Bedard v. Public Service Co. of N.H.

• Decision Date: 31 December 1959
• Parties: Raynold BEDARD v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF N. H. et al.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 772

156 A.2d 772

102 N.H. 349

Raynold BEDARD v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF N. H. et al.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Submitted Dec. 2, 1959.

Decided Dec. 31, 1959.

Fisher, Parsons & Moran, Doner, for plaintiff.

Sulloway, Hollis, Godfrey & Soden, Concord, for defendant Public Service Company of New Hampshire.

BLANDIN, Justice.

The question presented is whether the plaintiff, upon showing continued disability, is entitled to further medical and hospital benefits extending beyond a three hundred-week period, under Laws 1947, c. 266, § 19, (now RSA 281:21), which, as the parties agree, was in force at the time of the accident and therefore is controlling. Opinion of the Justices, 99 N.H. 509, 510, 112 A.2d 48, and authorities cited.

Section 19, after providing for medical and hospital services to be furnished the employee by the employer for a period of ninety days, goes on to state: 'Such ninety day period may be extended from time to time at the discretion of the commissioner of labor upon written request of the injured employee to the commissioner of labor and after the employer has been given an opportunity to file objections thereto and to be heard thereon * * *. Such aid shall not be considered under the provisions of sections 20 to 24.'

Section 28 (now RSA 281:30) in force together with § 19 supra under the heading 'Maximum Benefits,' provides, so far as is applicable here, that in no case 'shall any payments extend over a period of * * * three hundred weeks from the date of the injury.' It is the plaintiff's contention that because no time limit is put upon the right of the Commissioner of Labor, within his discretion, to extend the period for payments, under § 19, supra, he may, in a proper case, order them to continue so long as the employee's disability lasts. The question is one of legislative intent to be determined not by considering certain sections in isolation, but by viewing the whole act, its history and purpose.

From the time the legislation was first passed in 1911 (Laws 1911, c. 163) up to the present, the policy has been to liberalize all benefits under the Law, including compensation as well as medical, hospital and remedial care, but also to set fixed limits upon such recovery, both as to time and amount.

In Laws 1947, c. 266, § 19, supra, under the heading of 'Medical, Hospital Care etc.,' for the first time appeared the clause which permitted the Commissioner of Labor to extend the time for remedial care in special cases beyond the ninety-day limit. By Laws 1955, c. 98, § 9 (now RSA 281:30), under the heading 'Maximum Benefits, Limitation of,' after setting limits to the amount of compensation payable, the section concluded as follows: 'Nor shall any payments, including medical, hospital services, and other remedical care under section 19, extend over a period of more than three hundred and forty-one weeks from the date of the injury.'

The plaintiff argues that the insertion of the time limit here further supports his claim that no time limit existed before under c. 266, § 19, supra. In short, his position is that while throughout the history of the law the legislative policy had been to set definite limits as to time and amount upon the benefits recoverable, this policy was abandoned in 1947 as to the period during which medical and hospital care were to be furnished and then re-adopted in 1955. He would ascribe to the Legislature in 1947 a more liberal attitude as to the time limit during which benefits might be paid than in 1955, in spite of the enormously increased cost of hospital and medical services.

We believe this position cannot be maintained, as it is inconsistent with the history and policies of the law and the tenor of our previous holdings. In Carbonneau v. United States Casualty Company, 97 N.H. 438, at page 441, 91 A.2d 449, at page 451, decided under c. 266, § 19, supra, we stated: 'It is well settled that our compensation act is intended primarily to afford limited compensation, Mulhall v....