Memphis American Postal, Afl-Cio v. Memphis

• Decision Date: 21 January 2004
• Docket Number: No. 02-5694.,02-5694.
• Citation: 361 F.3d 898
• Parties: MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE AREA LOCAL, AMERICAN POSTAL WORKERS UNION, AFL-CIO a/k/a American Postal Workers Union, Local 96, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF MEMPHIS; H.B. Phillips, Inc.; Pro-Tech Security, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

361 F.3d 898

MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE AREA LOCAL, AMERICAN POSTAL WORKERS UNION, AFL-CIO a/k/a American Postal Workers Union, Local 96, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF MEMPHIS; H.B. Phillips, Inc.; Pro-Tech Security, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 02-5694.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: October 24, 2003.

Decided and Filed: January 21, 2004.^*

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Peter J. Leff (argued and briefed), O'Donnell, Schwartz & Anderson, Washington, DC, for Appellant.

David P. Knox (argued and briefed), Ford & Harrison, Memphis, TN, Henry L. Klein (argued and briefed), Apperson, Crump & Maxwell, Memphis, TN, Debra L. Fessenden (argued and briefed), Thomas Edwards Hansom (briefed), Law Offices of Thomas E. Hansom, Memphis, TN, Brian L. Kuhn (briefed), Shelby County Attorney's Office, Memphis, TN, for Appellees.

Before KEITH, MARTIN, and SUTTON, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

KEITH, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal of the order dismissing for failure to state a cause of action this civil rights action arising from the Defendants-Appellees' activities relative to picketing by the Plaintiff-Appellant. In light of the liberal pleading standards set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 8(a), and adhered to by the federal courts, the district court's decision to grant the Defendants' motions to dismiss is REVERSED and REMANDED for the reasons set forth below.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 19, 2001, Memphis, Tennessee Area Local 96 ("Union") filed a complaint against the City of Memphis ("Memphis"), H.B. Phillips, Inc. ("Phillips"), and Pro-Tech Security, Inc. ("Pro-Tech") in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. The Union prayed for injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. The complaint alleges that a deprivation of the Union's rights under the National Labor Relations Act and the U.S. Constitution, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arose during the course of the Union's strike at Phillips. The Union in its complaint avers that this deprivation was caused by on-duty and off-duty police officers of the Memphis Police Department ("MPD"), acting under color of state law and in accordance with a Memphis policy or custom, at the direction of and through a conspiracy with Phillips and Pro-Tech and their agents.

On February 1, 2002, Pro-Tech filed a motion to dismiss the Union's complaint pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. On February 5, 2002, Memphis filed a motion to dismiss. On February 14, 2002, Phillips filed a motion to dismiss. On March 19, 2002, the Union responded to all three motions.

On May 1, 2002, the district court considered Pro-Tech's motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, as a motion to dismiss pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6) and granted the motion, thereby dismissing the Union's claims against Pro-Tech. On May 1, 2002, the district court granted Memphis' motion to dismiss. On May 2, 2002, the district court granted Phillips' motion to dismiss. On May 20, 2002, the district court entered judgment by dismissing the Union's claims against Memphis, Phillips and Pro-Tech in accordance with the May 1 and 2 Orders. On May 21, 2002, the Union filed a Notice of Appeal appealing the Orders granting the motions to dismiss.

For purposes of the motions to dismiss, the following facts were taken as true by the district court, and are treated the same by this court. Since April 3, 2001, the Union has been engaged in "picketing and other expressions" in support of a strike against Phillips at or near Phillips's Memphis, Tennessee facility. Specifically, the picketers tried to call non-striking employees "scabs," tried to shout slogans at the non-striking employees, and tried to use sound amplifying devices (such as megaphones) to convey their message. During the course of the strike, Memphis has provided police services, and Pro-Tech has provided security services at or near the facility. Certain security officers employed by Pro-Tech are off-duty officers of the MPD.

During the strike, Phillips and Pro-Tech, through on-duty and off-duty officers of the MPD, have attempted to "interfere with, deter, and intimidate" the Union, and have directed MPD officers to "threaten to engage in and engage in force, violence, harassment and the unequal enforcement of the law." J.A. at 10; Compl. ¶¶ 18, 19. Furthermore, "on-duty MPD police officers continuously conferred with agents of Phillips and Pro-Tech before confronting members of the Union and their sympathizers on the picket line." J.A. at 11; Compl. ¶ 20.

Memphis, "through the MPD, has a policy and practice of allowing off-duty police officers to be hired by private security companies (including Pro-Tech)." J.A. at 9; Compl. ¶ 14. All other references to the actions of Memphis are made in the following form: "Phillips and its agents, and Pro-Tech and its agents, conspired with Memphis, through its on-duty and off-duty MPD police officers, to engage in the police misconduct [alleged to have violated the Union's rights]." J.A. at 12, 13; Compl. ¶¶ 22, 23, 25, 26, 26 (emphasis added). Specifically, in paragraph 20 of the complaint, the Union claims that, "Memphis, through its on-duty and off-duty police officers, engaged in a pattern of police misconduct" including: arresting and detaining strikers without cause, failing to respond to or investigate threats to the safety of strikers (including allegations that Union members on the picket line were struck by vehicles driven by non-striking employees), and compelling strikers to provide personal information. J.A. at 11, 12. In addition to the unlawful actions of Memphis, singularly, "Phillips and its agents, and Pro-Tech and its agents, conspired with Memphis, through its on-duty and off-duty police officers, to engage in the [pattern of] police misconduct described in ¶ 20 [of the complaint]." J.A. at 11; Compl. ¶ 22. The alleged police misconduct described in paragraph 20 was "committed in furtherance of the conspiracy," and "Memphis knew or reasonably should have known that the actions of the on-duty and off-duty MPD officers were unlawful and in violation of federal laws and the Constitution of the United States." J.A. at 7, 8; Compl. ¶¶ 25, 28. Finally, the Union alleges that, by means of their conspiracy with the other Defendants, Pro-Tech and Phillips were acting under color of state law. J.A. at 7; Compl. ¶ 27.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This court reviews de novo a district court's decision regarding a motion to dismiss, pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6), because the district court decision is based purely on the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff's case. Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246, 251 (6th Cir.1997). Under the liberal notice pleading rules, a complaint need only put a party on notice of the claim being asserted against it to satisfy the federal rule requirement of stating a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) (holding that a court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations). A complaint need not anticipate every defense and accordingly need not plead every response to a potential defense. Poe v. Haydon, 853 F.2d 418, 424 (6th Cir.1988) (stating that a civil rights plaintiff need not anticipate an affirmative defense which must be pleaded by the defendant). A court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations. Cooper v. Parrish, 203 F.3d 937, 944 (6th Cir.2000). Claims made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are not subject to heightened pleading standards. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 165-66, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993) (rejecting heightened pleading standards for § 1983 claims); Jones v. Duncan, 840 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that § 1983 complaints need not set down in detail all the particularities of a plaintiff's claim against a defendant).

B. Section 1983 Liability for Memphis

To set forth a cognizable § 1983 claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must allege that (1) agents of the municipality, while acting under color of state law, (2) violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights, and (3) that a municipal policy or policy of inaction was the moving force behind the violation. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 379, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989).

1. The Actions of the On-Duty Police Officers

There is no doubt that the Union has sufficiently pleaded the first two elements, "acting under color of law" and "a violation of protected rights," regarding the actions of the on-duty officers. At issue is whether the phrases "conspired with Memphis, through its on-duty and off-duty MPD police officers, to engage in the police misconduct" or "Memphis, through its on-duty and off-duty police officers, has engaged in a pattern of police misconduct," sufficiently allege the third element.

A municipal "custom" may be established by proof of the knowledge of policymaking officials and their acquiescence in the established practice. See Fletcher v. O'Donnell, 867 F.2d 791, 793-94 (3d Cir.1989). In its complaint, the Union contends that Memphis "knew or reasonably should have known that the actions of the on-duty and off-duty MPD police officers were unlawful and in violation of federal laws and the Constitution of the United States." J.A. at 8; Compl. ¶ 28. While the Union fails to specifically allege that there was knowledge on the part "of policymaking officials," a plaintiff need not anticipate every defense and accordingly need not plead every response to a potential defense. Poe, 853 F.2d at 424.

Furthermore, the Union does not state that the unlawful actions were part of an...