Fuston v. State, 2D00-951.

Decision Date19 July 2000
Docket NumberNo. 2D00-951.,2D00-951.
Citation764 So.2d 779
PartiesCharles B. FUSTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

PER CURIAM.

Charles B. Fuston appeals the summary denial of his motion to correct illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Fuston contends that his sentence as a habitual violent felony offender to thirty years in prison for burglary of an occupied structure is illegal because the trial court entered a departure sentence without giving written reasons. He contends that his sentence exceeds the sentencing guidelines for the offense and the statutory maximum.

The trial court denied Fuston's motion as being successive of a prior motion filed by Fuston pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, which the court addressed on its merits and denied. The trial court attached a portion of the prior motion, the memorandum in support of the motion, and the order denying the motion.

As Fuston correctly points out in his initial brief, there is no proscription against filing successive rule 3.800(a) motions. See Burnsed v. State, 761 So.2d 1139 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)

. However, a defendant is not entitled to successive review on a rule 3.800(a) motion of a specific issue which has already been decided against him. See Price v. State, 692 So.2d 971 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). Nevertheless, Fuston is correct that his prior rule 3.850 motion makes no mention that the trial court failed to provide written reasons for imposing a departure sentence. The issue raised in Fuston's rule 3.800 motion therefore technically is not the "specific issue" raised in his rule 3.850 motion. The trial court accordingly erred in denying his rule 3.800 motion as being successive.

This normally would require reversal. However, in the interest of judicial economy, we affirm because Fuston's underlying claim is without substantive merit. See Burnsed. Fuston was sentenced as a habitual violent felony offender in 1993. In 1988, the habitual offender statute was amended to exempt it from the guidelines. See Strickland v. State, 596 So.2d 1155, 1156 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)

; see also § 775.084(4)(e) ("A sentence imposed under this section is not subject to s. 921.001."). Hence, the fact that Fuston's habitual offender sentence exceeds the guidelines and the trial court gave no written reasons for that does not render his sentence illegal.

Moreover, in Davis v. State, 661 So.2d 1193 (Fla.1995), the supreme court concluded that a departure sentence without written reasons, but within the maximum period provided by law for the offense, does not amount to an "illegal" sentence as defined by rule 3.800(a). Subsequently, in State v. Mancino, 714 So.2d 429, 433 (Fla. 1998), the supreme court explained that an illegal sentence is not only one which exceeds the statutory maximum, but is also...

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16 cases
  • Downs v. State, Case No. 2D19-2323
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • June 17, 2020
    ...a claim as successive unless it was the specific issue raised by the prior motion and denied on the merits." (citing Fuston v. State, 764 So. 2d 779, 780 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) )).Affirmed. CASANUEVA and MORRIS, JJ., ...
  • Shaw v. State, 2D00-2955.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • January 31, 2001
    ...rule 3.850, a defendant is not entitled to successive review of a specific issue that has already been decided. See Fuston v. State, 764 So.2d 779, 779 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Price v. State, 692 So.2d 971, 971 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Burns v. State, 637 So.2d 937, 937 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). However, ......
  • Garcia v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • September 7, 2011
    ...of a specific issue that already has been decided on the merits. See State v. McBride, 848 So.2d 287, 291 (Fla.2003); Fuston v. State, 764 So.2d 779 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Although Garcia raised his claim of illegal mandatory minimum stacking in a previous postconviction motion, the claim was ......
  • Williams v. State, Case No. 2D17–1979
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • April 20, 2018
    ...a claim as successive unless it was the specific issue raised by the prior motion and denied on the merits. See Fuston v. State, 764 So.2d 779, 780 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). If a court does dismiss a claim as successive, "a copy of that portion of the files and records necessary to support the co......
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