Fuqua Bus Line v. Pink
Decision Date | 27 March 1942 |
Citation | 290 Ky. 213 |
Parties | Fuqua Bus Line v. Pink. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Appeal from Franklin Circuit Court.
S.H. Brown and Richardson & Redford for appellant.
William A. Young for appellee.
Before William B. Ardery, Judge.
Reversing.
The Mutual Indemnity Company (hereinafter referred to as the company) was a corporation organized under the laws of New York and was engaged in automobile indemnity insurance. On January 1, 1937, it issued a policy to the Fuqua Bus Lines, which was terminated on Nov. 27, 1937, by the insolvency of the company. The earned premium on the policy was $1,381.86. Louis H. Pink, Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York, was named as receiver of the company, and on Aug. 12, 1938, he mailed to the appellant notice of a 40% assessment made against all members of the company by the Supreme Court of New York. In the notice appellant was given ample time to show cause why it should not be held liable to pay such assessment.
An ancillary receiver was named for Kentucky by the Franklin Circuit Court and this action was brought by such receiver in that court against appellant on the New York assessment. Appellant's special demurrer to the jurisdiction and its general demurrer to the petition as amended seeking personal judgment against it on the New York assessment, were both overruled. Thereupon it filed answer.
The first paragraph of the answer is a traverse. The second paragraph pleads fraud by the officers and agents of the company in the procurement of the sale of the policy to appellant in that they knew the company was insolvent but represented it to be solvent; they further represented it was reinsured with Lloyds and that the policy was nonassessable; all of which was false but was relied upon by appellant. The third paragraph of the answer pleaded the assessment made by the New York court was void. The fourth paragraph pleaded the policy was issued in Kentucky and did not provide for an assessment, nor for a maximum contingent liability in conformity with Kentucky Statutes, Section 743a-14.
The court sustained a motion to strike these various pleas. Appellant refused to plead further and judgment was entered for appellee for $560.51 on a stipulation of facts covering the allegations of the petition.
The first question for determination is, what was the legal effect on appellant of the assessment by the New York court? The answer appears in an annotation in 48 A.L.R. 669:
A few of the cases supporting the rule are Pink v. Town Taxi Co., Me., 21 A. (2d) 656; Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, 191 Ga. 502, 13 S.E. (2d) 337, 137 A.L.R. 934; Great Western Telegraph Co. v. Purdy, 162 U.S. 329, 16 S. Ct. 810, 40 L. Ed. 986; Pink v. A.A. A. Highway Express, 62 S. Ct. 241, 86 L. Ed. . . . .
At the end the policy is signed by the president and by the secretary of the Company. On the back of the policy appear three headings: "What To Do and What Not To Do in Case of Accident"; "Notice To Policyholders"; "Safety Code Reminders." Under the first and third headings there appear eight separately numbered paragraphs, while under the second heading there are three such paragraphs. Under the first heading advice is given about rendering aid, taking names and addresses of witnesses, noting the nature of damage, not to run away from an accident, etc. Under the third heading the insured is reminded to see that his brakes are in good order, to be alert in driving, to obey traffic regulations, etc. The second heading "Notice To Policyholders" reads:
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