Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Piedmont Park Conservancy
| Decision Date | 16 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. A15A0356.,A15A0356. |
| Citation | 333 Ga.App. 265,775 S.E.2d 742 |
| Parties | FULTON COUNTY BOARD OF TAX ASSESSORS v. PIEDMONT PARK CONSERVANCY. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Cheryl Melissa Ann Ringer, Frank M. Gaither, Jr., for Appellant.
Alston & Bird, Clark Russell Calhoun, Andrew Whatley Yates, Atlanta, for Appellee.
Appellant Fulton County Board of Tax Assessors (“the Board”) denied appellee Piedmont Park Conservancy (“the Conservancy”) a charitable tax exemption as to a building in the Atlanta park owned by the Conservancy but occupied in part by lessees operating two restaurants. The Conservancy appealed to the Fulton County Board of Equalization, which also denied the exemption, and then to the superior court, which granted the Conservancy a tax exemption as to those portions of the building not occupied by the restaurants. On this appeal, the Board asserts that the superior court erred when it granted the Conservancy the proportional tax exemption because such exemptions are not authorized by law and because the Conservancy has failed to prove that it is entitled to such an exemption. We find no error and affirm.
The relevant facts are not in dispute. The Conservancy, which is recognized by the Internal Revenue Service and the Georgia Secretary of State as a Section 501(c)(3) charitable corporation, purchased the property at issue, which includes one building, from the American Legion in 1999. In March of that year, the Conservancy applied for a tax exemption for the property on the basis of the Conservancy's status as a “purely public charity”1 and represented to the Board that a portion of the building would be provided to the City of Atlanta police as a precinct “without charge.” The Conservancy also stated that fees arising from activities held at the property, such as evening courses, “would only cover expenses associated with programs” and “[would] not constitute a ‘lease’ or ‘rent.’ ” On the basis of these representations, the Board granted the Conservancy a full tax exemption as to the building in 1999. The police did not use any portion of the building as a precinct, however, and soon vacated the space given to them.
In 2001, after learning that visitors to the Park sought food services there, the Conservancy leased 18.57% of the building to Willy's Mexicana Grill for ten years in exchange for more than $50,000 annual rent and a profit-sharing arrangement under which the Conservancy would receive 6% of gross sales in excess of $1,000,000. In 2002, the Conservancy leased an additional 9.73% of the building to a second restaurant for ten years in exchange for more than $28,000 annual rent and 6% of gross sales in excess of $850,000. All of the income received by the Conservancy from the restaurants during the years at issue has been devoted to the Conservancy's charitable purposes, which include the preservation and enhancement of the park and the provision of recreational and educational services to the public; no part of the Conservancy's earnings is distributed to private persons or shareholders. The portion of the building not leased to the restaurants, amounting to 71.7% of its square footage and known as the Piedmont Park Community Center, consists of office space for the Conservancy, an environmental education center, and a room used for Conservancy events and community meetings. The Conservancy also uses the Center for events including summer camp programs and an open-air community market.
In 2005, and in response to an inquiry from the Board, the Conservancy represented that it continued to use the property for charitable purposes. In January 2013, after an appraiser observed the restaurants in operation at the property, the Board notified the Conservancy that its entire tax exemption as to the property was denied for the tax years 2010, 2011, and 2012, and requested that the Conservancy complete an exemption application concerning its use of the property for the tax years 2010 and 2011. The Conservancy did not complete the application; instead, it appealed to the Board of Equalization, which also denied the exemption. The Conservancy then appealed to the superior court, which granted an exemption as to the 71.7% of the building not leased to the restaurants.
On appeal from this ruling, the Board argues that Georgia law does not authorize a tax exemption for any portion of a property owned by a charitable organization engaged in commercial activities on that same property. The Board also argues that the Conservancy did not present evidence as to the charitable use of the remainder of the property. We disagree with these contentions.
OCGA § 48–5–41(a)(4) provides an exemption for “all ad valorem property taxes” to “[a]ll institutions of purely public charity[.]” Under the Georgia Constitution of 1945 and a 1946 amendment to it, charitable institutions were authorized to use a portion of their property to generate income as long as the property's “primary purpose” remained charitable. See Ga. Const. of 1945, Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. IV; Ga. L. 1946, p. 13, § 1(a), now codified as OCGA § 48–5–41(d)(1) ; Nuci Phillips Mem. Foundation v. Athens–Clarke County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 288 Ga. 380, 389–390(2), 703 S.E.2d 648 (2010) (Nahmias, J., concurring specially). As subsections (c) and (d)(1) of the same statute explain:
(Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 48–5–41(c), (d). And the Supreme Court of Georgia has long granted tax exemptions to charities even when the commercial activity at those charities' properties have generated income, as long as that income is used exclusively for religious, educational, or charitable purposes. In Elder v. Henrietta Egleston Hosp. for Children, 205 Ga. 489, 53 S.E.2d 751 (1949), for example, our Supreme Court upheld an ad valorem exemption for a hospital that charged patients for varying proportions of their medical care, but used all of the income generated for charitable purposes, on the ground that such charges did not destroy the hospital's status as a “purely public charity,” with “the fact that patients who are able to pay are charged for services rendered” not altering “its character as such.” Id. at 490–491, 53 S.E.2d 751 (). Likewise, in Church of God of the Union Assembly v. City of Dalton, 216 Ga. 659, 119 S.E.2d 11 (1961), the Court upheld an ad valorem exemption for a church building containing a restaurant used primarily to feed members of the church, visiting church personnel, and persons in need, but which was also open to paying customers. Because the evidence “demanded a verdict so exempting” the building, including the restaurant, the Court ordered that a verdict be modified so as to grant the building an exemption. Id. at 660, 662, 119 S.E.2d 11 ().
Court held that although a small portion of a building owned by the Georgia Baptist Convention and used by two retail stores “would not be tax exempt” because “[t]he area where the stores are located is being used to gain rental [income] and not for the primary purpose of operating the [home],” that portion of the same building actually used as a home for the aged was tax-exempt, even though its residents paid rent. Id. at 411, 170 S.E.2d 709. Thus, and although prior precedent had recognized that income-producing operations could occur on a property without destroying the charitable status of any part of that property, see Elder, 205 Ga. at 490–491, 53 S.E.2d 751 ; Church of God of the Union Assembly, 216 Ga. at 660–662, 119 S.E.2d 11, Peachtree on Peachtree ratified a charitable tax exemption as to those portions of a property not used to produce income. 120 Ga.App. at 411, 170 S.E.2d 709 ().
In 1991, the Supreme Court of Georgia reaffirmed that OCGA § 48–5–41 authorized ad valorem tax exemptions for property owned by a “purely public charity” under a three-part test: “First, the owner must be an institution devoted entirely to charitable pursuits; second, the charitable pursuits of the owner must be for the benefit of the public; and third, the use of the property must be exclusively devoted to those charitable pursuits.” York Rite Bodies of Freemasonry of Savannah v. Bd. of Equalization of Chatham County, 261 Ga. 558(2), 408 S.E.2d 699 (1991). In the wake of York Rite, this Court continued to hold that proportional exemptions as to those portions of a property not engaged in income-producing activities were consistent with OCGA § 48–5–41's provision of exemptions to “purely public charities.” See, e.g., Lamad Ministries v. Dougherty Cty. Bd. of Tax Assessors, 268 Ga.App. 798, 804 –806(3), 602 S.E.2d 845 (2004) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial