Furey v. Town of Gravesend

• Decision Date: 01 March 1887
• Citation: 10 N.E. 698,104 N.Y. 405
• Parties: FUREY and others v. TOWN OF GRAVESEND.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

104 N.Y. 405

10 N.E. 698

FUREY and others

v.TOWN OF GRAVESEND.¹

Court of Appeals of New York.

March 1, 1887.

Appeal from judgment of general term supreme court, Second department, reversing a judgment of the special term granting an injunction restraining defendant town from aliening certain lands. Defendant, with other evidence, introduced the record of a judgment in ejectment obtained by it against the plaintiff here for the premises which are the subject of this action, and which are situated upon Coney Island point.

Wm. C. Dewitt, for appellants.

Wm. J. Gaynor, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

We are of opinion that the complaint in this action shows no such interest in the lands which are the subject of the dispute as entitles the plaintiffs to the relief demanded, or the injunction awarded them by the trial court. The judgment rendered there awarded to the plaintiffs a perpetual injunction against the town from selling or conveying to one William Ziegler certain lands owned by it. No affirmative relief in respect to such lands was demanded in the complaint, or claimed on the trial, and the entire extent of the plaintiffs' claim was an absolute and arbitrary right to prevent the defendants forever from disposing of the lands in question except to the plaintiffs. There was no question made in the case but that the defendants are the owners in fee-simple of the lands in question, and entitled to its possession, nor claim made on the part of the plaintiffs that they are entitled to its use, enjoyment, or possession. The only foundation for the action rests upon the claim that the plaintiffs have an equitable demand against some one to be paid the value of certain erections formerly made by them upon the land in question, and which they omitted to remove therefrom when the term of their tenancy expired. The pleadings seemed to found this right upon the provisions of chapter 458 of the Laws of 1883, which, so far as they affect the controversy, are substantially as follows; ‘The care, management, and control of the common lands of Gravesend shall be vested in the supervisor of said town and five trustees,’ to be chosen as therein specified. It further provides ‘that such trustees shall not have power to sell or give title to any lands of the town of Gravesend, or to release or discharge any title or claim of said town thereto, excepting lots number 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, and Coney Island point, which premises are now in possession of lessees of said town.’ The act then proceeds to prescribe the manner in which the lands of said town, other than those excepted, may be disposed of by said town, and, as to the excepted lands, enacts as follows: ‘But the said supervisor and trustees shall have power, and are hereby authorized, to sell said lots Nos. 51 to 56, inclusive, of said common lands and Coney Island point, to the present lessees in possession of the same, provided such sales shall be ratified and confirmed by resolution duly passed at an annual town meeting, or at a special town meeting to be called for the purpose, such sale to be upon the same terms of payment orovided for sale of other lands of said town.’

In giving a construction to this act, courts are confined to the language and terms employed by the legislature, and are not at liberty to interpolate phrases and provisions, although otherwise the purpose and intention of the lawmaking power may seem indefinite, obscure, or incomplete. If they have failed to insert such provisions in the law as will accomplish the result intended, their omission cannot be remedied by construction, and the law must, to that extent, be considered defective and inoperative.

In so far as any duty is enjoined upon, or power and authority conferred by the act upon, the town commissioners, there does not seem to be any ambiguity in its provisions, but the particular object intended to be accomplished by the clauses quoted is left quite obscure and uncertain. Such commissioners are prohibited from selling or conveying any of the common lands of the town except those in question; and did the provision stop here a strong implication would arise that they had power, of their own volition, to sell these lands to whomsoever they should elect; but the act then proceeds to prescribe the manner in which, and the persons to whom, they are authorized to sell and convey. No limitation of time is imposed upon the prohibition, or the exercise of the powers or duties authorized and enjoined by the act; and, so far as its language is concerned, they...