G.F. v. St. Catherine Hosp., Inc.

Decision Date06 May 2019
Docket NumberCourt of Appeals Case No. 18A-PL-2460
Parties G.F., Appellant-Plaintiff, v. ST. CATHERINE HOSPITAL, INC., Vatsal K. Patel, D.O., and Indiana Patient's Compensation Fund, Appellees-Defendants.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Attorney for Appellant: Neal F. Eggeson, Jr., Fishers, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellees: A. Richard M. Blaiklock, Wade D. Fulford, Lewis Wagner, LLP, Indianapolis, Indiana, Michael A. Sarafin, Johnson & Bell, P.C., Crown Point, Indiana, Sharon L. Stanzione, Alan M. Kus, Johnson & Bell, P.C., Crown Point, Indiana

Riley, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Plaintiff, G.F., and Appellee/Cross-Appellant-Defendant, the Indiana Patient's Compensation Fund (the Fund), appeal the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Appellees-Defendants, St. Catherine Hospital, Inc. (St. Catherine), and Vatsal K. Patel, D.O. (Dr. Patel), concluding that, as a matter of law, the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act (MMA) applies to G.F.'s claim against Dr. Patel.

[2] We reverse and remand.

ISSUES

[3] G.F. and the Fund, in separate briefs, present this court with three issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as:

(1) Whether the trial court erred by allowing St. Catherine and Dr. Patel to file a response to G.F.'s motion for summary judgment outside the time period specified in Indiana Trial Rule 56 ; and
(2) Whether the MMA applies to claims involving negligent dissemination of protected health information.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] On June 5, 2015, G.F. received in-patient treatment at St. Catherine for pneumonia-related symptoms. While G.F. was being visited by a co-worker, Dr. Patel entered the room. With the co-worker in the room, Dr. Patel informed G.F. that his "CD4 count is low ... you need to see your infectious disease doctor as soon as you can!" (Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 12). Because G.F.'s visitor had a prior family experience with HIV, she immediately understood the implication of Dr. Patel's communication to G.F. As soon as Dr. Patel exited the room, G.F.'s co-worker voiced her understanding of Dr. Patel's statement: as her step-brother had died from HIV/AIDS, she recognized the inferences of discussing CD4 counts with an infectious disease doctor. Four days later, Dr. Patel phoned G.F. to apologize for what he said in front of G.F.'s co-worker. Dr. Patel had assumed the co-worker was G.F.'s fiancée.

[5] As a result of what she learned on June 5, 2015, G.F.'s co-worker has severed all ties with G.F. Though G.F. and his co-worker had been good friends prior to this incident, she now no longer calls or visits G.F., she does not return G.F.'s calls, and she even refuses to acknowledge his existence at work. Suggesting that the word is out at his workplace, G.F. observed that other co-workers now "change their path when they see [G.F.] heading in their directions." (Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 38).

[6] On August 20, 2015, G.F. filed his Proposed Complaint for medical malpractice against St. Catherine and Dr. Patel with the Indiana Department of Insurance [IDOI], in its capacity of the Fund. Five months later, on January 21, 2016, G.F. filed an anonymous Complaint for damages against St. Catherine and Dr. Patel with the Lake County Circuit Court. On March 4, 2016, St. Catherine and Dr. Patel moved to dismiss the Lake County action for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. On April 27, 2016, the Lake County Circuit Court denied the motion to dismiss.

[7] On October 19, 2017, the medical review panel rendered a split decision. The panel found no breach of standard of care in favor of St. Catherine. As to Dr. Patel, the panel concluded that G.F.'s allegations hinged upon "a material issue of fact not requiring expert opinion, bearing on liability for consideration by the court or jury." (Appellant's App. Vol. II, pp. 71-73).

[8] On January 6, 2018, G.F. initiated an action for declaratory judgment against St. Catherine, Dr. Patel, and the Fund in Marion County Superior Court, seeking a declaration of law that his claims fell outside the ambit of the MMA. On March 10, 2018, G.F. moved for summary judgment on his declaratory judgment claims, and the Fund joined in the motion on June 1, 2018. St. Catherine and Dr. Patel failed to respond to G.F.'s motion for summary judgment within the time allotted by Indiana Trial Rule 56(C) ; St. Catherine and Dr. Patel sought leave to respond on April 15, 2018. On April 17, 2018, the trial court permitted the filing of a belated response.

[9] On October 3, 2018, following a hearing, the trial court issued its findings of fact and conclusions thereon, denying G.F.'s motion for declaratory judgment and concluding in pertinent part that:

[G.F.'s] claim involves health care that was provided by a physician, working in his professional capacity as a provider of medical services, to a patient, within the confines of a hospital, in furtherance and promotion of [G.F.'s] health. Further, the [c]ourt finds that [G.F.] willfully and voluntarily subjected his claim to the requirements and restrictions outlined within the MMA, proceeded through the entirety of the medical review panel process, and obtained a medical review panel opinion in accordance with the MMA. Thus, because [G.F.] has willingly and voluntarily subjected himself to the MMA the [c]ourt thereby rejects his contention that his claim is not governed by the MMA, finds that it is one of medical malpractice, governed by the requirements and restrictions of the MMA, and thereby DENIES [G.F.'s] [m]otion for [s]ummary [j]udgment in its entirety.

