Fulton County v. Ward-Poag

• Decision Date: 05 October 2020
• Docket Number: S19G1619
• Citation: 310 Ga. 289,849 S.E.2d 465
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court
• Parties: FULTON COUNTY v. WARD-POAG.

310 Ga. 289

849 S.E.2d 465

FULTON COUNTY

v.WARD-POAG.

S19G1619

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: October 5, 2020

Leslie J. Bryan, Allegra J. Lawrence, Maia Jeanelle Cogen, Lisa Michele Haldar, Lawrence & Bundy LLC, 1180 West Peachtree Street, N.W., Suite 1650, Atlanta, Georgia 30309, Kaye Woodard Burwell, Assistant County Attorney, Office of the Fulton County Attorney, 141 Pryor Street, S.W., Suite 4038, Atlanta, Georgia 30303, Attorneys for the Appellant.

Rebecca Wyatt McLaws, McLaws Law Group LLC, 707 Whitlock Avenue, Suite A-40, Marietta, Georgia 30064, Attorneys for the Appellee.

Lisa Young Smith West, The West Firm, 235 Peachtree Street, N.E., Suite 400, Atlanta, Georgia 30303, Attorneys for the Other Party.

Philip Michael Thompson, Ellis Painter Ratterree & Adams LLP, 2 East Bryan Street, 10th Floor, Savannah, Georgia 31401, David Norton Nelson, Chambless, Higdon, Richardson, Katz & Griggs, LLP, P.O. Box 18086, Macon, Georgia 31209, Elissa Blache Haynes, Drew, Eckl & Farnham LLP, 303 Peachtree Street NE, Suite 3500, Atlanta, Georgia 30308, Malissa Anne Kaufold-Wiggins, Balch & Bingham, LLP, 30 Ivan Allen Jr. Boulevard, N.W., Suite 700, Atlanta, Georgia 30308, Attorneys for the Amicus Appellant.

Peterson, Justice.

In this case, summary judgment was awarded to Fulton County on Sandra Ward-Poag's civil whistleblower claims on the ground of judicial estoppel. In particular, the superior court concluded that judicial estoppel barred Ward-Poag's claims because she took an inconsistent position regarding the nature of those claims when she failed to disclose her claims in her bankruptcy case, and then amended her bankruptcy petition to value her claims against the County as worth far less than alleged here. The Court of Appeals reversed the superior court's decision, concluding that Ward-Poag's amendment to her bankruptcy petition to list the claim in fact showed that she did not take an inconsistent position in the superior court. See Ward-Poag v. Fulton County , 351 Ga. App. 325, 331 (1), 830 S.E.2d 799 (2019). In making that determination, the Court of Appeals relied on its case law seemingly creating a bright-line rule that a party takes consistent positions, and thus lacks an intent to deceive the court system, when the party successfully amends a bankruptcy schedule to include a previously undisclosed asset. We disapprove the Court of Appeals's analysis and its previous case law to the extent it created that bright-line rule, because such rules have no place in the application of judicial estoppel. We nevertheless affirm the Court of Appeals's ultimate conclusion that the superior court abused its discretion in applying the doctrine at this procedural stage because there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment to Fulton County.

1. Factual and Procedural History

Viewed in the light most favorable to Ward-Poag as the non-moving party for purposes of summary judgment in the superior court, the relevant facts of record and the procedural history of this case are as follows. Fulton County hired Ward-Poag as the entertainment manager for the Wolf Creek Amphitheater in 2012. In May 2013, Ward-Poag filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia. In March 2014, the bankruptcy court confirmed Ward-Poag's Chapter 13 plan, which required Ward-Poag to fully compensate her creditors by making payments to the bankruptcy trustee until March 2019.

While her bankruptcy petition was pending, in October 2016, Ward-Poag filed a whistleblower lawsuit against the County in Fulton County Superior Court. In her verified complaint, Ward-Poag alleged that from September 2015 to August 2016, a Fulton County commissioner attempted to use the amphitheater for his own private gain, which included the commissioner making repeated demands to reserve the amphitheater for his own concerts. Ward-Poag rejected the commissioner's requests, and as a result, she alleged, she was demoted and faced other forms of retaliation by the commissioner. In her amended complaint, filed in December 2016, Ward-Poag prayed for $3 million in damages and also asked for attorneys’ fees and pre-judgment interest.

On September 5, 2017, the County filed a motion for summary judgment in the whistleblower case, arguing that judicial estoppel barred Ward-Poag's claims because she failed to disclose the lawsuit as an asset in her pending bankruptcy proceedings. See 11 USC § 1306 (a) ("Property of the estate" for purposes of Chapter 13 bankruptcy includes property "that the debtor acquires after the commencement of the case but before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a ... [C]hapter 7, or 11, or 12 [bankruptcy case]."). In the County's statement of undisputed material facts in support of its motion for summary judgment, the County specifically asserted that Ward-Poag was required to amend her bankruptcy schedules to include her pending civil action as an asset and failed to do so.

On October 2, 2017, less than a month after the County filed its motion for summary judgment, Ward-Poag amended her bankruptcy petition to disclose the cause of action against the County as an asset. In her amended petition, she swore under penalty of perjury that the asset was worth $1. Three days later, Ward-Poag filed a response to the County's motion for summary judgment and its statement of undisputed material facts, stating that she "had no intention to deceive the bankruptcy [court] as to the existence of [her pending civil case], [because she] was unaware of her obligation to amend her petition to disclose [the civil] case to the bankruptcy court." She also stated that, once she was "made aware of her obligation to do so, [she] immediately amended her bankruptcy petition accordingly." Ward-Poag submitted an affidavit in support of her statements.

On October 17, 2017, the superior court held a hearing for argument on the County's motion for summary judgment. At the hearing, Ward-Poag argued that judicial estoppel could not apply because there was "no evidence of her intent to deceive the bankruptcy court." However, at the end of the hearing, the superior court announced from the bench that it had examined "the intent that [Ward-Poag] had in announcing [to the bankruptcy court] that her [superior court] case was believed to be [valued] in the amount of $1," and found that such a proclamation made "a mockery of [the superior] court and a mockery of the bankruptcy court," as Ward-Poag was "asking for considerably more than $1" in her lawsuit. The superior court concluded that Ward-Poag had acted "with an intent to deceive creditors," and determined that Ward-Poag was "judicially estopped from proceeding with [the] case as a result of [her inconsistent] filing[s]."

Three days after the superior court's oral ruling, but before the court reduced it to writing, Ward-Poag filed a motion for reconsideration. She also submitted an affidavit in which she again claimed that she was initially unaware of her obligation to disclose her lawsuit to the bankruptcy court, and her bankruptcy counsel submitted an affidavit in which he claimed that it was a "normal and customary practice" to represent to a bankruptcy court that a pending civil lawsuit was worth $1.

After a December 19, 2017, hearing at which it considered pending motions, including Ward-Poag's motion for reconsideration, the superior court entered a written order on May 22, 2018 granting the County's motion for summary judgment and implicitly denying Ward-Poag's motion for reconsideration. In its order, the superior court noted that Ward-Poag was a law school graduate¹ who was represented by counsel in her bankruptcy action. In its written order, the superior court determined that Ward-Poag's actions — amending her bankruptcy petition to list the lawsuit against the County only after the County raised the issue and, in amending the petition, undervaluing her claim — demonstrated an intent to deceive and made a mockery of the superior and bankruptcy courts.

The Court of Appeals reversed the superior court's decision, concluding that Ward-Poag's positions in the bankruptcy court and the superior court were not inconsistent and did not threaten judicial integrity given that her amended bankruptcy schedule disclosed her claim against the County. See Ward-Poag , 351 Ga. App. at 330-331 (1), 830 S.E.2d 799. We granted the County's petition for a writ of certiorari to address whether the superior court abused its discretion in applying judicial estoppel to bar Ward-Poag's claims.

2. Analysis

The County contends that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the superior court's decision to apply judicial estoppel to bar Ward-Poag's civil claims against the County. We disagree.

(a) Standard of review

Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that can be invoked by a court at its discretion, and we review a trial court's application of that doctrine for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Klardie v. Klardie , 287 Ga. 499, 501-502 (2), 697 S.E.2d 207 (2010) ; Goddard v. City of Albany , 285 Ga. 882, 885 (2), 684 S.E.2d 635 (2009). Whenever a trial court exercises its discretion, it must do so in conformity with governing legal principles. See Ford Motor Co. v. Conley , 294 Ga. 530, 538 (2), 757 S.E.2d 20 (2014). If a trial court significantly misapplies the law or clearly errs in a material factual finding, we may affirm the trial court's exercise of discretion only when we can conclude that, " ‘had the trial court used the correct facts and legal analysis, it would have had no discretion to reach a different judgment.’ " Id. (quoting State v. Pickett , 288 Ga. 674, 679 (2) (d), 706 S.E.2d 561 (2011) ).

Because the superior court was deciding the judicial estoppel issue in the context of a motion for summary judgment, the court was required to follow the well-established principles governing such motions. A trial court can grant summary...