Furman v. Georgia Jackson v. Georgia Branch v. Texas 8212 5003, 69 8212 5030, 69 8212 5031

• Decision Date: 29 June 1972
• Docket Number: Nos. 69,s. 69
• Citation: Furman v. Georgia Jackson v. Georgia Branch v. Texas 8212 5003, 69 8212 5030, 69 8212 5031, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972)
• Parties: William Henry FURMAN, Petitioner, v. State of GEORGIA. Lucious JACKSON, Jr., Petitioner, v. State of GEORGIA. Elmer BRANCH, Petitioner, v. State of TEXAS. —5003, 69—5030, 69—5031
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

408 U.S. 238

92 S.Ct. 2726

33 L.Ed.2d 346

William Henry FURMAN, Petitioner,

v State of GEORGIA.

Lucious JACKSON, Jr., Petitioner,

v. State of GEORGIA.

Elmer BRANCH, Petitioner,

v. State of TEXAS.

Nos. 69—5003, 69—5030, 69—5031.

Argued Jan. 17, 1972.

Decided June 29, 1972.

Anthony G. Amsterdam, Stanford, Cal., for petitioner Furman.

Jack Greenberg, New York City, for petitioner Jackson.

Melvyn Carson Bruder, Dallas, Tex., for petitioner Branch.

Dorothy T. Beasley, Atlanta, Ga., for respondent State of Georgia.

Charles Alan Wright, Austin, Tex., for respondent State of Texas.

Willard J. Lassers and Elmer Gertz, Chicago, Ill., for amici curiae.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner in No. 69—5003 was convicted of murder in Georgia and was sentenced to death pursuant to Ga.Code Ann. § 26—1005 (Supp.1971) (effective prior to July 1, 1969). 225 Ga. 253, 167 S.E.2d 628 (1969). Petitioner in No. 69—5030 was convicted of rape in Georgia and was sentenced to death pursuant to Ga.Code Ann. § 26—1302 (Supp.1971) (effective prior to July 1, 1969). 225 Ga. 790, 171 S.E.2d 501 (1969). Petitioner in No. 69—5031 was convicted of rape in Texas and was sentenced to death pursuant to Vernon's Tex.Penal Code, Art. 1189 (1961). 447 S.W.2d 932 (Ct.Crim.App.1969). Certiorari was granted limited to the following question: 'Does the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in (these cases) constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?' 403 U.S. 952, 91 S.Ct. 2287, 29 L.Ed.2d 863 (1971). The Court holds that the imposi- tion and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The judgment in each case is therefore reversed insofar as it leaves undisturbed the death sentence imposed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings. So ordered.

Judgment in each case reversed in part and cases remanded.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, Mr. Justice BRENNAN, Mr. Justice STEWART, Mr. Justice WHITE, and Mr. Justice MARSHALL have filed separate opinions in support of the judgments.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice BLACKMUN, Mr. Justice POWELL, and Mr. Justice REHNQUIST have filed separate dissenting opinions.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, concurring.

In these three cases the death penalty was imposed, one of them for murder, and two for rape. In each the determination of whether the penalty should be death or a lighter punishment was left by the State to the discretion of the judge or of the jury. In each of the three cases the trial was to a jury. They are here on petitions for certiorari which we granted limited to the question whether the imposition and execution of the death penalty constitute 'cruel and unusual punishment' within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment as applied to the States by the Fourteenth.¹ I vote to vacate each judgment, believing that the exaction of the death penalty does violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

That the requirements of due process ban cruel and unusual punishment is now settled. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463, and 473—474, 67 S.Ct. 374, 376, and 381, 91 L.Ed. 422 (Burton, J., dissenting); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 1420, 8 L.Ed.2d 758. It is also settled that the proscription of cruel and unusual punishments forbids the judicial imposition of them as well as their imposition by the legislature. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378—382, 30 S.Ct. 544, 553—555, 54 L.Ed. 793.

Congressman Bingham, in proposing the Fourteenth Amendment, maintained that 'the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States' as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment included protection against 'cruel and unusual punishments:'

'(M)any instances of State injustice and oppression have already occurred in the State legislation of this Union, of flagrant violations of the guarantied privileges of citizens of the United States, for which the national Government furnished and could furnish by law no remedy whatever. Contrary to the express letter of your Constitution, 'cruel and unusual punishments' have been inflicted under State laws within this Union upon citizens, not only for crimes committed, but for sacred duty done, for which and against which the Government of the United States had provided no remedy and could provide none.' Cong.Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2542.

Whether the privileges and immunities route is followed, or the due process route, the result is the same.

It has been assumed in our decisions that punishment by death is not cruel, unless the manner of execution can be said to be inhuman and barbarous. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447, 10 S.Ct. 930, 933, 34 L.Ed. 519. It is also said in our opinions that the proscription of cruel and unusual punishments 'is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.' Weems v. United States, supra, 217 U.S. at 378, 30 S.Ct., at 553. A like statement was made in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S.Ct. 590, 598, 2 L.Ed.2d 630, that the Eighth Amendment 'must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.'

The generality of a law inflicting capital punishment is one thing. What may be said of the validity of a law on the books and what may be done with the law in its application do, or may, lead to quite different conclusions.

It would seem to be incontestable that the death penalty inflicted on one defendant is 'unusual' if it discriminates against him by reason of his race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudices.

There is evidence that the provision of the English Bill of Rights of 1689, from which the language of the Eighth Amendment was taken, was concerned primarily with selective or irregular application of harsh penalties and that its aim was to forbid arbitrary and discriminatory penalties of a severe nature:²

'Following the Norman conquest of England in 1066, the old system of penalties, which ensured equality between crime and punishment, suddenly disappeared. By the time systematic judicial records were kept, its demise was almost complete. With the exception of certain grave crimes for which the punishment was death or outlawry, the arbitrary fine was replaced by a discretionary amercement. Although amercement's discretionary character allowed the circumstances of each case to be taken into account and the level of cash penalties to be decreased or increased accordingly, the amercement presented an opportunity for excessive or oppressive fines.

'The problem of excessive amercements became so prevalent that three chapters of the Magna Carta were devoted to their regulation. Maitland said of Chapter 14 that 'very likely there was no clause in the Magna Carta more grateful to the mass of the people.' Chapter 14 clearly stipulated as fundamental law a prohibition of excessiveness in punishments:

"A free man shall not be amerced for a trivial offense, except in accordance with the degree of the offence; and for a serious offence he shall be amerced according to its gravity, saving his livelihood; and a merchant likewise, saving his merchandise; in the same way a villein shall be amerced saving his wainage; if they fall into our mercy. And none of the aforesaid amercements shall be imposed except by the testimony of reputable men of the neighborhood."

The English Bill of Rights, enacted December 16, 1689, stated that 'excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.'³ These were the words chosen for our Eighth Amendment. A like provision had been in Virginia's Constitution of 1776 ⁴ and in the constitutions of seven other States.⁵ The Northwest Ordinance, enacted under the Articles of Confederation, included a prohibition cruel and unusual punishments.⁶ But the debates of the First Congress on the Bill of Rights throw little light on its intended meaning. All that appears is the following:⁷

'Mr. Smith, of South Carolina, objected to the words 'nor cruel and unusual punishments;' the import of them being too indefinite.

'Mr. Livermore: The clause seems to express a great deal of humanity, on which account I have no objection to it; but as it seems to have no meaning in it, I do not think it necessary. What is meant by the terms excessive bail? Who are to be the judges? What is understood by excessive fines? It lies with the court to determine. No cruel and unusual punishment is to be inflicted; it is sometimes necessary to hang a man, villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps having their ears cut off; but are we in future to be prevented from inflicting these punishments because they are cruel? If a more lenient mode of correcting vice and deterring others from the commission of it could be invented, it would be very prudent in the Legislature to adopt it; but until we have some security that this will be done, we ought not to be restrained from making necessary laws by any declaration of this kind.'

The words 'cruel and unusual' certainly include pen- alties that are barbaric. But the words, at least when read in light of the English proscription against selective and irregular use of penalties, suggest that it is 'cruel and unusual' to apply the death penalty—or any other penalty—selectively to minorities whose numbers are few, who are outcasts of society, and who are unpopular, but whom society is willing to see suffer though it would not countenance general application of the same penalty across the board.⁸ Judge Tuttle, indeed, made abundantly clear in Novak v. Beto, 5 Cir., 453 F.2d 661, 673—679 (CA5) (concurring in part and dissenting in part), that solitary confinement may at times be 'cruel and unusual' punishment. Cf. Ex parte Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 10 S.Ct....