Furtick v. SOUTH CAROLINA DPPPS, 25581.
Decision Date | 13 January 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 25581.,25581. |
Citation | 576 S.E.2d 146,352 S.C. 594 |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | James FURTICK, Respondent, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF PROBATION, PAROLE AND PARDON SERVICES, Appellant. |
Teresa A. Knox, Tommy Evans, Jr., and J. Benjamin Aplin, of South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services, all of Columbia, for appellant.
James Furtick, of Bennettsville, pro se.
The South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services ("DPPPS") argues that the circuit court erred in holding that the Administrative Law Judge Division ("ALJD") has jurisdiction to review the final decision of the DPPPS in this case.
Section 24-21-640 was in effect both in 1992, when Respondent committed the crimes, and in 1994, when Respondent was tried and convicted. Section 16-1-60 was enacted under the 1986 Omnibus Criminal Justice Improvements Act,1 and defines burglary in the second degree as a violent crime.2
The DPPPS classified Respondent as a violent offender based on a prior conviction for voluntary manslaughter.3 Respondent objected to the DPPPS's classification of him as a "violent offender," and ultimately appealed from the DPPPS's decision to the ALJD. The ALJD dismissed Respondent's appeal on grounds that the ALJD lacked jurisdiction to review an appeal from a final decision of the DPPPS. Respondent appealed, and the circuit court reversed and remanded, finding that the ALJD does have jurisdiction to review the final decision of the DPPPS in this case.
DPPPS raises the following issue on appeal:
Did the circuit court err in finding that the ALJD has jurisdiction to review the DPPPS's final decision that Respondent is not eligible for parole by operation of S.C.Code Ann. § 24-21-640?
LAW/ANALYSIS
Respondent argues that the ALJD has jurisdiction to hear his appeal from the decision made by the DPPPS that he is not parole eligible by operation of section 24-21-640. We agree.
338 S.C. 354, 369, 527 S.E.2d 742, 750 (1999). This Court recognized that not all of the SCDC's decisions were subject to review by the ALJD, and specifically declined to apply certain provisions of the APA to decisions made as part of the SCDC's internal disciplinary process. Id. The Court distinguished internal disciplinary decisions from the denial of sentence-related credits at issue in Al-Shabazz, however, on grounds that denial of good time credits affected a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Id. at 369-70, 527 S.E.2d at 750 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974)).
418 U.S. at 557, 94 S.Ct. at 2975, 41 L.Ed.2d at 951.
Like the inmate in Wolff, the inmate in Al-Shabazz protested the SCDC's reduction of good time credits he had accrued as a method of punishment. In Al-Shabazz, this Court found the inmate had a "protected liberty interest due to the potential loss of sentence-related credits" and, therefore, that he was entitled to review by the ALJD, and in turn, to review by the judicial branch. 338 S.C. at 382, 527 S.E.2d at 757.
In Al-Shabazz, the Court recognized that "[t]hese administrative matters typically arise in two ways: (1) when an inmate is disciplined and punishment is imposed and (2) when an inmate believes prison officials have erroneously calculated his sentence, sentence-related credits, or custody status." 338 S.C. at 369, 527 S.E.2d at 750. Respondent's case arises in the latter manner. He alleges that the DPPPS erroneously determined that he is not eligible for parole.
Under Wolff, to determine whether Respondent is entitled to review of the DPPPS's decision, the Court must decide whether Respondent has a liberty interest in gaining access to the parole board. In our opinion, the permanent denial of parole eligibility implicates a liberty interest sufficient to require at least minimal due process. Section 24-21-620 provides for review by the Board, "regardless of whether or not any application has been made therefore, for the purposes of determining whether or not such prisoner is entitled to any of the benefits provided for in this chapter." S.C.Code Ann. § 24-21-620 (Supp. 1992).4 Following DPPPS's determination that Respondent was ineligible for parole as a violent offender under section 24-21-640, Respondent then had the same right to review as the inmate in Al-Shabazz. In Al-Shabazz, the Court outlined the nature of the review available to inmates raising non-collateral issues that implicate liberty interests; those procedures apply equally to inmates affected by final decisions of the DPPPS that affect liberty interests, such as the decision in this case.
Although we believe Respondent was entitled to review of his claim by the ALJD, we will address the merits of his claim now for the sake of judicial economy. The issue Respondent raises is well-settled on the merits. As discussed, Respondent argues that he has been subjected to an ex post facto law because retroactively designating his 1968 manslaughter conviction a violent crime has enhanced his punishment for that crime. We disagree.
In Phillips v. State, under very similar factual circumstances, this Court held "[i]t is not a violation of the ex post facto clause for the legislature to enhance punishment for a later offense based on a prior conviction, even though the enhancement provision was not in effect at the time of the prior offense." 331 S.C. 482, 484, 504 S.E.2d 111, 112 (1998) (citing State v. Dabney, 301 S.C. 271, 391 S.E.2d 563 (1990)). In Phillips, the inmate's 1982 armed robbery conviction was used to deny him parole eligibility on his sentence for a 1987 burglary conviction even though armed robbery was not a violent crime until section 16-1-60 was enacted in 1986.5
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