A. G. Crunkleton Elec. Co. v. Barkdoll

• Decision Date: 23 January 1962
• Docket Number: No. 125,125
• Citation: 177 A.2d 252,227 Md. 364
• Parties: A. G. CRUNKLETON ELECTRIC CO., Inc., Employer, and U. S. F. & G. Co., Insurer, v. Albert L. BARKDOLL.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 364

227 Md. 364

177 A.2d 252

A. G. CRUNKLETON ELECTRIC CO., Inc., Employer, and U. S. F.

& G. Co., Insurer, v. Albert L. BARKDOLL.

No. 125.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Jan. 23, 1962.

Evan Crossley (Crossley & Latimer, Hagerstown, on the brief), for appellant.

William J. Dwyer, Hagerstown, for appellee.

Before HAMMOND, HORNEY, MARBURY and SYBERT, JJ., and O. BOWIE DUCKETT, Special Judge.

MARBURY, Judge.

Albert L. Barkdoll, claimant and appellee, was employed by the appellant, A. G. Crunkleton Electric Company, Inc. On November 26, 1951, Barkdoll, during the course of his employment, sustained fourth and fifth degree burns on both arms and as a result of these injuries had to undergo a bilateral amputation. Each arm was amputated about four inches below the shoulder.

He was hospitalized for a long period of time following this accident, both for treatment and attempted rehabilitation. For approximately two years after the accident he was furnished with nursing services. By way of workmen's compensation the employer-insurer, U. S. F. & G. Co., the other appellant, paid him the maximum benefits allowable under the existing statutes for both temporary total disability and permanent total disability. As soon as his arms were sufficiently healed he was furnished with artificial arms. Due to the shortness of the stumps he is unable to use these very effectively. The record discloses that he can remove his clothes, but he can not dress himself. He must have help in going to the toilet. He can only write by holding a pencil in his teeth, and can not use a cradle-type telephone, but he has found an old style telephone which he can operate. He has learned to type fairly well. Using his artificial arms he can drive a tractor but he must have someone to start it; if any difficulty develops he can not make any repairs or service the machine. When he is at the table he can use his claw to lift food to his mouth that adheres to a fork, but anything else must be fed to him.

Barkdoll has been fitted with the latest models of artificial arms available, but with only minimum success, whereupon a specialist recommended that he undergo a cyineplasty procedure. This consisted of a graft on his right chest over the pectoral muscle, which formed a tunnel. A cable ran from the tunnel to an artificial arm, and it was hoped that by the use of the pectoral muscle he could have better control and use of the claw. This method did not improve the use of the artificial limb. This tunnel must be cleaned every day to avoid infection, and he is unable to do this.

The appellee at present is living in a small house on a tract of land, about ten acres, with his wife and two children. His mother-in-law lives nearby, and assists his wife in taking care of him. The amount he earns with the tractor appears to be nominal. He receives an annual allowance from the Veterans' Administration of $2,700 for a non-service connected disability.

The Workmen's Compensation Commission entered an award for the appellee, directing the employer and insurer (appellants), to furnish the appellee necessary nursing service beginning as of June 23, 1960. Appellants then appealed to the Circuit Court for Washington County, which affirmed the award of the Commission. From the order of that court the appellants bring this appeal.

The appellants present three questions for our determination:

1. Did the Code (1951), Article 101, Section 36(a) authorize the Workmen's Compensation Commission to award medical and nursing service beyond the period of compensation paid for disability?

2. Is a wife entitled to receive compensation for nursing services performed for her husband?

3. Was the lower court in error in its finding that the disability of the appellee was such as to justify an award for nursing attendance?

We will proceed to discuss each question in the order set forth above.

Code (1951), Article 101, Section 36(a), applicable to the present case, provides as follows:

'In addition to the compensation provided for herein the employer shall promptly provide for an injured employee such medical, surgical or other attendance or treatment, nurse and hospital services, medicines, crutches, apparatus, artificial hands, arms, feet and legs as may be required by the Commission.'

It is clear from the above that the liability of the employer to furnish free nursing services and treatment is not subject to a period of limitation. The section, we think, empowers the Commission to order nursing care beyond the obligatory period of compensation and in addition to other benefits provided in the Workmen's Compensation Law if the circumstances merit such additional financial aid. In order to sustain the appellants' contention to the contrary, we would have to rewrite the statute so as to provide for a limitation which is not contained therein.

In 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 61.11 the author states that an integral and important part of the benefit scheme of all compensation acts is the provision of hospital and medical benefits. A tabulation of those states which provide for benefits, shows that a great majority of the states provide full benefits. Moreover, in a table contained in his work, Professor Larson categorizes Maryland as one of those states providing full benefits.

In support of their position appellants cite Meuse's Case, 270 Mass. 29, 169 N.E. 517; Simpson's Case, 144 Me. 162, 66 A.2d 417; Bedard v. Public Service Company, 102 N.H. 349, 156 A.2d 772. It is manifest that these decisions must be read in the light of the particular statute in each state. An examination of these cases indicates that the legislature of those states intended a specific limit on these benefits, and while a certain amount of discretion was vested in the commission, this discretionary power must not exceed the realm of the legislative intent. Here, in Maryland, no reference whatsoever as to time or amount limitations is provided in the statute.

The same argument urged upon us by the appellants was specifically rejected in the recent case of Downs v. Miller, 224 Ark. 35, 271 S.W.2d 623, where that court ruled that if its workmen's compensation commission did not have authority to pass an award for medical service after the period for the payment of compensation had expired, its legislature would have so provided. See also 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 272, p. 927; Lahti v. Fosterling,357 Mich. 578, 99 N.W.2d 490.

Appellants also contend that the recent amendment to Code (1957), Article 101, Section 37(a) (formerly Code (1951), Article 101, Section 36(a)) by Chapter 32 of the Acts of 1960, by inserting the words: 'for such period as the nature of the injury may require,' indicates a legislative recognition of the fact that it had not previously provided for a period of medical or nursing services that would extend beyond the period for permanent partial or permanent total disability compensation. The Report of the Legislative Council to the General Assembly of 1960, p. 191, says the amendment was to clarify a doubt as to the length of the period for which care could be required.

The title of the Act says it is an act 'to change the period of time for furnishing of medical care.'

This, it is argued, shows legislative recognition that the Act prior to its amendment did not provide for indefinite medical and nursing care. A subsequent legislative construction of the meaning of a prior statute is not binding or controlling on the Court, Marburg v. Mercantile Trust Co., 154 Md. 438, 140 A. 836; Gibson v. State, 204 Md. 423, 104 A.2d 800. City of Annapolis v. Arundeland, Inc., 205 Md. 170, 177, 106 A.2d 493; Congressional School v. Roads Comm., 218 Md. 236, 146 A.2d 558. Appellee's rights stem from the Act as it stood in 1951 when he was injured and as we read that Act it permits the order the Commission passed.

We, therefore, hold that the Workmen's Compensation Commission acted within its authority under the applicable law when it ordered payment for nursing services required by the appellee after the period of permanent total disability compensation and that this is in accord with the general purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Law of Maryland.

Appellants' next contention is that the appellee's wife is not entitled to receive compensation for nursing services performed for her husband. This...