[10] G.F. now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Standard of Review

[11] In reviewing a trial court's ruling on summary judgment, this court stands in the shoes of the trial court, applying the same standards in deciding whether to affirm or reverse summary judgment. First Farmers Bank & Trust Co. v. Whorley , 891 N.E.2d 604, 607 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied . Thus, on appeal, we must determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the trial court has correctly applied the law. Id. at 607-08. In doing so, we consider all of the designated evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 608. A fact is ‘material’ for summary judgment purposes if it helps to prove or disprove an essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action; a factual issue is ‘genuine’ if the trier of fact is required to resolve an opposing party's different version of the underlying facts.

Ind. Farmers Mut. Ins. Group v. Blaskie , 727 N.E.2d 13, 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). The party appealing the grant of summary judgment has the burden of persuading this court that the trial court's ruling was improper. First Farmers Bank & Trust Co. , 891 N.E.2d at 607.

[12] We observe that, in the present case, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law thereon in support of its judgment. Generally, special findings are not required in summary judgment proceedings and are not binding on appeal. AutoXchange.com. Inc. v. Dreyer and Reinbold, Inc. , 816 N.E.2d 40, 48 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). However, such findings offer a court valuable insight into the trial court's rationale and facilitate appellate review. Id.

[13] In analyzing a motion for summary judgment, a court may consider only properly designated evidence. Indiana Trial Rule 56(C) requires each party to a summary judgment motion to designate to the court all parts of pleadings, designations, and other matters on which it relies for purposes of the motion. Because G.F. and the Fund dispute the timeliness of St. Catherine's and Dr. Patel's response to G.F.'s motion for summary judgment, we must first resolve this procedural threshold issue and determine what designated evidence is properly before us prior to turning to the merits of the case.

II. Indiana Trial Rule 56

[14] As an initial matter, G.F. contends that the trial court erred in allowing St. Catherine and Dr. Patel to file a belated response to his motion for summary judgment. Trial Rule 56 states, in pertinent part:

(C) The motion and any supporting affidavits shall be served in accordance with the provisions of Rule 5. An adverse party shall have thirty (30) days after service of the motion to serve a response and any opposing affidavits ...
* * * *
(F) Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance or permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
* * * *
(I) For cause found, the [c]ourt may alter any time limit set forth in this rule upon motion made within the applicable time limit.

In HomEq Servicing Corp. v. Baker , 883 N.E.2d 95, 98-99 (Ind. 2008) (quoting Borsuk v. Town of St. John , 820 N.E.2d 118, 124 n. 5 (Ind. 2005) ), our supreme court clarified the time limits of T.R. 56 and declared that "[w]hen a nonmoving party fails to respond to a motion for summary judgment within 30 days by either filing a response, requesting a continuance under T.R. 56(I), or filing an affidavit under T.R. 56(F), the trial court cannot consider summary judgment filings of that party subsequent to the 30-day period." This is "a bright-line rule ... which precludes the late filing of responses in opposition to a motion for summary judgment." Mitchell v. 10th & The Bypass, LLC , 3 N.E.3d 967, 972 (Ind. 2014). "Now firmly entrenched as an article of faith in Indiana law, this bright-line rule provides clarity and certainty to an area of the law that for too long lacked both." Id.

[15] G.F. filed his motion for summary judgment on March 10, 2018. Accordingly, St. Catherine and Dr. Patel's response or request for additional time was due no later than April 9, 2018. It was not until April 15, 2018, that St....

To continue reading

Request your trial
12 cases
  • Duvall v. Heart of CarDon, LLC
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana
    • March 17, 2020
    ... ... CarDon & Associates, Inc. is the CarDon entity that provides management and administrative support, ... Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Steele , 766 N.E.2d 699, 704 (Ind. 2002) ... Ct. App. 2019) (Worker's Compensation Act); G.F. v. St. Catherine Hosp., Inc. , 124 N.E.3d 76, 84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (Medical Malpractice ... ...
  • Mercado v. Columbus Reg'l Hosp.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana
    • November 28, 2022
    ...substance of a claim, not the manner in which the conduct is framed in a pleading by the claimant." G.F. v. St. Catherine Hosp., Inc., 124 N.E.3d 76, 85 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019). "A medical malpractice claim under the [IMMA] exists only when the substance of the claim involves a causal connection......
  • Cutchin v. Ind. Dep't of Ins.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana
    • March 9, 2020
    ... ... Quotesmith.Com, Inc. , 476 F.3d 487, 48990 (7th Cir. 2007). In ruling on a motion for summary ... Knox County Hosp. , 900 F. Supp. 1065, 1072 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (citations omitted). "In much ... G.F. v. St. Catherine Hosp., Inc. , 124 N.E.3d 76, 84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (internal citations ... ...
  • Cmty. Health Network, Inc. v. McKenzie
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • April 13, 2022
    ... ... See, e.g. , G.F. v. St. Catherine Hosp., Inc. , 124 N.E.3d 76, 84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. 185 N.E.3d 376 The MMA ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT