Funeraria Del Noroeste Inc. v. San Antonio, Civil No. 11-1595 (JAF)
| Decision Date | 27 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 11-1595 (JAF) |
| Parties | FUNERARIA DEL NOROESTE INCORPORATED, et al., Plaintiffs, v. FUNERARIA SAN ANTONIO, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Plaintiffs sue alleging violations of their rights under the U.S. Constitution via 42 U.S.C. § 1983; they also raise causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985; the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7; and the Federal Wiretapping Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511. (Docket No. 53.) Plaintiffs also raise supplemental claims under the Commonwealth unfair competition statute, 10 L.P.R.A. § 258, and general tort statute, 31 L.P.R.A. § 5141 ("Article 1802"). (Id.) Several codefendant police officers (hereinafter "Movants")1 move for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(4) and (6). (Docket No. 25.) Plaintiffs oppose. (Docket No. 40.) Additionally, in a separate motion, codefendant Maria Conte ("Conte") also moves for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). (Docket No. 27.) Plaintiffs oppose. (Docket No. 41.) Movants and Conte respond jointly to Plaintiffs' opposition. (Docket No. 51.)
We draw upon the amended complaint, (Docket No. 53), to create the following summary of the facts alleged. Co-plaintiff, Funeraria del Noroeste, Incorporated, ("Noroeste") provides funeral services to all northwest Puerto Rico residents. (Docket No. 53 at 6.) Noroeste's sole stockholder, German Ramos-Santiago ("Ramos"), resides in Isabela, Puerto Rico. Codefendant Funeraria San Antonio ("San Antonio") has its principal place of business in Isabela, Puerto Rico, and is owned by codefendant Luis Ivan Rosario ("Rosario"). (Id. at 4.) Codefendant Carlos Delgado-Altieri is the Mayor of the municipality of Isabela, which is also named as a codefendant. (Id. at 5.) Movants are police officers in the Puerto Rico Police Department ("PRPD"). (Id. at 5–6.) Conte serves as the Executive Director of the Forensic Sciences Institute ("FSI"), a Commonwealth agency providing forensic pathology services in cases of violent deaths or deaths under unknown circumstances. (Id. at 7.)
The FSI contracts services with morgues or persons for the transfer of corpses from around the island to its facilities for autopsies. Plaintiffs allege that Rosario (through San Antonio) has such "a contract with the FSI, which has been renewed for many years." (Id. at 7.) This contract allegedly names San Antonio as the FSI transport agent in the event of a death of an unknown person, but provides that in other cases, the family members of the deceased have the right to pick the transport agent or funeral home of their choice. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that Rosario had a sign posted in the police precinct station indicating that San Antonio was the funeral home in charge of transporting bodies to the FSI. (Id. at 9.)
Plaintiffs allege that San Antonio "has and uses a scanner at its premises with which they can intercept the calls received by 911" and the calls received at the local Emergency Management office. (Id.) Rosario allegedly tampers with radio communicators and listens in to "the police frequencies and knows of all the decease[d]" persons in the area, and he follows up by calling the police to gather information so that he can show up unsolicited at the scene of death. (Id. at 8.) Rosario also allegedly has a contract to sell radio communicators and scanners to the PRPD.2 (Id.) Additionally, employees of the municipal hospital allegedly call San Antonio to alert Rosario of deaths. (Id. at 13, 15.)
Plaintiffs further allege that Movants, police officers in the Isabela area, alert San Antonio to calls received at the police station, 911, and Emergency Management, so that San Antonio can appear first at the scene of death. (Id. at 9.) Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege various incidents in which several different Movants, in their capacity as police officers, arrived at death scenes and insisted upon calling San Antonio, informing citizens that the bodies had to be transported by San Antonio. (Id. at 10–12.) For example, codefendant Pérez allegedly called San Antonio for transportation for a death at an elderly home without consulting the family as to which funeral service they wanted, and informed them that San Antonio was the only authorized transport agent. (Id. at 10–11.) Plaintiffs allege several other such examples of police officers coercing or persuading citizens into using San Antonio's services, even if the family already had a contract with Noroeste. (Id. at 10–13.)
Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that several police officers worked for San Antonio, such as codefendant Pérez, who allegedly moonlights as a funeral vehicle driver for San Antonio, as well as several unidentified officers who drive "private motorcycles escorting San Antonio" funeral processions. (Id. at 14–15.)
Plaintiffs allegedly met on multiple occasions with the Mayor, codefendant Carlos Delgado, to discuss their dissatisfaction with the favoritism shown by PRPD and municipal employees, but nothing changed. (Id. at 14.) In one of the meetings with the Mayor, he allegedly informed Plaintiffs that, from then on, "municipal officers" would only provide motorcycle escorts to funeral processions from "the funeral business of the urban side;" Plaintiffs explain that Noroeste is "the only funeral business outside the urban range." (Id.) At a later meeting, Plaintiffs allegedly "requested permission to buy their own motorcycles for escorting their funeral" processions, but the Mayor denied permission, citing potential interference with traffic. (Id.) Allegedly, "[m]onths later San Antonio appeared escorting [their] funeral services with private motorcycles." (Id.)
In addition to the fruitless meetings with the Mayor, Plaintiffs also allege that they wrote Conte a letter of complaint regarding San Antonio's practices, which went unanswered. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiffs also allegedly lodged several other complaints, written and oral, with various local and Commonwealth entities, including the PRPD, the Commonwealth Ombudsman ("Procurador del Ciudadano"), the FSI's attorney, and the hospital administration. These complaints also failed to change the situation. (Id. at 11–15.) Plaintiffs filed the original complaint in the present case on June 21, 2011. (Docket No. 1.)
Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(4) and (b)(5), a defendant may move for dismissal based on insufficient process and service of process. "Before . . . a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the procedural requirement of service of summons must be satisfied." Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Once a defendant challenges service of process, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove proper service. Rivera-López v. Municipality of Dorado, 979 F.2d 885, 887 (1st Cir. 1992).
A defendant may move to dismiss an action, based solely on the complaint, for the plaintiff's "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In assessing such a motion, we "accept[] all well-pleaded facts as true, and we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the [plaintiff]." Wash. Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 971 (1st Cir. 1993).
"[A]n adequate complaint must provide fair notice to the defendants and state a facially plausible legal claim." Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011). In considering a complaint's adequacy, we disregard "statements in the complaint that merely offer legal conclusions couched as fact or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We then take as true what remains, "[n]onconclusory factual allegations . . . even if seemingly incredible." Id.On the basis of those properly-pled facts, we assess the "reasonableness of the inference of liability that the plaintiff is asking the court to draw." Id. at 13.
Plaintiffs acknowledge that sovereign immunity bars claims for money damages against all codefendants who are government employees in their official capacities. (Docket No. 40 at 28.) Movants and Conte argue that: 1) qualified immunity shields them from suit; 2) the statute of limitations has run on Plaintiffs' claims; 3) Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under § 1985, the Sherman Act, or § 2511; and 4) the Commonwealth claims should be dismissed. (Docket Nos. 25; 27.) In addition, Movants (without Conte) argue for dismissal based on improper service under Rule 12(b)(4). (Docket No. 25.) We discuss each argument in turn below,3 and we dismiss all claims.
Movants argue that they were served with the original complaint, and not the amended complaint and that, therefore, we should dismiss all claims.4 We disagree. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) permits parties to amend pleadings with leave of the court, which should be given freely "when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); see also Krupski v. Costa Crociere, 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2497 (2010) ().
Here, Plaintiffs did not allege any new substantive claims or add any new defendants.5 Their second "amended complaint did not in fact contain a new claim for relief, and therefore did not require service under Rule 5(a)(2)." Blair v. City of Worcester, 522 F.3d 105, 109 (1st Cir. 2008). Thus, Movants' argument fails; "because the amended complaints did not urge any new, substantive claims against any of the defendants, additional service of process was not required." Id. at 110 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a)(2)).
Movants and Conte6 argue that qualified immunity applies in this case. (Docket No. 25.) We agree. State or Commonwealth officers or employees sued in their personal capacity may raise qualified immunity as an...
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