Furgason v. Page (In re Walton's Estate)

• Citation: 238 N.W. 577,213 Iowa 104
• Decision Date: 27 October 1931
• Docket Number: No. 40976.,40976.
• Parties: IN RE WALTON'S ESTATE. FURGASON v. PAGE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

213 Iowa 104

238 N.W. 577

IN RE WALTON'S ESTATE.

FURGASON

v.PAGE.

No. 40976.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 27, 1931.

Appeal from District Court, Woodbury County; A. O. Wakefield, Judge.

Action on a claim to recover for the value of personal services alleged to have been rendered a decedent. The court directed a verdict in behalf of the executor, and the claimant appeals.

Reversed.O. D. Nickle and Cordelia B. Egan, both of Sioux City, for appellant.

Snyder & Sears, of Sioux City, for appellee.

FAVILLE, C. J.

The decedent, Mary M. Walton, died in the month of January, 1929. The appellee is the executor of her estate. On September 3, 1929, the claimant filed her claim in said estate in the sum of $1,500, which amount is alleged to be due the claimant “for personal services done and performed by said claimant for, on account of and in behalf of the said decedent, Mary M. Walton, at her special instance and request.” One hundred dollars of appellant's claim is for money advanced for food and other materials. The executor filed a general denial. The cause proceeded to trial, and at the close of the claimant's testimony the court directed a verdict in behalf of the executor, and the claimant has appealed from the judgment dismissing said claim.

[1][2][3] The first ground of said motion, and the one most relied upon by the appellee, is that the claimant alleges that the services were rendered “at the special instance and request of the decedent” and that there is no evidence of such request. Strictness of pleading is not required in matters of this kind involving a claim in probate. Wilson v. Else, 204 Iowa, 857, 216 N. W. 33. The pleading sufficiently stated a case in quantum meruit. There was no proof of any express oral or written contract in regard to the services claimed to have been rendered by the appellant, but it is a well-established rule of this court that, “where one person renders services for another which are known to and accepted by him, the law implies a promise on his part to pay therefor.” This rule was announced at an early date in the case of Scully v. Scully's Executor, 28 Iowa, 548, and has been frequently reiterated. See Shelton v. Johnson, 40 Iowa, 84;Cowan v. Musgrave, Ex'r, 73 Iowa, 384, 35 N. W. 496;In re Estate of Bishop, 130 Iowa, 250, 106 N. W. 637;Farmer v. Underwood, 164 Iowa, 587, 146 N. W. 18;In re Estate of Squire, 168 Iowa, 597, 150 N. W. 706;Snyder v. Nixon, 188 Iowa, 779, 176 N. W. 808;Hopkins v. Convy, 191 Iowa, 402, 182 N. W. 225;In re Kahl's Estate, 210 Iowa, 903, 232 N. W. 133. The evidence was sufficient to take the case to the jury on the question as to whether or not appellant rendered services to decedent with her knowledge and whether the same were accepted by the decedent, and the reasonable value of said services.

[4] The second ground of the motion for a directed verdict was that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Appellee does not seriously contend that this ground of the motion was well taken, and therefore we need not discuss it. It is obviously without merit. Another ground of the motion to direct a verdict was based upon the proposition that the presumption is that the services rendered were gratuitous. No such presumption prevails in this case. The undisputed evidence shows that the claimant and the decedent were not related and were not members of the same family, and therefore the...