recover any of the payments could be maintained after September 16, 1919, unless the period of limitation fixed by the statutes of this state was extended by enactment of the Federal Transportation Act of 1920. 41 St. 462. The trial court held that it was so extended, gave plaintiff judgment and defendants have appealed.

The provision of the Transportation Act upon which the decision of this case turns is section 206 (f) reading as follows:

"The period of Federal control shall not be computed as a part of the periods of limitation in actions against carriers or in claims for reparation to the Commission for causes of action arising prior to Federal control."

Federal control began on January 1, 1918, and ended on March 1, 1920. Respondent therefore contends that the bar of the statute did not fall until 8 years and 2 months after the cause of action accrued. Appellants meet the contention with the argument that it is not within the power of Congress to extend the period of limitation fixed in a state statute; that, if Congress has such power, it has not attempted to exercise it in enacting the Transportation Act, and, finally, that the language of the act forbids the conclusion that it was intended to have a retroactive effect or to revive a right to sue which had become barred by the statute. Whether Congress has power to suspend the operation of a state statute of limitations is a question we need not consider.

We may say in passing that Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall. 493, 20 L.Ed. 176, and Adgar v. Alston, 15 Wall. 555, 21 L.Ed. 234, where the existence of the power was affirmed, involved a statute enacted to meet the situation created by the Civil War and the consequent interruption of the administration of justice in the courts of the southern states. It would seem that, even though this legislation had not been enacted, it might have been held that the war stayed the running of the statute for the time being, because the courts were closed to citizens of the northern states until after the conflict was over. Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 532, 18 L.Ed. 939; United States v. Wiley, 11 Wall. 508, 20 L.Ed. 211. The situation when we were at war with Germany was not the same. Neither the war nor Federal control of the railroad interrupted or suspended the prosecution of actions and the recovery of judgments against the companies. Kannellos v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 151 Minn. 157, 186 N.W. 389; Missouri P. Ry. Co. v. Ault, 256 U.S. 554, 41 S.Ct. 593, 65 L.Ed. 1087. Only the Federal Supreme Court can finally determine whether Congress was properly exercising its war-time powers in enacting section 206 (f) and, since the conclusion we have reached may be rested on another ground, we pass to a consideration of the remaining question in the case.

Assuming that Congress has power to extend the period of limitation fixed by a state statute, the power is not confined to causes of action upon which the statute had not already run. That was decided in Adger v. Alston, supra, and in Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 6 S.Ct. 209, 29 L.Ed. 483, and is conceded by counsel for appellants, so the vital question to which we now come is this: In enacting the Transportation Act, did Congress intend that it should have a retroactive effect so that a right to sue, if then barred, would be revived or restored? In Whittier v. Village of Farmington, 115 Minn. 182, 131 N.W. 1079, the present Chief Justice said of changes in statutes of limitation [at page 187]:

"A particular statute limits the right to commence an action to six years from the time the cause of action accrued. An amendment of that statute extending the time to eight years would not revive a cause of action which became barred a few days prior to the change in the law, though it would operate to extend the time as to all causes of action not then barred by the old statute. * * * The general rule is that the legislature has no power to revive a right of action already barred by limitations by retrospective legislation, or otherwise. * * * But, if the power be conceded, the intention to revive should be made clearly to appear by the terms of the statute, and not left to inference."

And again, in the Kannellos case, he said :

"It is clear that the language of the Transportation Act, though confessedly retroactive in operation, is not such as to justify the conclusion that by it Congress intended to revive rights of action barred and not in fact existing at the time of the passage of that act. * * * No rule of statutory construction with which we are familiar will justify the conclusion of an intent to restore the dead and down right to life and vitality."

Hopkins v. Lincoln Trust Co. 233 N.Y. 213, 135 N.E. 267, is to the same effect. Speaking in general terms of the revival of a cause of action once barred by the statute...