Fusco v. Fusco
Decision Date | 25 November 2003 |
Docket Number | (SC 16945) |
Citation | 266 Conn. 649,835 A.2d 6 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | DONNA FUSCO v. JOSEPH P. FUSCO, JR. |
Sullivan, C. J., and Norcott, Katz, Palmer and Zarella, Js. Bernadette M. Keyes, for the appellant (defendant).
Glenn L. Formica, with whom, on the brief, was Daniel W. Adelman, for the appellee (plaintiff).
The defendant, Joseph P. Fusco, Jr., appeals1 from the ruling of the trial court dismissing his motion for modification of postmajority child support payments to the plaintiff, Donna Fusco. The defendant claims on appeal that the trial court improperly concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the defendant's motion.2 We reverse the judgment of the trial court. The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. The plaintiff and the defendant were divorced on January 28, 1986. At the time of the dissolution, the parties had one minor child, Donna Marie Fusco, who suffered from chemical sensitivities. The parties agreed by stipulation that This stipulation was incorporated into the judgment of dissolution.
On December 2, 1992, the trial court modified the order of child support upward from $40 to $200 per week to bring the amount closer to that recommended by the child support guidelines. On August 1, 1997, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to open the judgment and to modify downward the awards of child support, alimony and educational expenses. The daughter reached the age of majority on December 16, 1997. On October 19, 2001, the defendant filed a motion for modification of child support due to a substantial change in his circumstances. The parties agreed that the motion would be decided on the briefs alone. On February 13, 2002, the court concluded pursuant to Miner v. Miner, 48 Conn. App. 409, 709 A.2d 605 (1998), that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the modification motion in the absence of a written agreement giving it power to modify the original postmajority child support order. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the defendant's motion. The defendant appeals from the ruling of the trial court.
The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to modify the postmajority support order. Although the parties have focused exclusively on the question of the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction, we conclude that this matter is not truly jurisdictional in nature, but involves the trial court's authority to act. We further conclude that the trial court had the authority to act on the defendant's motion.
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Amodio v. Amodio, 247 Conn. 724, 727-28, 724 A.2d 1084 (1999). (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 728.
The difference between a court's authority to act and its subject matter jurisdiction in cases involving the modification of postmajority child support was considered by the Appellate Court in O'Bryan v. O'Bryan, 67 Conn. App. 51, 787 A.2d 15 (2001), aff'd, 262 Conn. 355, 813 A.2d 1001 (2003) (per curiam). In O'Bryan, the parties' separation agreement, incorporated into the judgment of dissolution, provided that the plaintiff would pay child support until the end of 2006, when the parties' minor children would be twenty-seven and twenty-one years of age, respectively. Id., 52. In 1999, the plaintiff filed a motion to modify his child support payments, seeking to direct a portion of the support payments directly to the older child, who was then twenty years of age and living independently. Id., 53. The defendant responded by filing a motion to modify the child support as well, seeking to have the payments increased due to the plaintiff's increase in income. Id. The court granted both motions. Id. The defendant appealed and argued that the court could not modify the award of child support without a written agreement between the parties allowing for modification. Id.
The Appellate Court, at the outset of its analysis, noted the distinction between a trial court's jurisdiction and its authority to act under a particular statute recognized by this court in Amodio. It concluded that General Statutes § 46b-1,3 which provides the Superior Court with plenary and general subject matter jurisdiction over legal disputes in family relations matters, and General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 46b-66,4 which provides the court with jurisdiction to incorporate a separation agreement into its order or decree, provide the trial court with subject matter jurisdiction over motions for postmajority child support modification. O'Bryan v. O'Bryan, supra, 67 Conn. App. 54. The court then considered whether the trial court had the authority to grant the motions for modification of postmajority child support, considering the limitations put on such modifications by § 46b-66. Id., 54-56. It stated that O'Bryan v. O'Bryan, supra, 54-55.
Consistent with the reasoning of O'Bryan, we conclude that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's motion for modification of postmajority support, and we focus our analysis on whether the court had the authority to act on the motion pursuant to § 46b-66. The trial court declined to hear the defendant's motion because it found no evidence of a written agreement allowing the court to modify the postmajority child support. A close examination of the parties' stipulation convinces us otherwise.
The stipulation of the parties was incorporated by reference into the divorce decree. "A judgment rendered in accordance with such a stipulation is to be regarded and construed as a contract." Barnard v. Barnard, 214 Conn. 99, 109, 570 A.2d 690 (1990). (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Niehaus v. Cowles Business Media, Inc., 263 Conn. 178, 188-89, 819 A.2d 765 (2003).
"Contract language is unambiguous when it has a definite and precise meaning . . . concerning which there is no reasonable basis for a difference of opinion. . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Levine v. Advest, Inc., 244 Conn. 732, 746, 714 A.2d 649 (1998). "[T]he mere fact that the parties advance different interpretations of the language in question does not necessitate a conclusion that the language is ambiguous." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United Illuminating Co. v. Wisvest-Connecticut, LLC, 259 Conn. 665, 670, 791 A.2d 546 (2002).
In the present case, the stipulation unambiguously provided that the weekly child support payment could be modified. Specifically, it provided that "this agreement will not preclude the plaintiff from returning to court to seek an increase in the weekly child support order . . . ." When the trial court relies solely on the written agreement in ascertaining the intent of the parties and the language of the agreement is clear and unambiguous, the court's determination of what the parties intended by their contractual commitments is a question of law over which our review is plenary. Issler v. Issler, 250 Conn. 226, 236, 737 A.2d 383 (1999). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court...
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