Funk v. Riska
| Decision Date | 02 May 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 11-cv-11409 |
| Parties | JOSEPH FUNK, Plaintiffs, v. AMANDA RISKA, et al., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
HONORABLE STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III
This is a pro se civil rights case brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff Joseph D. Funk, currently confined at the Lakeland Correctional Facility in Coldwater, Michigan, alleges that the named defendants have refused to provide him with transcripts and other court documents, and have conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights. He names the following defendants in their individual and official capacities: Jackson County Court Clerk Amanda Riska, Jackson County Circuit Court Judge Chad C. Schmucker, Probation Officer Denise Welhusen, the Jackson County (Fourth) Circuit Court, and Jackson County (collectively "Defendants"). Funk seeks monetary damages, as well as any appropriate equitable, declaratory, or other relief. The Court has granted Funk leave to proceed without prepayment of fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). For the following reasons, the Court will dismiss the complaint with prejudice.
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 ("PLRA"), the Court is required to suasponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint before service on a defendant if it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court is similarly required to dismiss a complaint seeking redress against government entities, officers, and employees which suffers from these same defects. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he was deprived of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the federal Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1978); Harris v. Circleville, 583 F.3d 356, 364 (6th Cir. 2009). Additionally, a plaintiff must allege that the deprivation of his rights was intentional or the result of gross negligence in order to state a § 1983 claim; mere negligence will not suffice. See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333-36 (1986); Chesney v. Hill, 813 F.2d 754, 755 (6th Cir. 1987).
A pro se civil rights complaint is to be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Nonetheless, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint set forth "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The purpose of this rule is to "give the defendant fair notice of what the... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)and Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). While the pleading standard under Rule 8 "'does not require detailed factual allegations'...it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citation omitted)). "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Funk raises two causes of action in his complaint. First, he claims that Defendants denied him court transcripts and other documents. Second, he asserts that Defendants conspired against him to deprive him of the transcripts and documents. Funk alleges that as a result, he was denied the right to challenge his incarceration, or to seek habeas or other relief, to remedy an allegedly illegal extension of his sentence and a monetary forfeiture imposed against him.1
Liberally construed, Funk's claim that Defendants denied him court transcripts and other documents amounts to a claim for denial of access to the courts. It is well-established that prisoners, including indigent prisoners, have a constitutional right of access to the courts, which states have an affirmative duty to protect. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821, 824-25 (1977). This right, however, is not without limit. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354-55 (1996). A prisoner's right of access to the courts is limited to direct criminal appeals, habeas corpus applications, and civil rights claims challenging conditions of confinement. Id. at 355; Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 391 (6th Cir. 1999). Moreover, to state a claim for denial of access to the courts, a plaintiff must show prejudice or actual injury as a result of the challenged conduct. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351 (); Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 578 (6th Cir. 2005) (). Examples of actual prejudice "include having a case dismissed, being unable to file a complaint, and missing a court-imposed deadline." Harbin-Bey, 420 F.3d at 578 (citing Jackson v. Gill, 92 F. App'x 171, 173 (6th Cir. 2004)). Additionally, a plaintiff must allege that the deprivation of his rights was the result of intentional conduct or gross negligence; mere negligence will not suffice. See Sims v. Landrum, 170 F. App'x 954, 957 (6th Cir. 2006); Wojnicz v. Davis, 80 F. App'x 382, 384 (6th Cir. 2003).
In this case, Funk fails to allege any facts demonstrating that Defendants' failure to provide him with transcripts or other court documents was intentional in the constitutional sense. In fact, the attachments to his complaint indicate that the transcripts he requested are unavailable. See Compl., ex. C ( that Funk was provided with some records herequested and informed that transcripts were not available). No constitutional violation occurs when transcripts are unavailable. Hays v. Newsom, 3 F. App'x 270, 271 (6th Cir. 2001) ().
Additionally, Funk has failed to demonstrate that Defendants' conduct interfered with his ability to seek review in state or federal court. No actual injury occurs without a showing that a non-frivolous claim "has been lost or rejected, or that the presentation of such a claim is currently being prevented" by the defendant's actions. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354-56; Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Funk has failed to allege facts to meet this standard. Although he conclusorily claims that the lack of transcripts and other documents has prevented him from seeking habeas or similar relief, Funk has failed to adequately plead or prove that he has been unable to file a collateral challenge without the transcripts and documents. Moreover, there is no constitutional right to transcripts on collateral review of a conviction See United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 328 (1976). Accordingly, Funk has failed to allege sufficient facts to establish an "actual injury" and, therefore, his claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Funk's second claim must also be dismissed. Funk alleges that Defendants conspired against him to deprive him transcripts and documents, and thereby prevented him from seeking habeas or other relief. To state a claim for conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that there was a single plan, (2) that the alleged co-conspirator shared in the general conspiratorial objective, and (3) that an overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy that deprived the plaintiff of his civil rights.
Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 943-44 (6th Cir. 1985); Memphis, TN Area Local v. City of Memphis, 361 F.3d 898, 905 (6th Cir. 2004). "[C]onspiracy claims must be pled with some degree of specificity"; "vague and conclusory allegations unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient to state such a claim under § 1983." Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538 (6th Cir. 1987). Funk has not alleged any facts to establish that Defendants had a single plan, shared a general conspiratorial objective, or committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Funk's claim must therefore be dismissed.
Moreover, even if Funk had properly pled claims for denial of access to courts and conspiracy, the claims would still be subject to dismissal. First, Funk's claims against Jackson County (Fourth) Circuit Court must be dismissed because the court is not a "person" subject to suit under § 1983, but rather is an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Mumford v. Basinski, 105 F.3d 264, 267 (6th Cir. 1997); Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 418 (6th Cir. 1988). The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state, and its agencies or departments, unless the state has waived its immunity or Congress has abrogated it. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). The State of Michigan has not consented to be sued for civil rights actions in federal court, Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986), and Congress did not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity when it enacted § 1983. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979). Accordingly, the Michigan Supreme Court and its lower courts, which operate as arms of the state, are...
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